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uomo d'ingegno mirabile e rarissimo, 
ma senza virtù e senza religione. 
Ferdinando Galiani,  
Della Moneta  
(Naples, 1750), pp. 329–30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Law I have always felt is in a class by himself. He worked out the 
economics of his projects with a brilliance and, yes, profundity, which 
places him in the front ranks of monetary theorists of all time 
Joseph Schumpeter 
A History of Economic Analysis  
(London, 1954), p. 295. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
John Law, le fils ainé de Satan 
Mémoires de la Regence,  
De Piossens, 1730 
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Introduction 
 
Walking in Rue de Quinquempoix, a small street near Place Vendome in Paris, in the fall of 
1719 would not have been that bewildered for a modern stockjobber: shares of the so-called 
Mississippi Company were traded there, open air, with a frenzy and volumes exchanged 
comparable to the ones of an average day in a contemporary stock market. The company was 
basically controlling all the French economy: it had the monopoly of the trade with overseas 
colonies, it ran the tobacco industry, it collected all types of taxes and it owned almost the entire 
French sovereign debt. Every citizen was involved in this stock trading, but the will of 
possessing a share was driven mainly by speculation motives rather than by a rational decision of 
investment in company’s equity. In fact, supply and demand were constantly shaken by 
anonymous whispers on the expected revenues from Louisiana or on the future tax returns, but a 
widespread expectation throughout the market of a rise in price made the second always higher 
than the first. Exchanges were not limited at the simple buying and selling of common shares, 
but future contracts and call options were traded as well. Finally, the transactions were carried on 
using banknotes, issued by the de facto French central bank, which were not redeemable for 
precious metals but were backed by the economic activity of the country, i.e. were fiat money. 
The market was further stimulated by the central bank lending money at margin at a low interest 
rate, accepting shares as collateral. France’s economy was experiencing a modern management. 
The facts described above passed into the annals of history and into the economic literature as 
the Mississippi Bubble, one of the first irrational, exuberant and devastating manifestations of 
financial markets. However, leaving aside for a moment the concept of bubble, a scrupulous 
reader would have noticed that the imperfect understanding of economic notions present in 
Europe at that time does not support some elements of the system explained above. How concept 
as futures, options, centrality of credit and fiat money can be present in France of the beginning 
of 18th century, a country overwhelmed by the debt contracted during the wars conducted by 
King Sun, and the European country that will delay the most in adopting paper money? As we 
will see, the first is the main cause of the development of this system, while the second is the 
effect of its burst. However, the answer to the above question is simple: John Law de Lauriston, 
a Scottish that developed interests in economics and found a way to implement his anachronistic 
ideas in France. This work is mainly about him, about his economic theories and their role in the 
history of economist thought, about his economic policies and their surprizing modernity. 
John Law is a singular character to study. Not so many people have had such a various range of 
comments from their contemporaries and posterity. Most of the economists that lived after him 
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do not even consider his theories, but few of them consider him one of the foremost monetary 
economists Europe ever had. This character inspired hundreds of pieces of prose and drama that 
defined him alternatively as a fool, a gambler, a thief, a swindler or a visionary. When he was 
alive, for a certain period people venerated him as a god and everybody was willing to wait 
hours just for seeing him; in couple of years, he was the most hated person in Europe. Such a 
different range of emotions, and the drastic change in them, can be possible only if money is 
involved; and money, as we will see, is the pivotal element both of Law’s life and of this work.  
John Law de Lauriston exhibit his singularity since the early stage of his biography: a good 
student with an innate interest in public policy and an incredible talent for mathematics, leaves 
his country for London, where he applies his computational skills to win huge sums at the 
gaming tables and his beauty and savoir faire to seduce women. Here is convicted to murder, 
after a duel where he kills another dandy, but manages to escape from prison showing since the 
early stages of his life the ability to connect to the most influential personalities of the societies 
he lived in. It is after this incident that he starts to travel across Europe and to cultivate his 
interest in public finances and policies, in particular regarding money matters.  
Confident about his ideas and convinced that no one before him had fully understood the very 
nature of money and therefore the role it had to have within an economy to make it prosper, he 
made the goal of his life to persuade the government of a State about the soundness of his 
proposal and to let him implement his ideas. The first two governments to be addressed are 
England, in 1704, and Scotland, in 1705; in both cases he supported his proposals with two big 
treaties on economics, but the ideas proposed were considered too revolutionary and he was let 
down. From 1706 he starts to travel again, especially in Italy and Holland where he could gain 
new insights on the functioning of banking system and paper money. After a proposal made in 
Turin 1711 he understands, even thank to Amadeus of Savoie who had just turned him down, 
that France was the country where he would have had to propose his design. 
The economic situation at the beginning of 18th century in Europe was not florid. Several wars 
in the end on 17th century, and some others still active, were draining public finances almost 
everywhere. However, not all countries were in the same situation, mainly because of the way 
public finances were managed. In fact, the developing of a new social class, the merchants, and 
the new role of trade were clearly indicating that the current financial systems needed some 
changes. Payments were too slow, precious metals were scarce and no form of credit was 
present. Countries as Holland and England, mainly driven respectively by merchants and 
goldsmiths, had already started the innovation process as the creation of the Bank of Amsterdam 
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and the Bank of England shows. In Italy, small reigns as Savoie, Genoa and Venice were at the 
forefront of banking innovation. 
Law’s ideas were revolutionary, but in those countries a process of innovation had already 
started and there was not the need of something even more drastic. There was one country for 
which this was not true: France. France, which at the beginning of 18th century was still under 
King XIV absolute power, was in desperate economic conditions, overwhelmed by the public 
debt created to sustain the several wars King Sun undertook. Specie were the only instrument to 
conduct transactions, and their scarcity within French boundaries resulted in constant changes in 
value, mining French purchasing power and external competition; trade was languishing, as the 
colonies in Louisiana were just a formal possession to ascribe to the King’s empire; the only 
revenue for the State were taxes, which were collected by tax farmers under a regime of heavy 
corruption and general inefficiency. 
John Law, which learnt quite early and properly to prepare in advance the ground for his 
actions, understood the French situation and shaped the last refinements to the theory presented 
in his first writings in order to make it coherent with the situation King Sun’s reign was facing, 
just waiting for the right moment to propose his design. The moment came some months after 
the death of King Luis XIV when the Regent, which Law had met some years before and which 
estimated much the Scottish author, gave him the support to start to implement his innovative 
ideas on the nature of money and on its role in the economy. Bringing innovation in the old and 
well-established financial system of the ancien regime was not easy, and John Law encountered 
several obstacles, mainly from the Parliament. However, with the help of the Regent and with 
the success of his ideas in the first years, he managed to create the Mississippi System and 
become the Ministry of French Finances.  
Starting from the consideration that specie was not an adequate instrument to serve as money 
given the low stability in value and that more money would have stimulated the economy, 
creating a virtuous circle that would have avoided inflation, John Law revolutionized the French 
financial system, building the most powerful company Europe has ever seen and bringing many 
other concepts that today are part of the orthodoxy in monetary theory and economic policies. 
This work aims at travelling through all the events and facts, from the biographic elements to 
the historical circumstances, from the political conjunctures to the status of the economic theory, 
that determined the creation, the success and the burst of the Mississippi Scheme with the final 
goal to understand whether the theories and the policies suggested by John Law can allow us to 
consider him one the first modern economists ever existed. Are the elements of his scheme that 
today seem so modern, as fiat money, a credit-based economy, financial markets and derivate 
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instruments, a calculated outcome of his anachronistic understanding of the functioning of 
money and of the real economy, or are they just the uncontrolled results of some good economic 
policies done without a proper understanding of the real functioning of the economic system? 
Should we revisit the almost negligible role that the history of economic thought has attributed to 
Law, or should we agree with Lord Keynes when he says that he does not see any ancestors of 
his theory? Can this experiment, tragically ended, still be helpful nowadays to understand the 
flaws our current financial and monetary systems are exposed to, and to assess some recent 
attempts to create new instruments to serve as money? 
In order to provide an answer to these ambitious questions, this work is organized as follows. 
The first chapter will focus on John Law from a biographic and chronological point of view; we 
retrace all the events that brought him from the gaming tables to the economic theorizing until 
the exile in Venice. The focus will be the careful analysis of his theory, which he started to 
develop long before arriving in France. The second chapter explains the System and all the 
elements it was anchored on, why it took root in France and why it succeeded. The theory 
analysed in the first chapter will allow us to explain the differences between the system 
originally envisioned and the one actually put in place, and to delineate the elements that would 
have avoided its collapse. The third chapter aims to see the position that John Law occupies 
within the history of economic thought and to analyse the similarities between the system he 
created and some recent key elements of the current financial system. In order to do so, after 
describing the status of economic theory in money matters before him, we examine the opinion 
of the principal economic thinkers on John Law. In conclusion, after having collocated Law’s 
theory within the present debate between Keynesian and monetarist paradigms and having 
shown the elements of the current financial system already present in the Mississippi scheme, we 
provide a unique parallel with the most recent and successful attempt to reshape the payment 
system: Bitcoin. 
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1. John Law: the man and the economist 
John Law de Lauriston went down in history as the one who brought France to bankruptcy, a 
visionary whose crazy ideas enriched few and destroyed thousands. Because of the failure of his 
system, he has been blamed and several writers have made fool of him for no less than two 
centuries. However, some of his theories look incredibly modern and some components of the 
System he implemented three centuries ago are similar to the financial architecture the current 
world assumed after the fall of the Bretton Wood system in 1971. 
This work aims to shed light on his history and on his revolutionary ideas in monetary 
economics and in public policy. In this sense, it belongs to the stream of literature started by 
Harsin in 1930s (Harsin, 1928; 1934; 1935) and continued by Murphy during 1990s (Murphy, 
1991; 1997) that focused their attention into discovering of the actual facts. It is different from 
Murphy’s work because is more concerned on the economic ideas behind the events and in the 
thorough description of Law as economist and on his disguised importance in the history of 
economic thought with the final goal of assessing, from a modern point of view, his theory and 
of applying the latter to better understand a recent experiment to introduce a new type of money. 
In order to do so, before deeply studying the system he implemented and its economic 
implications, it is necessary to examine in a very detailed level his biography since his 
personality and his previous life experiences played a determinant role in shaping the 
“economist” and the “banker” sides.  
The other main reference for this chapter, beyond Murphy’s John Law – Economist and 
Policymaker (1997), is the masterwork of Paul Harsin, who has been the first to complete the 
exercise of publishing all Law’s writings in 1934. The Œuvres contain the evolution of the 
economic thought of the Scottish author, and for the purpose of this work is particularly 
interesting for the later memories, where Law tries to give explanations of what he did and why 
it failed. However, as indicated in Murphy (1991; 1997) and confirmed by some research done 
for this work, not all the texts included in the Œuvres have been written by John Law and Harsin 
may also have neglected couple of manuscripts that may be attributed to the Scottish writer (or at 
least mainly drawn by his original works).  
The other author which attention was caught by John Law is Earl J. Hamilton. The professor 
dedicated almost the whole life studying Law’s character and all his economic innovation. 
However, he died before publishing the results of his deep research: we have two important 
papers from him but not a complete and comprehensive work.  
Among the original sources of 18th century, the writings of Nicolas DuTot are definitely the 
most relevant. DuTot, Law’s friend and cashier of the System in its second part, but also a 
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relevant personality in the study of economics at that time (Velde, 2009), wrote two main 
manuscripts. The first, entitled Reflexions politiques sur les finance et le commerce was written 
in 1735 and published in the integral version by Paul Harsin in 1935; the second, entitled 
Historie du Système de John Law, has been recently found at Poitiers and published for the first 
time in 2000 by A.E. Murphy. Both of them are focused in defending Law’s System and the 
economic rationale behind it: while the Reflexion of 1735 presents also a theoretical construction 
on the management of the numeraire and on the importance of the interest rate, the second is a 
pure apologetic narration of Law’s System.  
Regarding the historical facts and all the edicts and laws promulgated, the main sources are the 
Memoires de la Regence, a faithful story of France during the Regence of the Duc d’Orléans 
written in three volumes in 1730, and a manuscript, Histoire de Finance, whose author has not 
been yet unanimously identified by the literature. Harsin (1934) ascribed the Histoire to Law and 
considered it in the Œuvres (III); new, convincing evidence provided by Murphy (1997), 
however, refutes Law’s paternity. 
The sources mentioned above will be integrated with several other information drawn by Law’s 
contemporary writers as de Piossens, Forbonnais, Cantillon, Saint-Simon, the truthfulness of 
which will be assessed with the comparison with respective historical events, and by other 
authors that in the course of history studied this incredible experiment of fiat money and public 
debt management (as Levasseur, Fauré, Rist, Hyde, Wood and Velde). 
 
1.1 A brief biography – the man  
 
“The enemy of gold was born in a Goldsmith’s house”.  
 
In this way Eduard Faure1, in his La banqueroute de Law, one of the early biographies of John 
Law, names the opening chapter. This statement has many flaws, but correctly indicates that the 
origins of the author we are focusing on are from an environment where gold and specie played a 
central role. 
John Law was born in Scotland in 1671. His father was in fact a goldsmith but, as reported by 
several authors (Hyde, 1969; Fauré, 1977; Murphy, 1997), was de facto a banker who vaunted 
credit from the most prestigious families of Scotland. The goldsmith profession, in that period, 
had evolved towards a banker function, providing credit to the merchant class; the profits made 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Edward Faure (1977), La banqueroute de Law (17 julliet 1720), Gallimar. 
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by them were sensibly high (Chown, 1994). Proof of this is the fact that Law’s father, when Law 
was still a child, could afford to buy several properties, among all the Lauriston estate, which 
brought Law’s family into the entourage of the wealthier families in Scotland (Ainsworth, 1864). 
Not much is known about Law’s schooling. According to Hyde, Law showed a precocious 
talent towards mathematics and a strong interest for the study and the analysis of public and 
private credit, trade and taxation (Wood, 1791). If Law’s attitude toward maths can be agreed 
upon, it seems premature to collocate the inception of his interest for economic policy – a term 
not even known at that time – in his schooling age (Murphy, 1991). 
Before becoming an economist, Law has been a man. And as a handsome wealthy young man, 
that liked to enjoying the fruits of life, he could not stay longer in Edinburgh, where he had gone 
back after finishing the school (Murphy, 1997). Of the many itches he acquired, the first has 
undoubtedly been the itch to travel, and London was the city that attracted him the most (Hyde, 
1969). 
Around 1693, he gave up the straightforward opportunity of entering the Scottish gentry 
indirectly offered by his family status and moved to London. In 1694, while his fellow-
countryman William Peterson was involved in the creation of the Bank of England2, John Law 
was far more concerned in amorous adventures and gambling rather than planning a revolution 
of the current monetary and banking systems. As Hyde indicates (1969), he quickly ran out of 
money and was forced to convey back to his mother the Lauriston property for cash. 
Since this early time of Law’s life, we can find a characteristic that will be always present 
during his whole life and that probably explains his success later on. Thanks to his personality, 
his intelligence and a great deal of savoir faire Law had always been able to connect with the 
higher classes of every society he lived in, marketing his ideas to involve the counterpart. 
The end of his life as a beau-dandy was heralded by the duel he fought on 9th April 1694, 
during which he killed James Wilson, another well-known dandy of that time. Wilson’s life 
could be the topic of an entire research work, as his lifestyle and his spending were completely 
not in line with his recorded income, really low since he did not have a proper job. Several 
stories had been told and diverse pamphlets and books have been written to explain the source 
for the finance of Wilson’s lavish expenditures.3 Most of Law biographies are not clear in this 
regard, and settle the matters as a showdown between similar personalities in competition. 
Probably, the issue was more intricate and several people from the higher class were involved, as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 William Paterson, Scottish as well as Law, was one of the co-founder the Bank of England. In his pamphlet A Brief 
Account of the Intended Bank of England, he describes how he would act as the English government's banker.  
3 The pamphlet Love-Letters Between a Certain Late Nobleman and the Famous Mr. Wilson: Discovering the True 
History of the Rise and Surprising Grandeur of that Celebrated Beau, published in 1723 to discredit John Law, 
offers several insights on the true story. 
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demonstrated by the sudden destruction of all Wilsons’s papers after his death and all the 
subsequent events that allowed Law to escape from prison. Murphy’s analysis (1997) of all the 
Law’s trials and of the incarceration period indicates that there was a considerable political 
intrigue over his fate. 
What is clear is that Law was clever enough to not challenge in a duel another man in a public 
place. Putting crime news – and gossip – aside, what matters for the purpose of this work is the 
fact that Law was arrested and sentenced to death but he managed to escape from the King’s 
bench prison in the summer of 1694. Even around the escape, several stories have been written 
and the Gray’s4 is without any doubts the most thrilling and spectacular one. As for the overall 
biography of the Scottish man, the truth is much more nearer to the political dimension: his 
escape was arranged by some high-ranked members of the government with the implicit 
connivance of King Williams, as the emission of a fake description of the fugitive clearly 
indicates. Probably even Gray’s story was a part of the “plan” to create a diversion for the 
general wisdom (Fauré, 1977). 
Little is known on Law’s life between his escape in 1694 and his involvement in the land bank 
proposals in England and Scotland in 1704-1705. Is it sure that John Law left England and 
started traveling around Europe: France, Holland and Italy the destinations where there is 
concrete proof of his stay (Levasseur, 1758).  
Two of the main biographers, Du Hautchamp (1739) and Gray (1721), are not precise regarding 
Law’s travels and locations. Both of them report Law in Paris at the beginning of 1700. This stay 
in Paris, the first to our knowledge, has been greatly important for the Scottish man since he 
weaved the first important relations with the most influential people of the governing society and 
met Katherine Knowles, a wealthy lady that became his companion and common-law wife 
(Hyde, 1969). 
They left Paris and moved to Italy, where Law made a fortune at the gaming tables 
(Forbonnais, 1758; Fauré, 1977). However, John Law was not a gambler in the traditional sense 
of the term, since he used his ability to rapidly calculate the probabilities to offer bets to 
opponents. He understood that the common gambler did not foresee the probability involved in, 
for example, dice games. Several sources5 show how he offered 10000 to 1 for throwing a six six 
times consecutively. He knew that the probabilities were 46656 to 1, so he was sure to win as the 
game was repeatedly played, but opponents did not and ran for participating in this bet with him. 
It is curious as he already started acting as a banker in this stage of his life, when he still knew 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Quoted in Hyde (1969), John Law, the history of an honest adventurer. Holdert & Co. NV 
5 Wood (1791), Hyde (1969) and Ainsworth (1864). 
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little about money and banking. He performed the role of a banker not in the sense he would 
have done ten years later in France, but rather as the banker at the gaming table (Murphy, 1997). 
He understood that acting as the banker of the table offered a systematic opportunity to win.  
It is in this period that he started spending his time in studying and writing on economics, 
showing within some years analyses that had never seen before for accuracy and completeness 
(Murphy, 1991). He probably rediscovered some of his juvenile interests on math and public 
policy, matching them with the good knowledge of gold and specie due to his origins and 
channelled his intelligence to address issues regarding financial and payment systems that were 
on the hedge at that time. In fact, the economic situation was critical almost everywhere in 
Europe for the continuous wars that destroyed public finances and obliged monarchs to take 
extreme actions (Marion, 1915). The theoretical debate was concentrated on the finding of new 
and innovative ways to finance the public debt and manage the payment system. John Law 
noticed that his ideas were completely new, especially in some fields, and made the goal of his 
life to put them in practice somewhere (Murphy, 1997). 
How this serious side as a brilliant economist can be reconciled with the personality of the 
gambler that shines through several tales? How comes he gained completely the trust of the 
Regent? Even at the gaming table, Law showed his nature of a man of other time (Velde, 2003). 
Given his lucidity in the analysis of the economic situation and his capacity to take advantage of 
the opponent, the most probable hypothesis is that he knew, and in this sense was a professional 
gambler, that at the gaming table paid to show another face. When people think you are fool it 
take less effort to dupe them into losing to you (Murphy, 1997). He was not the foolish who had 
lost his inheritance, the irrational lover who killed a rival in a duel nor the one that bet for the 
pleasure of the risk and for a great deal of addiction as was perceived at the gaming tables and 
pictured in the current journals; he was a rational player with an information advantage who 
exploited his knowledge to make gains, putting money down only when odds were on his favour. 
He rather was the banker of the table, what today would be called a bookmaker, able to exploit 
opponent’s weaknesses (Velde, 2003). 
In this sense, the two personalities are perfectly compatibles and coherent. From several letters6 
he wrote after the collapse of the system, it can be further understood how he started using his 
genius and his knowledge in a rational way even at the gambling table. To some extent, the 
gambling techniques developed at gaming tables were also applied in the political part of his life, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The III volume of the Œuvres contains several letters written after 1720 to close friends where Law reminisces all 
the steps that brought him to lead France’s economy. Another precious source is the collection of pamphlets and 
letters written for Law’s return in Britain, crafted by G. J. Adams (2012). 
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when he often threatened the counterpart betting his own fortune on the success of his proposals 
to show their reliability (Murphy, 1997).  
As shown above, Law’s personality, given its multifaceted aspect, has attracted the interest of 
several authors and the biography of him abounded. However, most of them depict him as a 
gambler and interpret his System as the final, destructive gamble made with French economy. 
These assessments are definitely motivated by the social angry that developed after the collapse 
of the system, when thousands of people lost huge amount of money, at least in relative terms 
(Murphy, 1997). However, as will be shown in the rest of this work, the collapse cannot be 
imputed at Law’s bad faith. He did several mistakes, but the blame should go more on the 
political side rather then on him.  
During the gambling trip he visited two countries, Holland and Italy, which were at the 
forefront of the financial innovation (Rist, 1938). Probably, as can be inferred by some later 
memories, he did not end up by chance in the cities with the most advanced banks. In 
Amsterdam, he discovered and directly studied the Bank of Amsterdam7 and he experienced the 
functioning of one of the first stock market in the current meaning of the term, where shares of 
the main trade companies were exchanged (Hyde, 1969). Amsterdam had not been the first city 
to establish a stock market, as we find earlier experiment in Italy, Venice and Florence, and in 
France with the annuities of the Hotel de Ville. However, it had the first stock market with a 
fundamental characteristic: liquidity. In Italy, he had the opportunity to directly see the 
functioning of the Bank of Giro, in Venice, while in Genoa he studied the Bank of Saint 
George8, the one the contributed the most at the envisagement of the Mississippi scheme (DuTot, 
1735; Velde, 2003). 
A great confusion arises in the literature upon which has been the first work written by Law on 
economic matters. The colossal work of research and synthesis of Paul Harsin reports the Money 
and Trade as the first work ever written by Law. However, in recent years, more researches 
conducted mainly by Murphy shed new light on the matter and indicate the Essay on a Land 
bank, dated 1704, as the first manuscript. We conversely believe, as suggested by Chown (1994), 
that the first work ever written by John Law has been a small manuscript presented in Scotland at 
the beginning of 1701, entitled Proposal and Reasons for Constituting a Council of Trade. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Bank of Amsterdam was mainly a deposit and transfer bank. It enabled merchants to settle their accounts, both 
with credit and debit entries, into its lodges. 
8 The Bank of Saint George has been founded in 1407 and is one of the oldest chartered banks in the world (Davis, 
2002). Towards the end of the 17th century it was heavily involved in the maritime trade and became the main 
competitor of the Dutch East India Company and the English East India Company. During his history, the bank 
invented several bank techniques, which were later exported throughout Europe (Chown, 1994). The Bank had a 
social capital and its shareholders were remunerated by an interest of 7%. Furthermore, it issued paper money in the 
form of nominal notes payable at sight and transferrable. 
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pamphlet, in fact, presents concepts as the importance of trade and the role of a proper 
government in money matters that seem coherent with the subsequent development of Law’s 
theory. The attribution to Law also confirms that the Scottish author started to be interested in 
public policy and management at the very beginning of the 18th century. However, there is no 
agreement across the literature on the aforementioned conclusion. 
 The last decade of 17th century and the first years of 18th has been a period of financial 
revolution in Europe; the most active country was England, where the creation of the Bank of 
England (BoE) in 1694 constituted a dramatic change. However, even other countries were 
looking for some financial innovations that could have helped to solve the issues connected to 
the public finance, especially during war periods, and France was one of them. There were 
definitely opportunities for make fortunes formulating new ideas and convincing governments to 
implement them (Fauré, 1977). Giving Law personality, there is no wonder if he actually decided 
to initiate a new career away from gaming table by applying his brightness and his skills to 
economic issues (Murphy, 1997; Levasseur, 1854). 
He went back to Scotland around 1703-1704 where he joined the bunch of authors competing 
for the presentation of a money reform proposal based on land. In 1704 he published the Essay 
on a Land bank, which was submitted to English authorities to assess the goodness of the reform 
proposal. After the rejection of his proposal, he went back to Edinburgh and had to hurry up to 
finish his masterpiece, Money and Trade, which he submitted to Scottish authorities in 1705 and 
which was aimed to confute and become the substitute of the proposal recently made by Doctor 
Chamberlain. Furthermore, it also highlighted the unsustainability of the current system of 
State’s finance management that resulted in the Bank of Scotland ceasing payment in December 
1704. His proposal was far more advanced and structured that any ever presented, but common 
public financial wisdom was not ready to such a revolution (Rist, 1938). The Scottish Parliament 
turned down is proposal and, as will happen even in other occasions, it did it more for an internal 
political interest that for the weakness and danger of the proposal per sé. The other aspect that 
damaged Law was his perception by public wisdom: more a gambler convicted to death than a 
brilliant monetary economist (Balen, 2002). 
Given the decision of the Scottish Parliament, oddly in the same session that refuted Law’s land 
bank proposal, to continue with the pace toward the political union with England, he was forced 
to abandon his country because of the impending of the Act of Union that would have made him 
a convict murderer even in Scotland. He refused, however, to give up with his economic ideas 
and started another tour into the continent to try to convince other monarchies of the viability of 
his projects (Forbonnais, 1758). 
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In November 1706 he submitted a proposal to French authorities and the at-the-time Ministry 
Chamillard personally read it appreciating several insights (Murphy, 1997; Marion, 1915). 
According to Hamilton (1967), this Memoires touchant les monnois et le commerce is the “best 
single presentation” of Law’s theory. However, even if he probably adjusted some language to 
make it more attractive and intriguing, the economic theory and the policies suggested here are 
very similar to the ones already present in Money and Trade. The other two memories he wrote 
for France contained the seeds of his final conception of money, but were still directed towards a 
land bank (Œuvres, II). 
More determined in getting a yes as an answer rather than demoralized for the refusal, and 
probably supported by the belief that all the rejections were more for political constraints and 
ignorance of this matter rather than due to serious flaws in his theory, he did not give up and kept 
travelling, gaining more insights on the financial revolutions taking place at that time in the old 
continent. He ended up in 1711 in Italy, in Turin, where he finally made the step of abandoning 
the land anchoring making his theory, based on the pillars of inefficiency of specie money and 
on the necessity of pursuing a debt management policy, fully coherent. This new theory was 
contained in the Manuscript of Turin (Harsin, 1934), dated 1711 and delivered to Victor 
Amadeus of Savoie to advise and guide for the establishment of a bank in the very same city. 
Victor Amadeus was forced to turn down Law, who experienced for the umpteenth time a 
negative answer. However, the Duque of Savoie was probably the first person, along with some 
influential people in France that will play a relevant role in 1715 but whom identities is not 
proved, to be enthusiastic about Law’s design and to strongly believe that the system he had 
envisioned could have worked in practice. He had to turn down the proposal because of the 
limits of his reign - “I have too much to loose” - but suggested him to go back in France for 
implementing his sound ideas, certain that French people would have welcomed him this time 
(Murphy, 1997). 
The endorsement and the advice given by Victor Amadeus, along with the positive feedbacks 
he had from the first contact with France in 1702 and from the subsequent visit in 1707 with the 
acquiescence of the Ministry of the Finance, convinced Law that France was the right place, for 
several reasons, to transform his theories and designs into concrete action. 
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1.2 The early writings – the economist 
“I have never known anybody in France or elsewhere who works on 
sound principles with respect to money and credit”.  
John Law, Œuvres, I. 
 
It is not by accident that Law chose to travel in Italy and Holland after leaving England. 
According to some biographers (Ainsworth, 1864; Hyde, 1969), the main reason was to find new 
places where to gamble. However, at the beginning of 1700, gambling was for Law probably 
more a way to gains huge amounts of money then just an amusement. As shown above, his 
interest in public finance had already started and the choice of these two destinations can be 
interpreted in a more formative meaning (Murphy, 1997; Velde, 2003). 
 His ideas were already different and innovative with respect to the ones in the political and 
theoretical debate of the time, but he perfectly knew that he had to insert them within a solid, 
comprehensive and coherent theoretical framework before presenting them. In order to do this, 
he studied a lot of previous and contemporary authors, which had concentrated in economic 
matters, John Locke above all (Murphy, 1997). He also needed practical experience into the 
countries that for him were the most advanced in financial innovation. Bank of England was one 
of the main source of inspiration, from which to draw both strengths and weaknesses. But he 
could not stay in England. The focus had been therefore on Italy, especially Florence and 
Venice, where the most innovations in term of banks had taken place, and Holland, a small 
country capable to emerge as one of the leading European powers thanks to the trade with 
colonies and the ability to manage its proceeds through the establishment of the Bank of 
Amsterdam (Fauré, 1977).  
The theory that will be presented below has its pillars in the experiences of these three 
countries. Law’s intelligence and ambitions allowed him to take all the positive aspects of them, 
merging everything into a unique theory freed from the flaws he thought all of them had. 
According to Hamilton (1967) the first proposal ever made by Law has been in France in 1702. 
While Harsin did not include it in the Œuvres because not certain of Law’s paternity while 
Murphy arguments that the Memoires au sujet de l’etablissement d’un banque en France has not 
been written by Law, we are more in line with what Hamilton seems to have discovered 
(Hamilton, 1936). In fact, Law was in France before 1702 and he referred to this proposal in 
several of the memoires and letters that he wrote when exiled (Œuvres, III). The fact that Law 
had already started writing about economic in 1702 further confirms the connotation of the 
character we gave regarding the gambling dimension of his personality: he did that for having 
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fun and earn needed money, but he never forgot his economic ideas and his ambitions to 
implement them.  
The first proposal for which Law’s paternity is nowadays universally acknowledged is the land 
bank proposal made for England in 1704. We will examine this first proposal and Law’s chef-
d'oeuvre, Money and Trade, in details because they contain all the new visions, at least at a 
primordial stage, the Scottish author brought upon. 
A land bank, at that time, consisted in a prototype of modern financial institution that based its 
notes emissions on the value of the land, which was to be owned by the State. This new concept 
gained consensus from 1650 onwards, when specie was often scarce and land seemed to be a 
valid substitute because of a very elastic supply and a relative stability of value. Furthermore, the 
wealthier and most influential people of the society owned it, and an increase in the social value 
of this asset furthered their own cause (Rist, 1938).  
The line of land bank proposals has been opened by William Potter in 1656 but achieved a 
significant success only three decades later because of the success of the concept of bank due to 
the creation of the BoE in 1694 (Murphy, 1997; DuTot, 1735). The other reason explaining the 
proliferation of land bank proposals can be traced in the urgent need of some financial 
innovation that could provide a solution for the drainage of money caused by the continuous 
wars along with the initial acknowledgment that specie supply could reveal too scarce or volatile. 
Furthermore, several authors have being pushed to write and study the land bank solution by 
landers themselves, which perceived the momentum for a general financial innovation as a threat 
since it shifted the interest and gains towards the merchant class (Davis, 2002).  
 
1.2.1 Essay on a Land Bank 
The manuscript Essay on a Land Bank is in many aspects a treaty on money and lays the 
foundation for Law’s masterpiece, Money and Trade, in a similar way as the Treatise on Money 
can be considered for The General Theory in the Keynesian sequence (Murphy, 1997). The 
Essay does not yet consider the overall macroeconomic dimension of – English, in this case – 
economy, but rather focuses on money and value theory. As mentioned above, the Scottish 
thinker strongly believed that no one before him had yet fully understood the dynamics that 
regulated money and this was the main reason why the policies implemented were deeply 
flawed. The Essay is still a primordial point in the development his economic thought, but there 
can be found several allusions of what was to come later on (Hamilton, 1936). However, the 
policy recommendations derived from here are far from the ones he implemented in France ten 
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years later, showing that the economist side of Law had just started its evolution (Murphy, 1991; 
Velde, 2003). 
The main conclusion of the Essay is the statement, strongly argued, that land money could be 
issued in place of the specie, i.e. the metallic money. However, it represents also a significant 
step toward the correct comprehension of the theory of value and of the functions of money. All 
the theoretical improvements developed here served as starting point for building the overall 
theory present in Money and Trade. The Essay does not yet have the ambitious goal of showing 
that the current money supply was insufficient; this would be impossible here since the strong 
interrelation between money and economic activity - trade, for Law, is not yet present. It is 
focused on the delineation and on the analysis of the functions and qualities of money in order to 
show that land money, being more stable in value, should have been preferred to specie money 
(Velde, 2003). 
As alleged before, Law was a calculating individual, and the absence of the scarcity issue 
regarding money supply should probably be interpreted as an intended move, since he deeply 
developed this concept less than a year later for the proposal handed out to the Scottish 
Parliament. Even if in need of money, English economy was suffering less then the Scottish one 
and Law probably did not want to push too much regarding critiques already proposed in the 
Essay. When he submitted his work to English authorities, he therefore urged them to consider 
land money as a substitute for silver money because of its better qualities (i.e. stability in value), 
and not as a supplement because of the scarcity of money supply. 
The landmint may be erected and managed by a Commission of Parliament. In that case 
the revenue over what pays the necessary charges may be given to her Majesty in place of 
a proportioned part of the land tax or other taxes or be applied to any other uses the 
Parliament thinks good and the deficiencies, if any happen, to be made good by 
Parliament 
 
In order to show why land money was preferable to the metallic money, he had to present an 
organic theory of value and of money within which its main conclusion would have had sense. 
One can object that he built the theory just because of the proposal he wanted to make (Rist, 
1938). We definitely reject this interpretation for several reasons. First of all, Law was not a 
landowner, therefore its interest in the land bank was more connected to the advantage it could 
have derived from it as a man of the State rather than the advantage of receiving cash as a 
collateral for his possession. Second, he wanted to enter in the theoretical debate regarding 
financial innovation in place during those years, and in order to do it he had to follow the land 
bank proposals stream of literature. Third, as will be shown in next paragraph and in next 
chapter, he was far more committed with his general theory than with the goodness of land 
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money. The scratches of his economic and monetary theory that emerge from the Essay will be 
further developed contributing to his final thought, while the land bank will be gradually 
abandoned (Murphy, 1991).  
In the theoretical reasoning that brings at the exaltation of the land money at the end of the 
Essay, he provides a deep analysis of the functions and types of money. It starts the 
argumentation by defining money as: 
 
the measure by which goods are valued, as the value by which goods are exchanged, in 
which contract are made payable, and payments are made.  
 
In this definition, as well as in the one provided in Money and Trade9, we find explicitly 
defined three functions of money: measure of value, means of payment-cum-medium of 
exchange and a standard of deferred payment (Murphy, 1997). What about the store of value 
function? According to Murphy (1991; 1997) and Fauré (1977), for Law this function was 
implicit in the function as of deferred payment, even if he mentioned only the intertemporal 
maintenance of the value neglecting the intertemporal holding dimension. Here there is room for 
the main critique that can be posed to Law money theory. As Rist (1940) strongly argues, Law 
considered money mainly as a mean to make transactions and the store of value function is just 
related to deferred payment, again for making transaction. It is therefore true that for him money 
could transfer value in time, but as will be shown when presenting the functioning of the System, 
holding money was perceived as bad and counter producing for the whole economy. Money was 
meant to circulate and hoarding it was a wrong practice that had to be defeated (DuTot, 1735). 
The subsequent step was defining the qualities that money should possess. The revolutionary 
contribution made by Law has not been the list of the qualities the money should have but rather 
his attempt to integrate for the first time the theory of value with monetary theory (Harsin, 1934). 
He distinguished between value of use and value in exchange and introduced for the first time 
the concept, and the tools, of supply (in term of quantity) and demand analysis. Regarding the 
paradox of value, we are in line with Bowley (1973) who stated that Law contribution was not 
dramatically different from what was been written that far, mainly by Davanzati and Locke (the 
latter most probably read by Law given several allusion, see third chapter). However, he presents 
the paradox of value in a different way, with a far more clarity and, above all, with the purpose 
of explaining its functioning through the demand/supply analysis, a step missing in previous 
authors (Murphy, 1997). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In Money and Trade the last part of the definition is removed: payments and exchange are treated as synonymous. 
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Supply and demand analysis for Law becomes the fundamental tools through which he explains 
the value of goods, the reason why there was the necessity to substitute the silver as the principal 
monetary means and why land money would be superior to silver money (Davis, 2002). 
He delineated two categories of money, on the basis of the qualities and the functions of the 
instrument, which are summarized in Table1 below. In the first category he considered all types 
of instruments (“moneys”) that had all the six qualities (stability of value, homogeneity, 
durability, divisibility, transferability, stamp to show the value) and that fulfilled all the three 
functions. In this narrower category land money and banknotes were the preferable instruments, 
while silver money did not always respect the stability-of-value requirement. In the second 
category, where he envisaged a much broader concept of money, were all those instruments 
without stability in value but that could be used to make payments. It is within this category that 
he considered shares (both of a company and of a bank) as money. Table 1 offers a graphic 
representation of the functions, qualities and categories of money defined by Law. 
 
Functions of money 
 
Qualities necessary 
for money 
 
Categories of 
money 
 
Examples of 
money 
Measure of value 
 
(1) Stability of value 
 
Category I money 
Money that 
possesses qualities 
(1)–(6) and fulfils 
the three functions of 
money 
 
- Land money 
- Banknotes  
- Goldsmiths' 
notes 
- Silver money (to 
a lesser extent) 
(2) Homogeneity 
 
Mean of payment or 
medium of exchange 
 
(3) Durability 
 
(4) Divisibility 
 
Category II money 
Money that 
possesses qualities 
(2)–(6) and fulfils 
only the payment 
and ex- change 
functions of money 
 
- Bank of England 
shares  
- East India 
Company shares 
 
Standard of deferred 
payments 
 
(5) Transferability 
 
(6) Have a stamp 
that denotes the 
value of money 
Table 1. Categories of money according to Law’s definitions in the Essay.  
 
In the first category, land bank was the superior type and silver money the less preferable. In 
the middle, Law indicated banknotes and goldsmiths’ notes, already acknowledging the 
importance of paper money. While stating the advantages of banknotes with respect to silver, he 
criticized the over issue of the Bank of England against the specie reserves, which constituted 
only the 20-25% of the outstanding paper money (Œuvres, III). In case of a run on the Bank, it 
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would have failed and people that deposited money there would have been “disappointed”. With 
the land money it was possible to offer paper money completely pledged to a real asset. The gain 
was twofold: all the outstanding notes would have been pledged and the total value would be 
greater than the current one. Land money had therefore a greater elasticity of supply, as its 
reserves were the totality of the lands in England, whereas the ability of BoE to expand the 
money supply was limited and constrained by the amount of specie and of bullion reserves. Here 
we find already one of the pillar of the system he created later, i.e. a paper money fully backed 
by a real asset, in order to avoid inflation and failure in case of a run to the bank. And at the end 
of the manuscript we also have the first allusion to the scarcity of money supply, which will be 
on of the central theme in Money and Trade. 
The second category grouped the types of money that could be used to make payment but that, 
since not possessing the quality of stability in value, was note suitable for being used as measure 
of value or for making deferred payments. It had a specific value in a determined time frame and 
should have being used within it. In this category he envisages all the financial instrument that 
could be considered money, in particular the shares of the Bank of England and the shares of the 
East India Company. This constitutes the embryonic conceptualization that would later induce 
him to consider the shares of his company as money, and even at monetize them.  
Three passages from the Essay are particularly meaningful to show what explained above: 
 
Money to be qualified to serve as the measure by which goods are valued and as the value 
in which contracts are made payable ought not only to be certain in its value, but likewise 
to be capable of being brought to a standard id: e: that the different pieces of money have 
a value equal to their denomination, that by it the value of goods in the same or different 
places may be measured and that both he who is to pay and he who is to receive may be 
certain that the sum contracted for shall be of the same value at the time of payment that 
it was of when the contract is made and that the payment shall be made in pieces of 
money whose value is of the same proportion to the denomination with the other pieces. 
 
The stocks of the East India Companies, of the Bank, Irish debentures, etc. are received in 
some payments because their value though uncertain what it will be yet at the time it is 
known and they who think these stocks will rise rather than fall and are willing to run the 
hazard will prefer them to the same sum in silver money. So these stocks serve the uses 
of money in some payments and would serve in most payments if they were capable of 
division. 
 
What approximates most to a new type of money is the East India Company. The stock of 
this Company is divided into shares like that of the bank. They are traded each day on the 
exchange and the current price is published for the public's information in the gazettes 
 
The mistake in considering shares as money is a substantial one (Rist, 1938), but it shows 
another aspect of Law’s modernity in economic understanding: the con
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liquidity was for him, as is today, a crucial element for the success of an enterprise and also for 
the economy overall (Murphy, 1997; Velde, 2003). 
As hinted above, he used the demand-supply analysis to challenge the goodness of silver as 
money. The reasoning is simple: the value of silver could have changed for two reasons, namely 
the deterioration of its quality and a greater supply relative to the demand. Given the 
overexpansion in the global supply of silver and the reiterated debasement operation by 
monarchies, its value had not been constant. And given the fact that stability of value should be 
the main characteristic of the instrument selected as money, silver did not fit to serve this 
purpose. In this sense, land value was far more stable during time and therefore it constituted the 
natural substitute for silver.   
He knew where his theory was weaker or at least where it would have seemed weak to 
contemporaries and therefore tried to anticipate all the potential critiques that could have been 
addressed towards his proposal. In particular, he addressed the issue of the homogeneity: land 
was not a homogeneous good easily divisible into pieces of equal value. The solution he 
envisaged consisted in combining different qualities of land into homogeneous units that could 
be used as money, with the Parliament that had to establish a standard unit for land, against 
which all other lands would have been valued (Œuvres, I).  
From the point of view of the soundness of the types of economic policy suggested, the land 
proposals constitute the weakest point in Law’s theorizing (Murphy, 1991; Rist, 1940). 
However, the way through which the Scottish author reaches it is without precedents, and all the 
economic theory built to justify his prescription can be considered “modern” both in the contents 
and in the way it is argued (Velde, 2003). The turning point in Law’s theoretical production is 
when he abandons the land money and focuses on something more feasible: banknotes and, to a 
lessen extent shares, linked to the activity of trade, the very synonymous of economic activity. 
Even though the shifting from land money towards the banknotes, or more in general an 
instrument without an intrinsic value linked to some economic activity, happened some ten years 
later, he already envisaged this type of money in the Essay, along with other instruments. 
John Law has been one of the first economic writers to recognise that the development of the 
financial markets, creating a market for the single instrument that enabled to determine its value 
just before the transaction, would create liquid instruments that could be included into his 
broader definition of money. What Law did not take in account in the Essay and later on in his 
career regarding shares is the fact that if markets become volatile, the price of a share can 
experience a very high variance, undermining its “moneyness” (Rist, 1940; Fauré, 1977).  
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In the Essay Law modelled also the interest rate. While advocating and strongly arguing in 
favour of a low interest rate, he did not suggest to achieve this by creating a new type of money 
perceived to be less valuable than the specie (silver) money. The determinants of the interest rate 
were the quantity of money present in the economy, the quality of the government and the 
security of the state’s debt (Murphy, 1997). These three present, and the interest rate would fall. 
The Essay present also an interesting perspective on time preference: “anticipation is always at 
discount: 100£ to paid now is of more value than 1000£ to be paid by 10£ a year for 100 year”. 
However, this statement is never exploited into some refinement of his interest theory. 
 
1.2.2 Money and Trade 
After the rejection of the English Parliament of his proposal, Law went back in his home 
country to elaborate another land proposal to submit to the Scottish Parliament. Facing the 
competition of an alternative proposal with a similar purpose to be examined by the Parliament10, 
he had to rush up to finish his manuscript in time to let the designated commission analyse it. In 
order to broaden the interest in his proposal and introducing since the presentation some 
elements of discontinuity with the opponent’s one, he arranged for the publication of a broadside 
containing his main proposal giving the first written demonstration of his singular capability of 
marketing his ideas. 
Money and Trade considered with a proposal for supplying the nation with money was first 
published in Edinburgh in 1705. It starts from the issues raised in the Essay but goes much 
further, creating a general macroeconomic framework within which Law prescribes coherent 
macroeconomic policies. As simply inferable from the title, money is now put in relation not 
only with price level, but also with economic output, that for Law coincided with trade. He 
embraced a completely new approach to economics that led him to discover or present for the 
first time in a modern way several concepts that sparked off later on in the evolution of the 
economic thought and that are still relevant today. In Money and Trade he discovers the money-
in-advance requirement and the circular flow of income, further analyses the inflation in an 
international contest under the demand and supply analysis and formulates the law of one price 
in a small open economy (Murphy, 1997). 
If in the Essay he was just concerned with the demonstration that a paper money based on land 
is superior, because of its value’s stability, with respect to silver money, in Money and Trade he 
adopts a comprehensive approach to macroeconomics, trying to relate the money with the real 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 The alternative proposal being the work submitted in 1704 by Chamberlen (called “Drs.” by Law within Money 
and Trade) and was being examined by a committee of the Scottish government (Murphy, 1997). 
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economic activity. Addressing his proposal to Scotland, he was firmly convinced that the supply 
of money was too small for solving the problems the country was facing because Bank of 
Scotland’s silver reserves were too small. Law was convinced that money had a paramount 
importance for the economy: a greater quantity of money would stimulate, according to his 
definitions, the trade (i.e. economic growth). He therefore built Money and Trade to demonstrate 
this and subsequently arguing in favour of a land bank issuing land money to solve Scotland’s 
current issues. 
There are four dominant themes in Money and trade: the nature of money, the superiority of 
land money on silver money, the interrelationship between money and trade and the potential - 
therefore the necessity - of an expansion of the money supply through the establishment and the 
expansion of land money. 
The first part of the manuscript is focused on the analysis of Scottish economy and in the 
understanding of the variables responsible for the issues. He proposed a very pessimistic 
appraisal of the Scottish economy, being particularly concerned by the unemployment problem. 
All the issues that were limiting Scotland expansion were imputable, according to Law, to a bad 
government, in particular a bad monetary management (Vickers, 1959). The aim of the 
manuscript was to demonstrate that the current circulation of currency was not enough, in doing 
so preparing rooms for his proposal. But he also had to demonstrate that all the problems 
Scotland was facing could have not being solved by the instruments already existing: Bank of 
Scotland was too small, silver was a inappropriate medium of exchange, and debasement was not 
the correct solution to expand the money supply. Here his appraisal of the economic situation in 
Scotland: 
This country is more capable of an extended trade than any other country of Europe, yet it 
is reduced to a very low state. Trade is ruined; the national stock is wasted; the people 
forsake the country; the rents of land are unpaid; houses in towns and farms in the 
country are thrown upon the owners hands; the creditor cannot have the interest of his 
money to live upon; and the debtors person and estate are exposed to the law. 
 
In order to build such an argumentation, the first step was elaborating on the concept of money. 
In order to do so, he described how and why money had replaced barter. In the very first pages of 
the manuscript, in fact: 
Before the use of money was known, goods were exchanged by barter, or contract; and 
contracts were made payable in goods. This sate of barter was inconvenient, and 
disadvantageous. 1.he who deſired to barter would not always find people who wanted the 
goods he had, and had such goods as he deſired in exchange. 2. Contracts taken payable 
in goods were uncertain, for goods of the ſame kind differed in value. 3. There was no 
measure by which the proportion of value goods had to one another could be known. 
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This condition, where people depended on “landed men” to have something to barter for, 
evolved soon thanks to the replacement of barter with money. In particular, Law refers to silver 
and explains how it possessed all the qualities necessary to be money described in the paragraph 
above, and how it improved the exchange. Silver shifted out the production function frontier, but 
not as far as it could have gone with better money instruments (Murphy, 1991; Hamilton, 1967).  
After the description of money, the argumentation towards the main message of the manuscript 
evolves linking the money with the real economy. The crucial assumption of the overall theory is 
in fact the symbiotic relation between money and trade, used by Law as synonymous of 
economic activity. A short supply of money was the cause of trade not developing properly, and 
this would turn as unemployment. In fact, he wrote: 
 
Domestic trade depends on the money. A greater quantity employs more people than a 
lesser quantity. A limited sum can only set a number of people to work proportioned to it 
and it is with little success laws are made for employing the poor or idle in countries 
where money is scarce; good laws may bring the money to the full circulation it is 
capable of, and force it to those employments that are most profitable to the country. But 
no laws can make it go further, nor can more people be set to work without more money 
to circulate so, as to pay the wages of a greater number. They may be brought to work on 
credit, and that is not practicable, unless the credit have a circulation, so as to supply the 
workman with necessaries; if that is supposed then that credit is money, and will have the 
same effects on home and foreign trade. 
 
For him, the need to departure from a silver based system was straightforward. In fact, he 
interpreted the reluctance in pursuing this by the government and the overall society as a 
fundamental ignorance upon economic and monetary issues. Spain could continue in using gold 
and silver because master of the mines, but all countries without natural holdings of precious 
metals should have looked for another type of money.  
As previously done in the Essay, the theoretical tool used for demonstrating his economic 
principle is the supply-demand analysis. With respect to the Essay, however, he goes much 
deeper in the potentiality of this analysis. In order to have a value, a good must first have a use. 
Once possessing this, the value is determined by its demand and its supply, and the changes in its 
value depend upon changes in supply and/or quantity. As clearly stated since the beginning of 
Money and Trade: 
Goods have a value from the uses they are applyed to; and their value is greater or lesser, 
not so much from their more or less valuable, or necessary uses, as from the greater or 
lesser quantity of them in proportion to the demand for them. 
 
And in another passage: 
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When the quantity of a thing is increased or where the demand for it is reduced, the price 
falls; because the value of all things is determined by the proportion that exists between 
quantity and demand; one or the other being increased or reduced the price or value 
changes in the same proportion 
 
He was aware of the functioning of the price mechanism to allocate resources and of the 
importance of stock for handle shortage periods. He also modelled prices in a contest of an 
international economy: how markets would respond to a divergence between domestic and 
foreign prices. Though he understood the price mechanism functioning, he was definitely not an 
advocate of the laissez-faire; he rather envisioned an interventionist state, especially in monetary 
matters, as will be shown in the description of the system. 
The problem of Scotland was that in case of reduction of prices, it would not be able to serve 
all the demand since the production could not adapt because of the limit of credit. Therefore, the 
only way to transform the demand into effective demand was to use money, and to use it in 
advance. Only later, with the growth in the production, the economic activity would be in line 
with the outstanding money, avoiding inflation. The money he was proposing had to have two 
characteristics: stability of value over time and elasticity in supply, which had to be enough to 
guarantee increases in output to provide employment not only for all Scottish, but also for other 
people immigrating. Law macroeconomic theorizing is encapsulated into the circular flow of 
income, the first ever presented by an economist, according to Murphy (1997). He was proposing 
something similar to what is currently defined the Clower or cash in advance requirement 
model11. 
He could accept some flexibility in wages if in heavy unemployment, but was not ready to 
accept that this measure could have solved the problems. The only solution was money, the sole 
instrument capable to put in contact employer and workers. In fact: 
If one half of the people are employed, and the whole product and manufacture 
consumed; more money, by employing more people, will make an overplus to export: If 
then the goods imported balance the goods exported, a greater addition to the money will 
employ yet more people, or the same people employed to more advantage; which by 
making a greater, or more valuable export, will make a balance due. So if the money 
lessens, a part of the people then employed are set idle, or employed to less advantage; 
the product and manufacture is less, or less valuable, the export of consequence less, and 
a balance due to foreigners. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The cash-in-advanced requirement, or the Clower model, is a possible further assumption to insert in economic 
models to capture the monetary phenomena. Since in the traditional models (Walras, Arrow-Debreu, etc.) there is no 
role for money, in order to say anything regarding monetary phenomena as money supply, inflation or monetary 
policy, it is necessary to add some more assumptions. The most popular is the cash-in advance constraint, which 
prescribes that economic agent had a sufficient initial quantity of cash to start his activities. 
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It will be asked if countries are well governed why they do not process their wools and 
other raw materials themselves, since, where money is rare, labourers work at cheap 
rates? The answer is that work cannot be made without money; and that where there is 
little, it scarcely meets the other needs of the country and one cannot employ the same 
coin in different places at the same time. 
 
Another theoretical pinning was the elasticity of currency. A more elastic currency would have 
allowed providing loans to entrepreneurs for put into work under-used resources. This would 
have created employment, therefore rising output and the demand for money in a way such to re-
equilibrate the money supply expansion and avoiding price to increase. Expanding money supply 
would also have the desirable consequence of lowering interest rate. The importance of a low 
interest rate is one of the theoretical finding that Law will use the most in his policies. Interest 
rate at 2%, in his opinion, justified his actions both regarding the high valuation of shares and the 
massive debt conversion he undertook later on. 
Finally, according to Monroe (1923), Law is one of the first economic thinkers that brought the 
homogeneity quality of money in the literature. After the apologetic description of how to solve 
homogeneity issues of land in the Essay, he restated similar concept in Money and Trade, 
arguing that this characteristic needed to be a relevant variable when assessing the feasibility of 
an instrument to serve as money. 
 
1.2.3 Final theory refinements 
Turned down for the second time in Scotland in 1705, he spent the following decade in the 
continent trying to convince other monarchs about the goodness of his proposal. Building on 
what he already theorized in the Essay and in Money and Trade, he further developed two issues: 
the replacement of specie money with paper credit system and the necessity to treat the monetary 
policy along with a sound debt management policy.  
There is room to argue that all last refinements of his theory have been done with one country 
in mind: France. In fact, the drastic switch towards the inclusion of debt management in his 
already complicated theory happened right after his visit in France around 1707 (Murphy, 1991). 
Furthermore, in his later memories he repeatedly makes reference at this country and at the 
people who were managing it. The reign of King Sun was attractive for several aspects. First of 
all, he could not stay in England or in Scotland given the Act on Union. Secondly, he knew 
French (DuTot, 1735), he already went there (Hamilton, 1936) and probably had already some 
influential friendships (Levasseur, 1854). Finally, with the gradual transition of his theory 
towards an omni-comprehensive approach to the macroeconomics of a state and with a crescent 
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interest in debt and fiscal policies, France was the perfect place to put into practice his project 
(Rist, 1938). 
When analysing the problems of the French economy he realized that they were not only 
monetary, but there was also a financial crisis due to the huge public debt derived from the wars 
Luis XIV made for expanding his reign. The bank of England served again as a benchmark for 
the evolution of his thought: in fact, the newly created central bank and the large trading 
companies closely related to it had been designed also for tackling the debt-management 
problems the Crown was facing (Balen, 2002). 
As clearly highlighted by Murphy (1997) from the very beginning of his work, John Law has 
been both a policymaker and an economist. However, he did not achieve fully coherence 
between what he theorized and the policies he put in practice. We will come back on this topic in 
next two chapters, as the reasons are often related to constraints not under his control. What is 
important to report in this part is a flaw in the refinement of his theory regarding shares. As 
shown before, he envisioned shares as a form of money within the “second category” and 
emphasised stability and liquidity among the desirable properties money should have had. The 
first leads him away from silver, the second one towards financial securities he had seen traded 
on London market. However, in his writings, he never addressed the issue of the potential 
volatility in shares’ price that, as his very System will show, can be far more unstable than 
silver’s and require drastic actions to cool them down.12 
Finally, we want to highlight the silence in his writings on the centrepiece of the System, the 
debt conversion and the takeover of all tax collection. Even though he tackled the issue of debt 
management, the possibility for a single company to take over a nation’s debt is not present in 
his works. Most probably, this later development in his theory occurred after he started to have a 
significant role in France society and he did not have time to create a theoretical framework for 
it. Furthermore, part of the actions he took from 1718 are not completely in line with the original 
theory, making the precise assessment of the latter regarding this issue complicated. There are 
some references on later memories (Œuvres, III), but they were more apologetic writings to 
restore his name rather than serious theoretical constructions (Velde, 2003). 
What can be inferred combining his writings before 1715 and the actions of economic policy he 
undertook, is that he considered government debt as an unproductive investment, which 
subtracted resources from investment at the basis of growth (DuTot, 1735). If an institution with 
sound fundamentals and a potential flourishing economic activity, as he thought his Company 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 In fact, this tension is at the root of his fateful decision to fix the price of shares in term of notes in March 1720. 
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was, took the public debt in his equity, the original savings would have been channelled into 
more productive purposes. However, this is in partial contradiction with the strong arguments 
made in favour of a low interest rate, since the shares would reasonably have returns higher than 
his desired 2%. The interpretation provided by Murphy (1997), which we agree with, is that 
conscious of public’s limits in understanding the very essence of this matter, he could have 
shown the advantages of shares with respect to debt, further increasing the demand from them 
and therefore the confidence in the System. 
 
1.3 Its system - the banker  	  
Law was totally convinced by his theory and determined to put it into practice in France, but 
arguing that he was not also interested in making money and become famous would be 
pretentious. As it has been shown in the first part, his economist personality came up beside with 
the dandy’s, which loved enjoying life’s pleasures and needed money (Ainsworth, 1854). Rather 
than a negative point, this further motivated him in pursuing his goals and led him to use his own 
money to start his venture (Hamilton, 1936). 
When Law arrived in France, he had a considerably fortune with him, estimated around 1.5 
billion livres (Hyde, 1969). As remarked by Wood (1791), he did not have any particular 
problem in getting a meeting with the Regent, meaning that he was already knew and that he 
probably had some contacts before. Some sources even indicated that he managed to present his 
plan to Luis XIV some weeks before his death, and that the King refused to even consider the 
plan, albeit positive comments made by his counsellors, because John Law was not catholic 
(Forbonnais, 1758; Levasseur, 1854; dePiossens, 1730). 
After the death of the despot, Law found the way to exploit his friendship in French nobility to 
get closer to the Regent and convince him about his proposal, obtaining the right to found his 
own bank on May 1716. However, his initial proposal of a public bank had been scaled down by 
political tensions of that time, and he was allowed to create just a private bank. 
The way in which a relative small and common private bank evolved into the Mississippi 
System in its totality is surely a product of Law’s economic policies. However, it shows insights 
also on his strategic skill in politics. The System does not constitute just the result of the 
evolution of an initial idea. Law had clear in his mind since the beginning all the components 
needed to build a system able to put in practice and make work his economic theory. It is 
obvious that he did not envision exactly what would have happen, as we will see most of the 
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discrepancies with the original project will derive from political constraints and tensions, but the 
direction was clear since the beginning. 
The policies in financial matters implemented after Luis XIV death, mainly by the Duc de 
Noaille, were far from solving France issues and also had some tough social repercussions 
(Marion, 1915). It is not surprising that the Regent wanted to try to follow Law’s design, which 
constituted in a new and innovative approach to public finances. However, neither Noaille nor 
Anguesseu, another influential personality in France’s aristocracy, were keen to support this 
project (DuTot, 1735). 
What Law tried to achieve was a total brake up of current financial and monetary system. The 
main obstacle in his plan was the nobility, in particular by the Parliament, which was strongly 
attached to the current system and therefore opposed since the beginning Law and all his 
revolutionary proposals. Had the Parliament known what Law had in mind, it would have 
probably opposed him more strongly in the first place.  
The ability in convincing opponent and in marketing his idea, allowed Law to persuade the Duc 
of Noaille, the President of the Conseil de Finances, to grant him an initial trust. The Duc de 
Noaille, in fact, at least until the publishing of the arrêt of 12th September 1717 without his 
knowledge, seemed to be convinced about the establishment of the bank, at least for the benefits 
that could be occurred in State’s finances (DuTot, 1735). 
Law was seen as a threat for the Parliament not only for his revolutionary ideas on the 
monetary system that, if implemented, would have reduced the nobility power. The General 
Bank, after some months of stagnation, started to show some results both in term of confidence 
from the public and of financial proceeds (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730). This allowed the 
Regent to have more independency from a financial point of view giving him more power 
delaying Parliament’s plans to return to the "pre-fronde" position of authority. On the contrary, 
the Regent understood the necessity to exploit Law’s innovation to twist the trade off he had to 
accept after the King’s death with respect to the Parliament.13 
In the cold war between the Parliament on one side, and the Regent and Law on the other one, a 
significant role has been played by the Abbey Dubois, who revealed to be a powerful ally against 
the conservative nobility in the initial stage of the system (Murphy, 1997; Cesarano, 1990). 
However, the person without whom Law could not have built what he did is the Regent. 
Interested and intrigued by Law’s proposal since the first time he heard them, somewhere in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 See paragraph one of next chapter. 
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171414, he always helped the Scottish man to get what he needed. At the beginning, was 
probably driven by self-interest, having seen in Law’s theory some interesting elements that 
could have brought France out of the crisis and elevated his personal power with respect to 
Parliament. Reading the Memoires de la Regence (1730), it can be inferred that their relationship 
was becoming tighter every day, increasing with Law’s reputation. According to Saint Simon 
(1930), and in line with what contained in the Mémoires, by the end of 1717 the Regent was 
firmly convinced that Law was the person who would pull France out of the recession, or at least 
the only one who could have actually done it. Therefore, he started to grant him his full support 
and shape the monetary policies accordingly to what he indicated and what he needed for the 
development of his bank that, as we have seen, was just the first step of a greater design.  
The more Law succeeded, the more the Parliament tried to obstacle him, mainly through the 
help of Anguesseu and the Duc of Noailles, who was again on the opposite side given the clear 
intention of Law to increase his power in the shaping of French economic policies at his 
expenses. In order to solve this dispute and try to reconcile his most important men in the 
management of public finances, the Regent arranged a meting at the beginning of 1718 between 
the four of them (Memoires du Duc de Saint-Simon, 1930). Noaille explained to his commensals 
the basic rationales of his economic policy, which had been the basis for all the last two years 
reforms. Though acknowledging the merits and soundness of principles, the Regent expressed 
concerns for the lack of progress that had been made that far offering a favourable ground to the 
presentation of Law’s principles. Law explained in details all his design and the system he had 
envisioned since 1715, confirming the objective of his plan to solve France’s dual crises, the 
monetary crisis and the financial crisis. 
Regarding the monetary crisis, he simply proposed to scale up what had already been done with 
his own private bank, the General Bank. The Bank, who in the last 6 months had started to show 
considerable progresses both in term of revenues that in term of public’s confidence, should have 
been converted into a public bank, own by the State, whom banknotes should become legal 
tender for transaction above a certain threshold. The best solution to solve the financial crisis, on 
the other hand, was the foundation of a trading company that allowed the public to convert state 
debt into company’s equity. It was not necessary to create a new company; they just had to 
develop the current Company of the West in the right direction. He had worked two years for 
that meeting (DuTot, 1735; Saint-Simon, 1930; Wood, 1791).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 It is not sure (Murphy, 1997), but for some authors (Levasseur, 1854) Law already had some contact with the duc 
d’Orléans before he actually became the Regent, probably in the visit in the beginning of the century. It is sure that 
the relationship between the two men, in 1716, developed quite fast (DuTot, 2000). 
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Noaille, already frustrated by the friction triggered by the sudden publication of an arrêt some 
months before, did not favour the proposal even if the main reason seems to be related to the 
reaction he knew the Parliament would have had after the proposal. However, the Regent’s 
enthusiasm prevailed and this meeting basically ratified the establishment of the System 
(Marion, 1915). As forecasted by Noaille, the Parliament did not like Law proposal and strongly 
attacked both the Scottish man and Regent’s administration (Saint Simon, 1930). The Regent 
counter move consisted in pushing Anguesseu and Noaille to resign and to appoint the Marquis 
d’Argenson as Controlleur de Finance to their position. By conferring to the marquis two 
positions, the Regent sent the strong message to the Parliament that he was no longer willing to 
tolerate its interference in the decision-making process (Murphy, 1997). As remarked by several 
sources (DuTot, 1735; Saint-Simon, 1930; du Hautchamp, 1739) Argenson had no economic 
understanding background, and his appointment seemed ideal to carry on Law’s policies without 
any more interference from the Ministry of Finances. Fauré (1977) does not agree with this 
interpretation, he rather thinks that given his past not completely in line with the Parliament, the 
new ministry, the first that would have received Parliament complaints, would not have had any 
problem to confront the nobility. 
When studying the sophistication of some edicts promulgated by Argenson, it seems quite 
straightforward that Law played a significant role in them. Several sources15 report that just three 
people ultimately discussed all policies regarding financial and monetary matters, at that time: 
the Regent, Law and Argenson, even if only one seemed to be the real director. For example, the 
edict issued by Argenson on May 1718 that devalued the currency without even passing through 
Parliament’s registration shows Law’s direct involvement in Argenson’s economic decisions. In 
this case, in fact, there were no economic needs to devalue the currency. However, the 
devaluation obliged coin holders to bring to the mint the old, struck coins along with some Billet 
d’Etat as a partial payment, therefore reducing the overall State’s debt in circulation. This debt 
management policy seems too much for an individual with no economic background. 
Tension with nobility kept growing. In middle 1718, the Parliament produced its own arrêt 
prohibiting workers to follow the disposition of one edict just released by the Conseil of de 
Regency (Memoires de la Regence, 1730). The Regent revoked the arrêt and soldiers were sent 
throughout the city to monitor the correct implementation of the initial edicts. The crisis broke in 
August, when the Parliament issued an arrêt which limited the spectrum of activities of the 
General Bank to the ones described in the original charter; furthermore, it also prohibited to any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Directly reported in Forbonnais (1758), Levasseur (1854) and in the Memoires of Duc de Saint-Simon (1930); 
indirectly inferable from DuTot (1735) and Mémoires de la Regence (1730). 
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foreigner to be involved in disbursement and management of Royal funds, essentially an ad hoc 
disposition for Law (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730). 
This period of tension between Law, the Regent and the Parliament is confused between 
different sources depending on the level of affinity with one or the other party. What is certain is 
that in the summer of that year, a lit de justice solution was put into place. Saint Simon, one of 
the proposer and firmly opposed to the Parliament, offers the most detailed narrative (1930). By 
the end of summer 1718, then, the institutional oppositions were removed and Law could finally 
start planning to put in practice his design caring only of the economic dimension.  
The other possible opposition could have come from the financiers, especially from the Pâris 
brothers, probably the most influential at that time. Instead of starting a fight even with them, 
Law facilitated the establishment of the United Tax Farms, done at the end of august 1718 by a 
group of financiers lead by Pâris brothers, which purchased a six years lease for 48.5mL. Even if 
this has been called the anti-System because of the similarities in the capital structure and in debt 
management objectives (Levasseur, 1854), DuTot (1735) is quite clear in arguing that the United 
Tax Farm was part of Law’s design and should have been eventually merged in the Company of 
the West. According to the cashier of the System and to other writers of the time, the potential of 
the United Tax Farm was even greater than Law’s Company’s, both in terms of debt 
management and subscription of shares. In fact, it aimed to convert into equity the long-term 
annuity, not only the billet d’état, and the revenues from the tax farming seemed quite a 
sustainable source of income. However, the Pâris brothers’ company did not succeed in selling 
shares and their anti-System never took off. As noticeably affirmed by Murphy (1991), the risk 
of the United Tax Farm posing any threat to Law’s was stillborn, and this is completely in line 
with DuTot interpretation that this Farm was, in some way, just another component of Law’s 
broad design. The design, which foresaw to merge the Tax Farms and the Company, could not be 
completed because of some divergences occurred somewhere in second part of 1718. 
The next step in the schedule towards the completion of the System was to make the General 
Bank the Royal Bank, a public Bank that could have centralized debt management and monetary 
policy. The nationalization, in December 1718, officially declared what was already true in 
practice since some months and gave France for the first time a central bank (Velde, 2003). 
The General Bank had been managed prudently: in fact, the several emissions of banknotes 
never brought the ratio with the specie reserve below 25%. With the edict of December 1718, the 
Bank stopped to have constraints on the quantity of banknotes it could print. However, the Bank 
was part of the overall System envisioned by Law and it did not loose the connection with the 
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Company of the West. As DuTot (2000) wrote, the two were to be thought as being two side of 
the same coin. 
After having twisted his private bank into the Royal Bank, Law concentrated in expanding his 
trade company acquiring several other companies making the former Company of West the 
Company of Indies. Subsequently to all these mergers and acquisitions that brought inside the 
System several companies, Law declared that he would have paid a dividend of 60 livres per 
share. He then started what will be his main achievement, the conversion of national debt into 
Company’s equity through the setting of a gigantic swap. It is around this period, in later 
summer 1719, that Paris started to venerate John Law. People had finally trust in him and 
confidence in the new instruments introduced by him in the market; shares price was raising 
every day, allowing every segment of the population to enrich and forgot about the poverty of 
some months before. His house in place Vendome was always surrounded by hundreds of people 
that wanted to see or even to talk with the man who seemed to be a magician (Hyde, 1969). 
Shares were rising, people getting richer. Several tales from different sources, even the oldest 
one, show how company’s shares trading enriched everyone. The word millionaire was 
introduced for the first time to describe the people enriched by speculation in the System (Wood, 
1791; Levasseur, 1854; Murphy, 1997). 
With his power growing, the number on enemies quickly tailored. It was asserted he had lodged 
in the Banks of England and Amsterdam no less than twenty millions sterling on his own 
account (Ainsworth, 1864), as a proof of his bad faith. This assertion, however, was entirely 
unfounded, as he invested almost the whole of his proceeds in the purchase of lands and real 
estates in France, in the hopes of conciliating the confidence of the people, and precluding all 
accusations of having drained the kingdom of specie by sending it to foreign parts (Levasseur, 
1854). 
On 18th of January 1720, as the final apex of his fast – and not long lasting – career, John Law 
was made Controlleur General de Finance, de facto first ministry of State, a position previously 
covered by men like Colbert and Desmaret. He was still convinced to raise France where it had 
never been, and he thought he was close (Murphy, 1997; Œuvres, III). It did not have any 
scruples in doing this, as the bet he made in summer of 1719 with Lord Londonderry shows: he 
declared that he would be able to take down the East India Company’s stock and promised to sell 
him 100.000 livres of stock at 11% less that the present price at that time. Unfortunately, when 
he made the bet the South Sea Bubble was starting and at the expire date of the gamble, he had to 
pay much more than the original market value (Murphy, 1997). In this period, he provoked in the 
Earl of Stair, English Ambassador in Paris and Law’ close friend until some months before, 
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strong concerns that induced him to write several letters to his capital, to highlight the danger 
Law could have been for London, as well as to the Regent, to show him “the plan under another 
lens”. He believed Law wanted to limit and decrease England’s power, and the concerns were 
even stronger given his acquired power with respect to the Regent, that was completely 
dependent on him. As Stair was writing in 1719: 
He, in all his discourse pretends that he will set France higher than ever she was before, 
and put her in a condition to give the law to all Europe; that he can ruin the trade and 
credit of England and Holland, whenever he pleases; that he can break our bank, 
whenever he has a mind; and our East India Company16. 
 
However, in the beginning of 1720 Law was too powerful to be attacked, the ambassador was 
called back in England and his letters further convinced Law and the Regent to reduce England’s 
power. In order to avoid a diplomatic crisis with a country that was at that moment too strong, 
English Parliament decided to start the procedure to grant Law the Royal pardon. The issues 
flagged out by Lord Stairs, however, had an impact later on. Law was seen as dangerous for 
England because of his presumed will to reduce country’s power to benefit France, and English 
parliament made all in his power to keep Law away both from France and England as soon as his 
power dropped (Wood, 1791). 
If the raise of the System has been fast, its failure was even faster. Some political actions in 
spring 1720, not totally approved by Law, brought to the loss in confidence in the paper currency 
and in the drop of shares price. Banknotes, which were now legal tender and no more backed by 
real asset, suddenly did not have a value and the public unrested. We will explain this in details 
in next chapter. 
Law was removed from his position and the Regent was enough able to ascribe to him all the 
burdens of the failure of the System. Towards the end of 1720, the Scottish economist 
understood that was the right moment to leave France before his life would have put in serious 
danger. 
1.4 Later memories – the exile    
When Law left France in December 1720, he thought he would come back. In some way his 
design, his dream was not fully completed and he believed the Regent would have called him 
back. The proof of this being that between 1721 and 1723, a part the stay in London for the 
ceremony of his formal pardon for Wilson’s murder, he staid nearby France refusing some 
interesting proposal of engagement from the Czar of Russia and the King of Denmark (Murphy, 
1997). Notwithstanding the support from the Regent and form Bourbon, which kept writing to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Quoted from Murphy (1997), pp. 202. 
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Law, the cardinal Dubois, who basically replaced Law as the closest economic and policy 
advisor of the Regent, made all in his power to ensure that Law would have never went back in 
France. Even British were concerned about his movement because suspicious with his links with 
Stuarts (Forbonnais, 1758). 
Law arrived in Venice in Jan 1721. After some days, he tried to go and to settle in Rome but 
Burges, the British envoy quite close to Law, strongly advised against this. Venice was nice and 
gambling was a never-ending passion for him. However, Law was not satisfied and tried in all 
ways to go back in France or at least near there. He did not get the permission from the ministry 
to go back to London, but he decided to go in October 1721. He asked for audience, getting it 
under the annoyance of Cardinal Dubois. Law assiduously worked his back into the favour of 
British establishment; he was the former financial ministry of France and the creator of the 
Mississippi System, probably the main driver of the South Sea Bubble. People were not just mad 
at him; they were interested (Murphy, 1991). Law’s return to favour was marked in early 
December by the formal pardoning for Wilson’s murder. 
From the available records17, Law talked openly about the possibility of his return to France, 
especially because Pâris Brother, the ones who substituted him, were not doing the right things 
according to the Scottish: the were trying to re-equilibrate the economy with a heavy tax on the 
gains made through the Mississippi System. In 1722, after the continuous rejection of France to 
let his wife leave the country and to free from prison his brother Williams, Law started to be 
angry at his country of adoption (Œuvres, III). 
He had several debts around Europe but used again his economic understandings to sort out a 
solution for all of them (Ainsworth, 1864). He repeatedly asked the Regent to settle his balances 
on his behalf, since most of the debts he contracted were for defending and boosting his System 
and therefore France economy, but never received a formal reply, even tough is it possible that 
some of them had been cleared (Murphy, 1997).  
Between April and May of 1723, in the continuous struggle for going back to France, he 
submitted to the Regent the Projet d’edit sur les retablissement du credit en France along with 
one of the letter of their intense correspondence. According to Law (Œuvres, III), the Regent 
replied him that he had “resolved the difficulties and fear”, implicitly King’s. In the same period 
he also wrote to the Regent the Mémoires justificatif d’avril-may 1723 (Œuvres, III, 33) where, 
starting from an introductory letter to the duc d’Orléans where he glorifies the achievements of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Mainly from the letters contained in the third book Œuvres, 1934. 
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his system18, he revisits its evolution, from the reason why he started it, to the difference with the 
English situation, until the reasons of its failure for which he ultimately asks the judgment of the 
Regent: 
J'examineray ma conduite avec sincérité; je connois mon attachement pour le bien public 
et pour vostre gloire, mais je suis homme; peut estre que mon zèle m'aura porté à faire ce 
qui doit estre Manié. Je me soumets au jugement de Vostre Altesse Royale. 
 
Another letter, that Law wrote to Mr. Rosemberg, Serbian Ministry of Finances, gives a further, 
significant testimony of the vision the Scottish man had on his system and on the actions he 
undertook. Even after the failure, in fact, he did not stop to glorifying it merits. In the letter, Law 
explains how his main goals were make the nation stronger and people happy, and how he 
completely succeeded. He had no enemies but France’s and he saved the nation from the coming 
bankruptcy after Luis XIV. The most significant passage is when he clearly acknowledged that 
some mistakes had been made, but these were not a direct implication of his theory. When paper 
money was legal tender, preferred to specie and with a premium over it, the economy was 
functioning smoothly and this, according to his vision, should have lasted “as long as the French 
government”. 
In the autumn of 1723, things seemed to turned good again for Law: politicians on both side of 
the Channel were discussing the possibility of him returning and France and the health 
conditions of cardinal Dubois were deteriorating. However, in December 1723 the Regent died, 
and Law was invited back in France but just for this reason. Accordingly to a letter written in 
1724 to the Duc of Bourbon, he would have been called back to take care of France’s finances, 
had the Duc d’Orleans lived longer. In the correspondence he had with the Regent few days 
before the latter’s death, the Regent would have acknowledge the theoretical merits of the 
System and its complete success, hadn’t he been forced by events to take some drastic measures 
not in line with it (Murphy, 1997). 
After the definitive fade-out of the possibility to going back to France to “complete what had 
been started”, Law moved back to Venice. Here, he mainly devoted his time to gambling and 
enjoying the flourishing arts of the city, with particular attention to paintings. He also had several 
visitors, some of them not well desired. Indeed, some of the formerly Law’s friends went to 
Venice to have back money they lent to him, threatening to kill him and his son hadn’t he paid 
them back. Some other visitors were more interested in the System and offered him the 
possibility of reminisce about it.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 « Monseigneur, Le sistème que j 'avois étably en France a eu un si grand succès dans ses commancements qu'il est 
certain que s'il avoit continué de mesme ce Royaume seroit devenu très puissant par son crédit et par son commerce	  […].	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On 28th August he played host to Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de la Brede et the 
Montesquieu (1689-1755) with whom he thoroughly discussed the functioning of the System 
(Hyde, 1969). Even if the French author already parodied Law and his System in the Persian 
Letters, the Scottish man probably acknowledged the substance of his interlocutor and tried to 
exploit the situation to make him change vision. However, as clearly stated by Murphy (1997), 
Montesquieu was “unable to grasp many of the issues that Law discussed” a part from the insight 
of how the bank economized on dividends’ payments by playing with different payment dates of 
the shares given as collateral for borrowing. 
Venice has been the last city he saw, since he contracted pneumonia and died the 21st march 
1729. 
 
The exile period has been a one of intense writing activity for Law. He kept an intense 
correspondence with France, he tried to go back in England, and he maintained relationship with 
his closest friends. However, the common aspect of all his writing in this period seems the 
necessity to provide justifications for his actions to posterity. He knew that his System had 
caused damage, but since the very last moment he never gave up in promoting the soundness of 
his ideas (Velde, 2003). 
He often repeats some of the central concepts of his theory, sometime restating specific 
definitions. For example, regarding the supply and demand quantity, he restates it in a very 
similar and succinct way, demonstrating that he did not change opinion over the importance of 
this tool. He also explains several times how one of the principal problems of France at that time 
was the taxation system, which with its high rates and ample range of product taxed, was 
slowing down the economy. And was for this reason that during his System he tried to 
implement some measures that could have helped to alleviate the burden of taxation, admitting 
that this has also been a tactical move to raise the favour of French with respect to his System. 
 
One of the main critiques Law’s contemporaries – and not only them – address to the Scottish 
economist is related to the hypothesis of his fraudulent behaviour. According to them, he had 
been gifted with a fast brain which allowed him to put in practice a system with the sole intent of 
make as much money as possible non caring about people. This statement, mainly driven by the 
angry and the delusion present in France right after the collapse of the System for the 
contemporaries, by ignorance for more recent commentators, is far from the true. Is it true that he 
earned a huge amount of money: after founding the private bank, from which he gained a high 
return thanks to the royal conversion. He also invested in the Mississippi Company, buying a 
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huge amount of shares that made him one of the richer individual of the time. Law himself, who 
in a letter 1723 asserted that during the apex of his System he has been the “richest individual 
who ever lived”, confirms this. Not only he accumulated a huge value in term of financial 
securities, but he also started a painting collection that at his death, in 1729, revealed to be one of 
the most impressive private collections of the time (Wood, 1791). He also made some mistakes, 
but we feel confortable in arguing that money was not the ultimate objective. It was important, as 
he liked enjoying life’s pleasures, but was not the final point of all his theoretical construction 
and political struggles. The growth of his fortune, in fact, did not stop him to further improve his 
System until the end. Being one of the richer people in Europe at that time meant more than 
buying masters’ paintings and luxury real estates. He could have afforded much more and, above 
all, he could have stored his money in a Holland banks had it thought the System was just a way 
to enrich himself. He rather invested everything in France19, not a smart choice had he thought 
he was doing a gamble with French economy. He was strongly convinced by the positive and 
time lasting innovation the System was bringing in French economy, the country that adopted 
him and he had chosen to live in. 
As Montesquieu summarized, and he was not a big fan of the Scottish author, Law was a man 
“more in love with his ideas than with his money” (Montesquieu, Œuvres complètes). 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 A part for a diamond bought in 1718 (Histoire de Finances). 
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2. The Mississippi System: theory against practice 
2.1 Why France  	  
After having read the first chapter, the answer to this question seems obvious: because it was 
the only country which let him do it and that was with any hope left. This statement contains part 
of the true, but is not entirely correct. The theory Law was supporting in 1715 was far more 
different and complicated that the one embedded in the proposals made to England and Scotland. 
His understanding of the relation between monetary policies and real economy was almost 
complete (Murphy, 1997). Furthermore, he already started to look more into the fiscal 
dimension, the public finances and their role in the overall economy (Velde, 2003). 
France was without any doubt at the last hope, but it presented also the type of economy that 
fitted better with the design Law had in mind. Greater power than Scotland (or even Savoie), but 
without a proper trade company as England, with a serious problem of public finances. Is it true 
that Luis XIV rejected Law’s first proposal (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730), but the reason was 
more superstitious than soundly motivated. On the other side, as shown before, Law started to 
get contact with France some ten years earlier and from several memories it can be deducted that 
he had actually chosen France (Hamilton, 1936).  
So it is difficult to delineate the exact causal relation, but it can be argued that Law’s System 
had greater effect, both positive (first period) and negative (second), on the French economy that 
would have elsewhere had because both of the structure of France’s economy and for Law’s 
ideas, which were shaped, at least in the last years, thinking of France model. 
Building on shaky ground, the main problem of the France guided by the old Luis XIV has 
been the war expenditures. The Dutch war (1678), the War of the Reunion (1681), the Nine 
Years War (1693) and, among all, the war of Spanish Succession (1705) drained the finances 
increasing the public expenditure, with the non-military expenditure slowly growing (Marion, 
1915). The war of Spanish succession definitely dropped the primary surplus, letting the public 
debt exploding and forcing the king to levy new taxes, income taxes among all (Velde, 2003). 
Taxes were the main source of fiscal revenues, but their collection was decentralized (Rist, 
1938). The government fixed nationally the revenues of direct taxes and then split this amount 
by provinces, where local authorities further divided in local assessments. For indirect taxes, 
instead, the collection was to be carried out by tax farmers on behalf of the government and the 
right was to be assigned to the highest bidder. The bid consisted in the fixed amount the farmer 
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committed to pay annually to the government; the difference between this amount and the actual 
collected was the profit, or loss, of the farmer (Velde, 2009; Histoire des finances). 
The French government established in a similar way all types of monopolies, salt and tobacco 
being the most important ones. The creativity of the French authorities in crafting monopolies 
was particularly fertile in periods of shortage of funds20. Local treasurers spent a portion of these 
locally farmed proceeds, before turned them over to the Paris Treasury. 
With a negative primary surplus due to the general increase in taxes, both direct and indirect, in 
order to finance the wars and the insufficient proceed generated by monopolies, the government 
needed to appeal to borrowing. In the France of the beginning of eighteen century, there were 
two main types of long-term borrowing: annuities (rentes) and sales of offices (Vurer, 1886). 
Annuities, which could be life or perpetual, were usually assigned to a specific tax revenue and 
the interest paid by the tax collector. This type of contract was also very used by private parties. 
The Church, being concerned about the usury and the proliferation of loans, forced the State to 
insert a clause on annuity’s contract that allowed the borrower to repay in full the debt whenever 
he wanted while the creditor could not ask for the extinguishment of the same (Hyde, 1969). The 
other form of borrowing, the sales of offices, constituted in the selling of the right to hold a 
government position that brought privileged to the officer. The King paid interest on the sum 
borrowed in the form of a wage (gages) to the officer. Offices could be removed only after the 
complete repayment from the King. The Encicopedie methodique reports that Luis XIV 
instituted over 3000 offices from 1689 to 1712, mainly because of the war of Spanish succession. 
Both offices and annuities were considered real estates, and therefore could be mortgaged, and 
transferrable, but the transaction cost was not negligible (Vickers, 1959). 
Money, in the broader sense, had two components: coin and unit of account. Coins, made by 
gold and silver, were standardized objects produced by the government-operated mints that 
people used to buy goods and services. The unit of account, the livre tournois (L)21, was used to 
express prices and other monetary quantities in numbers. The monetary policy, if it can be called 
in this way, consisted in the relation between the coins and the unit of account. The relations was 
obviously determined by the King, which basically had to establish a specific number of livres 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Several examples of very strange monopolies are offered by the literature: from the right to sell ice and snow in 
the Paris district for 10000L in 1701, to the right to sell the specific parts of pork (Marion, 1915). 
21The livre was established by Charlemagne in the 8th century as a unit of account. Several types of livres developed 
in the whole France and the livre parisis became the official coin of the Capetian dynasty. The livre tournois derives 
instead by the denier tournois, a coin minted by the abbey of Saint Martin in the Touraine region of France. At the 
beginning of 13th century, after Philip II seized the countries of Anjou and Touraine, the livre tournois started to 
supersede the livre parisis, which slowly disappeared (Davis, 2002). The livre tournois was, as the Charlemagne’s 
original livre, divided into 20 sols, each further divided in 12 deniers. From 14th century onwards, coins worth one 
livre tournois stated to be minted and they were called francs (Chown, 1994).  
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for coins (the face value) and to decide the price at which the mint had to provide each coin. 
Following the definition give by Velde (2003), for each coin there were two significant 
measures, both decided by the King: the first, the Mint Equivalent (ME), measured the number 
of units of account per quantity of metal brought to the mint; the second, the Mint Price (MP), 
had the same unit of measure and indicated the quantity of metal necessary for the coin. Of 
course, MP had to be lower or equal to ME, the difference 1-MP/ME being the seignorage rate 
applied to convert metal into coins, i.e. the legal tender. As reported in Velde, the ME of silver 
has been constant since 1641 and in 1679 the MP has been set equal to it (no seignorage). 
However, the deteriorating condition of the public finances obliged the King to use the 
seignorage instrument: from 1689 to 1726 the ME changed 64 times, 8 times in 1720 only. 
Changing these parameters constituted a monetary reform, and induced (if not coerced) 
individual to submit to the seignorage tax, which was contextually increased. The King simply 
had to announce a demonetization of the existing coin and its replacement with a coin with a 
higher face value, thus forcing the owner of an old coin that needed the legal tender to bring it to 
the mint and pay the seignorage tax (Ferguson, 2008). 
Luis XIV dead in 1715 and left France after 72 years of reign with a public debt of around 
2800milion livres, divided across annuities, offices and floating debt (Vurer, 1886). The primary 
surplus, back to be positive in 1710, was not enough to pay the interest on annuities and offices. 
On the top of this, there were around 45mL deriving from the 4% interest rate on the floating 
debt. The ratio public debt – GDP was around 100%, pretty high if compared to the England’s 
63% (Velde, 2003). 
The successor at the reign, Luis’ grandson, was five and too young to be King. After some 
institutional confusion, the duke d’Orléans, King’s nephew, convinced the parliament that he 
would have brought back its importance and obtained the approval for installing a Regency22.  
The enormous public debt was further groaned under intolerable taxes imposed to afford the 
payments of its interests. The industries were checked, trade was annihilated, merchants and 
traders almost brought back to beggar (Histoire des finances). The state of affairs was so much 
worrying that Council debated and actually proposed the Regent to declare bankruptcy (Wood, 
1791). The Regent refused this solution and opted for the establishment of a commission, the 
Visa, to enquire the status of national debt and trying to reduce it (Capefigue, 1841).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Louis XIV, whose first years of reign were troubled by the Paris Parliament's unrest, had imposed his will and 
deprived it of the right to remonstrate. When he died and left the Regent's powers severely curtailed in his will, the 
Regent bartered with the Parliament: the court would declare the will null and void, and he would return the right of 
remonstrance (Sargent & Velde, 1995).  
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The Regent’s government, headed by the duke of Noailles, immediately carried out two 
monetary reforms containing partial defaults and reduction bringing back to around 2mL the 
public debt (Vurer, 1886). The most significant reduction, obtained mainly through forcible 
measure, occurred in the floating debt that was also converted into bearer notes called Billet 
d’Etat, with an interest of 4% and no precise redemption date. The drawback of this operation 
was that the Billet d’Etat notes started to be traded at a 40% discount soon after their issue in 
1716, reaching 60% in summer (DuTot, 2000).  
Higher indirect taxes and drastic cut in the spending, especially military, brought France’s 
balances almost to parity in 1718 (Velde, 2009). However, the methods used were the traditional 
ones, and sensibly weakened the country from the military point of view. The European situation 
was far to be settled and France was not in the condition to engage into another war (Mémoires 
de la Regence, 1730). Having said all of this, it is clear why the Regent entrusted John Law and 
allowed him to take the control of the overall French finances. The remedies put into place were 
not enough and definitely not sustainable. A radically new and more rational way to manage 
finances was needed: John Law based it on a new form of money and on credit. 
According to the France’s Financial history since 1715 (Marion, vol. III, 1915), Law was 
coming at the right time. At that time, in fact, the Billets d’Etat were totally discredited and the 
specie were not enough even for the small amount of transactions occurring in such a destroyed 
economy. This quantity was further reduced by the continuous concealing of silver done by most 
of individuals to preserve some wealth against the frequent diminutions of the precious metals. A 
“papier public de confiance” was dramatically hoped for, a general royal paper able to bring 
back to the economy what the diffidence induced in concealing. Even according to Noailles 
(Saint-Simon, 1930), the scarcity of specie, in particular of silver, was the main reason of the 
desperation permeating France at that time and this was further aggravated by the lost of 
confidence and the mistrust deriving from the frequent diminution. 
 
2.2 The General Bank    	  
After twelve years and several rejections, for the first time the fate turned into Law’s favour 
and he finally obtained the permission to build his own Bank (Hyde, 1969). The key element 
being the full support of the Regent, who was firmly convinced that Law and his ideas were the 
right choice to solve French problems. The Regent used the devastation of France’s finances as a 
further leverage to justify the trust accorded to Law.  
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John Law initially proposed a 100%-reserve public bank that should have handled the 
government’s and France’s finances. What emerges from the literature23 of that time is that the 
Regent would have wanted to allow the Scottish economist to implement his initial proposal, but 
facing strong opposition from his cabinet, he granted only the establishment of a private owned 
bank24. 
On 2nd may 1716 the letters patent for the establishment of the General Bank were granted to 
John Law (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730). The proposal for the establishment of a public bank 
had been rejected “due to the circumstances of the time”, but he was now granted the 
establishment of a private bank, to be financed by private funds and by all the proceeds it would 
gain doing its business. The ten articles of the letters contain the explanation of the setting within 
which building the bank (Mémoires de la Regence, I). The company had the monopoly to be a 
General Bank for twenty years. Its banknotes were to be denominated in specie-equivalent 
écus25, meaning that there would have always been an equivalent in metallic money not subject 
to changes in the value of specie in terms of unit of account, i.e. livre tournois. In this way, 
hedging from any change in specie value due to changes in the domestic exchange rate, Law26 
incentivised specie holders to deposit their metallic money into the bank27. This prescription is 
the first of a long series done by Law in order to properly market his ideas and fasten the 
development of his system that, above all, needed trust (Hamilton, 1968). 
Aside from the Regent, no form of control was effectively put in place, since the inspector 
nominated by the Duc d’Orléans was a merchant that already supported Law in his proposal of 
1715 (Marion, 1915). All other articles concentrated on mundane peculiarities rather than on the 
concrete ways in which the bank should have worked as, for example, whether should it be a 
deposit bank or had the power to create credit. Two weeks later, the 20th may 1716, other letters 
patents were issued for the description of the modus operandi of the bank (Mémoires de la 
Regence, 1730). 
The capital of the bank was to be made by 1200 shares for a total value of 6 million livres, 
equivalent to 5000 livres per share, or one thousand écus. Shares were mostly payable in billet 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 This element can be found, in various meanings and represented through various anecdotes, in DuTot (1735; 
2000), Levasseur (1854), Mémoire de la Regence (1730) and therefore in Harsin, Murphy and Fauré. 
24 The other clear element being the Regent did not want to reopen the controversy started with the Parliament for 
his confirmation as Regent (Pâris-Duverney, 1740).  
25 The écus was the standard silver coin, roughly the size of a thaler or Spanish dollar. In 1718, 8 écus were minted 
out of a marc of standard silver, and its face value was 5L. A 100 écus note was therefore a claim to 100/ 8 marcs of 
coined silver, and had a legal tender value of 500L (Velde, 2003). 
26 The letters were officially from the French bureaucracy. However, as will be the case for the next four years, Law 
was the mind behind any disposition regarding economic and finance matters, or at least he was informed and 
participated in the decision process.  
27 Of course in this way they would not gain from an appreciation of the specie. But since silver was scarce, this had 
never been the case for several years, so this was a hedging against losses. 
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d’état - which stood at 60% market discount at that time (Wood, 1791) - at face value, the rest in 
cash. Only one fourth of the 5000L had to be paid initially, therefore it took 690L in cash to buy 
a share. Law himself bought almost one fourth of the outstanding shares, as reported in Harsin 
1934 (Œuvres, III, 245). Here can be found the first hint on the shape of the overall design, 
which aimed to manage French finances overall: billet d’Etat were accepted at face value even if 
they were standing at heavy discount in the market. In this way, the Bank was revaluing French 
debt letting glimpse the already present interest, in Law, in the management of public finances. 
The Bank had the power to discount bills and letters of exchange, but was not formally allowed 
to trade or borrow money. Its banknotes were to be payable at demand and were to be issued 
fully backed by specie. The bank was similar to a modern limited liability company (Velde, 
2003). Dividends were to be distributed twice a year in conjunction with the assembly, where 
shareholders voted according to their share’s holdings. The Bank’s main activities consisted, 
other than discounting bills, in selling foreign exchanges, taking deposits and managing current 
accounts (charging a fee of 0.025% on transfers between accounts and on cash payment orders), 
and issuing notes payable in specific silver coins, écus, on demand to the bearer (Murphy, 1997; 
Hyde, 1969).  
The Bank created was very different to the one envisaged by Law in the first proposal. Even if 
the Regent fully supported the Scottish man, he could not guarantee him what he asked for, as 
the political tensions in the French nobility after the death of King Sun were still strong and his 
role not yet defined. According to DuTot (2000), however, the Bank was established under 
private name company in order to “test the public”, to see how people would respond to a new 
financial institution, and assess whether or not there were rooms for making it public. Given the 
full support received by the Regency in the first year of activity, this interpretation seems 
reliable. 
Law, on the first day of opening of his Bank, which only branch was at his house in what now 
is Place Vendome in Paris, delivered to the public a moving speech, arguing that a banker was 
worth death if he delivered out notes or bills of exchange without “having the effective value in 
his strong box” (Wood, 1791; Œuvres, II; Mémoires de la Regence, 1730). 
The most critical objective for the Bank in the first period was to build confidence in the 
banknotes and let them circulate, avoiding the public to return them for redemption. The Regent 
and other important people, as long as several institutional ad hoc norms, played a crucial role in 
building it and let the public trust bank’s activities (Levasseur, 1854). 
Fixing the redemption value of the banknotes in terms of écus hedged the owner of the bill 
against the manipulation of the precious metals, especially silver. The banknote contained the 
	  	   46	  
promise to pay a determinate number of coins in a determined day 28. The banknote essentially 
waved against the seignorage in a form of tax credit (Murphy, 1991)29. This was one of the most 
attractive elements of banknotes and will constitute one of the main differences with the 
transformation of the General Bank into the Royal Bank.  
The Bank did not take off in the first months. Law faced the strong opposition of other bankers, 
which feared that a new competitor, who was even supported by the Regent, would have mined 
their businesses and their power. Also common people did not trust the bank, given its small 
initial capital, and thought that the deposits made by some rich people had been done only to 
please the Regent (Pâris-Duverney, 1740). On the other side, Law did not give up and started to 
run the Bank in an efficient way with the added ability of marketing all his actions. It completed 
a significant international transaction on behalf of France with Sweden and did it 25% cheaper 
than any other bankers would have done (Forbonnais, 1758). He advertised that the bank would 
handle remittances by giving a bill of exchange without any interest or commission (Mémoires 
de la Regence, 1730). It also offered free discount services and free foreign exchange 
conversions. All these expedients, along with the Regent support (he even publicly deposited a 
huge amount in the Bank) enticed traders to use the bank starting from the end of the summer of 
1716. People started to have confidence in the Bank, the hedge against “augmentation” and the 
prompt convertibility being the main reasons. By the end of January 1717, even the author of the 
Gazette de la Regence, who opposed Law since the beginning, had to admit that the bank was 
firmly established in the French system (Wood, 1791; Mémoires de la Regence, 1730). 
The results obtained after some months by the Bank appear even more noteworthy if related 
with the small initial working capital. In fact, even if the initial capital was defined in 6 millions 
livres, only one quarter of the price of the share was called up at the moment of the subscription. 
Furthermore, only one fourth had to be paid in specie; the rest could be paid in billet d’Etat 
which were standing at a heavily discount - around 60% - thank to the incapability of the French 
government to repay them within the due time in the past (Davis, 1887). Ultimately, the working 
capital was 375.000 livres, a very small amount for reaching the objectives set by Law. Despite 
this low number, in its two and a half years of operation as the General Bank it issued in total 
149 million livres in banknotes (44.4 in 1716, 51.6 in 1717 and 52.6 in 1718)30. How is it 
possible? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “the Bank promises to pay on sight to the bearer 100 écus of the weight and fineness of this day” (Mackay, 1841) 
29 If one deposited 1000 livres the day of opening, when the ratio was 40l per marc, whenever he will withdraw his 
capital he will get 25 marcs, no matter if the ratio between livres and marc had changed. 
30 This numbers, probably accounted by Bourgeois, the treasurer of the bank, are reported in Harsin, 1928. Since the 
bank’s books have been destroyed, this is the most reliable source available today. 
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According to the old controller general Desmaret, in a memory of middle 1716, the bank would 
not survive since its only income was the 4% gained from the billet d’Etat used by the public to 
(partially) pay the shares, while the running expenses were estimated around 60.000 livres 
annually (in Murphy, 1997).   
Not only the bank did not fail, but in two years Law was able to transform it in a financial 
institution able to generate some 615 livres per share as dividend, or 64% in two and half years. 
This profitability and the strict relation with the French debt (great part of the capital had been 
paid in billet d’Etat) convinced the Regent and his ministry to take off the Bank transforming it 
in a public bank (DuTot, 2000).  
Given that only 1.5 million had being paid at the beginning and that in 1718 the shareholders 
were repaid in full, it means the Bank was able to generate more than 5 millions (if we consider 
the billet d’Etat at the 100% value). How the difference with Desmaret’s numbers can be 
explained? 
We are in line with Murphy (1991; 1997) and Velde (2003; 2009) in interpreting these 
astonishing results obtained by the Bank as consequence of it operating also in giving credit. It is 
not possible that discounting bills of exchange and carrying on foreign exchange operation, 
much of them done for free in the first months of activity, could make such a return. Given the 
destruction of all Bank’s papers and the extreme reluctance of Law in talking about the ways he 
managed it31, there will never be a conclusive answer. Is it sure that the calculation made by 
Desmaret were based on its strict interpretation of the statute, namely a 100% ratio between 
reserves and banknotes, which therefore impeded the Bank to lend money. Law probably 
interpreted the dispositions in a more relaxed way. As reported in the Œuvres (III.312), in fact, 
“as the resources increased, it used them to meet other needs of the State”, letting also other 
activities to benefit from his bank de facto lending money. 
Even according to the author of the Historie de Finances, the General Bank was involved in 
lending activity, and the reserves-deposit ratio is estimated in 50%.  
 
The system Law had envisaged was far more articulated than a simple private bank. As soon as 
the bank started to permeate into the French financial system, around fall 1716, he stopped the 
“marketing activities” and focused more on transforming the General Bank into the banker to the 
government. As previously happened, he had the full support of the Regent, persuaded that Law 
was the right man and his system the right solution to end the crisis France was sinking in. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 This is admitted by him in a letter of 1717 to the Regent (Œuvres, II) 
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In October 1716 the Conseil de Finance requested the provincial intendants to order the Royal 
tax collectors and the tax farmer to pay on sigh the banknotes of the General Bank and to remit 
taxes receipts to Paris only in banknotes (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730). The tax collectors 
were hostile to this measure, and managed to avoid respecting it advocating that the current 
supply of banknotes was not enough. On the 10th of April 1717, however, an arrêt of the Council 
of the State stipulated that the banknotes could be used as legal tender in payment of taxes, with 
the justification that the transportation of specie from the provinces was mining the smoothness 
of trade. The measure, without any doubt pushed by the Regent and therefore by Law32, heralded 
the start of the Bank’s involvement as the banker to the government. DuTot defines the arrêt of 
the 10th of April “the most important measure taken for the development of the bank” adding that 
hitherto no Royal paper (billet de monnaie, billet d’état, etc.) was ever been accepted in payment 
of taxes. With this arrêt starts the pace towards the status of legal tender for Bank’s notes.  
The link between the Bank and the government was further strengthened by the arrêt of 
September 1717, which ordered that all taxes in Paris and in its suburbs were to be paid in 
General Bank’s notes. In November of 1717 Law wrote that the main driver of the bank’s growth 
was due to the government funds rather than from the private sector. He also complained 
because given the private nature of the Bank, its capital was not at the level it should have been 
and this constituted a risk for the public. According to the Scottish banker, the capital was only 6 
millions livres and the Bank was not able to build up its reserves as it paid dividend to 
shareholders every six months. This statement is flawed because the bank was building up 
reserves (DuTot, 2000) and shareholder kept paying the outstanding amount for the initial 
subscription (Marion, 1915). We do not believe Law was disingenuous as indicated in Murphy 
(1997), but rather that he used once again his capability as marketer to show the Regent and the 
French élite that his bank was doing very well but could have concretely helped the French 
recovery, had them give to it the “Royal” status, i.e. let it become public. 
 
2.3 The Company  
The second step for the realization of his System was a Company of Trade. He founded the 
Compagnie d’Occident in August 1717, a trade company similar to the ones succeeded since 
Richelieu and Colbert, which had not had great success (Histoire de finances). The company had 
granted the monopoly over the trade with Louisiana, a French possession, which corresponded to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 This statement seems particularly true given the fact that the Duc of Noailles, the minister of the French finances, 
was not aware of the arrêt and asked to remove it as soon as he saw it, signing the beginning of the controversy 
between him and Law.  
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almost one half of the present territories of the Unites States of America33. The name given to the 
trading company by early historians and that will uniquely identify Law’s System, Mississippi, is 
derived from the name of the main river of Louisiana territories.  The arrangement put into 
practice was really similar to the ones used by other countries in the past: the ruler (the State) 
granted the right to develop a colony and trade under monopoly in a given period of time 
(Giraud, 1953). In this way, the State did not have to bear the cost and the risk of the 
establishment of the colony, and could benefit both a payment from the company for the issue of 
the right and a plausible increase in the tax base as the colony prospered (Velde, 2003). 
The former colony’s proprietor returned it to the King in payment of taxes in 1716 and 
suggested, when describing the ideal successor, something that had the characteristic of Law’s 
Bank (Murphy, 1997). Since 1716 several proposals were made for the granting of the monopoly 
over Louisiana. Once again, Law summarized them and made them more ambitious, and 
exploiting his strict relationship with the Regent and the growing reputation he was building in 
the French nobility, secured government’s approval in August 1717 (Giraud, 1953). Louisiana 
was ceded to the Company as a fief in perpetuity; moreover, the Company had a 25-years 
monopoly on trading with the colony. The Company was allowed to raise a private army, to 
enter into treaties with the Native Americans, and to call on the government for military 
assistance against other European powers. At the expiration of the monopoly, it would retain 
ownership of the colony but it would have to sell any forts and military equipment to the king 
(Mémoires de la Regence, 1730).  
As in the Bank’s IPO shares were issued, but at this time they were wholly payable in billets 
d’Etat. This further demonstrates the paramount importance that the relation between public 
French finances and the design Law had in mind. He was concerned about the French fiscal 
problems, and accepting the billet d’Etat as a payment was a substantial help for French finances. 
It is also clear that this term of the subscription allowed Law to start to control a significant 
quantity of French debt, which will be used later on to gradually acquire all the monopolies from 
the State without the need of cash (Hamilton, 1967). As we have shown above, the billet d’Etat 
were at a heavily discount, since they were not changed for more than 150-160 livres with a face 
value of 500l: taking them as payment for the share at their full nominal value, consisted de facto 
in making a loan to the King of around 100mL (Wood, 1791). The first year of interest would 
need to settle the business (“commercial purposes”), the other annual rents of the following years 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33French Louisiana – la  Louisiane française – was an administrative district of New France. The area, under French 
control from 1672 to 1762 and from 1802 to 1804, was named after Luis XIV by the French explorer Rene-Robert 
Cavalier. It covered a huge territory, which included most of the drainage basin of the Mississippi River, from the 
Great Lakes to the Gulf of Mexico and from the Appalachian mountain to the Rocky Mountain. 
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were to be allotted for paying regularly the shares’ dividends, fixed initially in 20 livres per share 
(Murphy, 1997). 
People were more than happy to get rid of the billet d’Etat, but previous experiments with 
colonies did not show significant gains and the scepticism was still high. John Law perfectly 
understood this and persuaded the public of the contrary, also exploiting the reputation that had 
started acquiring throughout the population. Louisiana was presented as a fertile land full of gold 
and silver and the disappointing results of previous administration explained as the consequences 
of wrong management rather than weakness and scarcity of its commodities (Davis, 1886; 
Giraud, 1953). Public started to get interest in this topic and some influential people begun to 
share the company’s management belief that the new colony would have granted a stable and 
relevant flow of revenues. However the common person, not particularly educated, needed more 
time and an established trend to follow. 
 The IPO began on 14th September 1717 and 29mL were subscribed within two weeks, but of 
that amount as much as 13.3mL had been bought by Law himself (Murphy, 1997). After that, 
subscriptions were very slow, and dragged into 1718. In June 1718 measures were taken to speed 
up payments, mainly by introducing a down-payment system: a subscriber paid 20% of the price 
to secure an option on a share, with the rest payable within five months, else he forfeited the 
down-payment (DuTot, 2000)34. This option, which Law liked really much and that he will use 
even later for fasten the subscription of other shares of the Company, broadening the basis of 
people who could now afford the subscription and offering an incentive to invest, helped to 
increase the number of shareholders. However, it did not work in the same way it will work one 
year later for the subscription of the cinq cents, when French were more used to shares and stock 
markets and completely trusted the System and its inventor. In fact, the subscription was closed 
on Dec 31st, 1718, with 100mL sold but more than 40% was owned by the King, which used 
spare billets d’Etat that had been printed but not spent to but the shares (Forbonnais, 1758). 
From the Mémoires de la Regence we have notice that given the high demand of billet d’Etat 
for subscribing the shares, the price of the government bond went back at the nominal value of 
500livre. For a holder of a billet d’Etat, subscribing to the IPO meant converting a 4% bond into 
a share in a Company whose main assets were the same bonds and Louisiana. From the point of 
view of the government, the debt was still the same, and it had given away an existing asset that 
had proven worthless so far. There seemed to be only upside potential for the subscriber, and it is 
a little hard to see why the government went along, unless the idea – explicitly negated in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The possibility of acquiring a share in several instalments has been one of the main innovation brought by Law, 
which in this way made the market for his shares much faster but at the same time constrained people to have some 
trust in the medium term sustainability of the Company. 
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terms of the Company’s charter – was ultimately to substitute the returns on Louisiana for the 
interest on the bonds (Murphy, 1997). This would be the idea behind the System, but it was not 
officially the initial idea behind the Company. The underlying debt remained intact but changed 
hands and the Company would receive perpetual annuity contracts with the King, with interest 
accruing from January 1718. These annuities would provide a working capital of 4mL per year.  
The Company nevertheless immediately began its activities. Most of the capital raised with the 
initial shares was dedicated, or at least seemed to have been, for preparing everything was 
needed in order to proper colonize and exploit the new territories: vessels, provisions, people. As 
Giraud (1953) documents, the Company inherited some assets from the previous owner of the 
Louisiana concession, including one ship. Law also hired competent and knowledgeable people 
as directors and colonizers, and they proceeded to purchase, lease and build new ships, so that by 
December 1718 it had a dozen ships at its disposal and had already made several voyages to 
Louisiana. However, the expected revenues from trading activity never arrived (Velde, 2003). 
In May 1719, the Company needed some actions to increase its momentum: shares’ prices were 
still under the nominal value and people were not keen to fund it. Not satisfied with the proceeds 
deriving from Louisiana, Law, in less than two years, expanded the his company trade power 
towards other zones acquiring and merging with several other trade companies. In less than 4 
months, from May to August 1719, it bought the company of Senegal, the Company of the 
Indies, the Company of China, the Company of Santo Domingo for slave trading in Guinea and 
received Company’s of Africa privilege on trade with North Africa. As reported by Wood 
(1791), an edict gave to Law’s Company the exclusive privilege to trade with that areas. After 
this cycle of merger and acquisition, the Company of the West changed the name in Company of 
the Indies35. 
However, the greatest expansion of the Company did not occur abroad, but inside France’s 
boundaries. Given the modest proceeds the company was having from abroad, mainly due to the 
difficulties in establishing a proper quantity of colonisers and because of the complications in 
working with the indigenous population, Law understood that the income from the trade was not 
enough to sustain his system and started to concentrate his attention to internal public finances. 
He thought since the beginning that finances had to be managed in a centralized way, i.e. by his 
Company, but probably believed that trade would have had a stronger participation in the 
revenues.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Law later explained, in a memory of 1723 (Mémoires justificatif de May 1723, Œuvres, III), that he needed the 
money raised from the merger and acquisition and from the new concessions to “fit out 24 ships of 500 tons each”. 
At this stage, therefore, he still believed in the importance of the trading company as component to sustain his 
System. 
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Following Law’s plans of the necessity of the overall control on all the economic activities of 
the country, the Company started to be involved also in fiscal matters, especially tax farming, 
proceeding toward a takeover of the French economy. In 1718, the Company purchased the right 
to run the tobacco monopoly for 4mL a year. At the beginning of summer 1719 (Jul 25th), the 
Company purchased the right to run the Royal Mint, for a lump sum of 50mL that was never 
paid in cash thanks to the huge possession of government’s debt in terms of Billet d’Etat. Some 
days later, Law’s Company bought out the officers in charge of collecting all direct taxes, around 
55% of the government’s revenues (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730). 
The most significant acquisition, the one completed the full circle, has been the incorporation 
into the Company’s activities of the tax farming. With the arrêt of 27th August 1719, it bought 
the right to run the General Farms, which at that time collected most of the taxes in France, 
around 30% of the government’s revenues. The King (i.e. the Regent) univocally broke the lease, 
started just one year earlier and granted to the Paris Brothers, and transferred the right to Law’s 
Company for 52mL per year who agreed to pay 3.5mL livres advanced rent for them (Wood, 
1791). 
The tobacco takeover was a creative idea by Law to avoid losses due to the delay of interest 
payment by the King on the billet d’état in Company’s portfolio. With this move, Law basically 
cancelled out the payment owed by the French government (around 4mL). Furthermore, he was 
also convinced that he could have run the monopoly in a more efficient way, so the gains 
appeared to be twofold (DuTot, 2000).  
Regarding the purchase of the tax farms, the reasoning was similar, even though the amount 
was far more different than the due interest on his billet d’état. In fact, the possession of the billet 
d’état was not enough to takeover the tax farms and in order to buy the rights Law needed to 
recur to the emission of new shares, done in several successive issues. At every issue, the shares 
were payable in monthly instalments and the offered price raised although all the shares had the 
same initial nominal value and were entitled of the same dividend. Table 2 shows the different 
issues of Company’s shares, the total amount raised and the payment terms decided by Law. 
 
Emission Date No. of shares Price Payment terms 
Jun1717–Dec 1718   200.000 500L Billet d’état at face value 
June 1719    50.000 550L Cash, 50L down +20 monthly 
instalments 
July 1719    50.000 1000L Cash, in 20 monthly instalments 
Sept – Oct 1719   300.000 5000L Cash, in 10 monthly instalments 
Table 2: issues of shares of the Company of the Indies. 
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In June 1719, the delay in the arrêt stipulating the emission of 50.000 new shares at a face value 
of 550 demonstrates that Parliament was still against him (Œuvres, III, 248). Even Argenson, the 
ministry of finances placed by the Regent and Law himself one year before, strongly opposed to 
the issue of new shares, which were meant to buy out monopolies and tax farms, thinking that 
concentrating all the economic activity in just one Company was dangerous (Levasseur, 1854). 
In this climate, Law recurred once again to his gambling technique, offering to personally write 
down for the emission of these shares with a down payment of 2.5 millions livres. If this offer 
was enough to convince Parliament to promulgate the arrêt, he needed some original measure to 
make shares more attractive. 
The second and third issues took the form of a rights offering: a subscriber to the June issue had 
to own four original shares (which came to be known as the mère, “mothers”, as opposed to the 
June shares known as filles, “daughters”), and a subscriber to the July issue had to own four 
mothers and one daughter to purchase one petit-fille, “granddaughter.” This requirement, which 
helped turn the secondary market in the older shares into a frenzy (Fauré, 1970), is the product of 
Law intelligence and of his complete understanding of the true functioning of shares market and 
trading. DuTot interpret the creation of filles and petit-filles as one of the most important devices 
for Law’s success (Velde, 2009). 
Previously, he had also demonstrated the profits to be made in a bull market by introducing 
Parisians to options, buying call options on shares of the Company in March–April 1719, and 
cashing in after the merger with the Indies Company, helping to boost the price of shares. In this 
period, the first futures contract appeared on the Parisian market brought by some more expert 
traders, which were inspired by what Law had shown his market could have done (Rist, 1938). 
Prior to August 1719 there are no precise information on the prices of shares. Comparing 
different sources, as the Mémoires de la Regence (1730), the later memories of Law (Œuvres, 
III), DuTot (1735) and Forbonnais (1758), in fact, it is hard to find a complete track of prices 
before that date. However, they are not completely different in the estimates given and what they 
all show is that the price stayed around 250L for the 1718 and started to rise from February 1719, 
reaching around 1000L in July 1719. Therefore, the prices at which the mere and the filles were 
offered to the public do not seem consistently different from the market prices.  
After all these merges and acquisitions, Law communicate the public that the dividend on 
Company’s share would be 60 livres for each share. This further stimulated the frenzy already 
present in the market and boosted shares’ price to 5000 livres. Given the subsequent emission of 
new shares at higher price, it is reasonable to think that Law wanted to increase the price in order 
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to make the coming issue of new shares, which were at high price, in line with the value present 
into the market. 
The edit of 27th August 1719, in fact, did not pass in the French history for its concession of tax 
farming rights but rather for ratifying one of the first attempts in history to take over a sovereign 
debt by a private company. In summer of 1719 was now clear to Law that the trade was no more 
the principal activity of his Company. Imports from Louisiana languished, while profits from the 
management of internal affairs just started to rise and promised to be sustained. It is in this 
climate and with the intimate relation with the Regent that Law decided to loan to French 
government the money necessary to repay its outstanding debt, starting what is probably the 
most sophisticated financial operation ever seen until then. 
The Company offered to repay all governments debt by loaning to the government 1600million 
livres36. It is clear that the Company did not have such an amount of cash readily available (it 
was more than the current outstanding cash). Therefore, it needed to turn to the market and 
obtained the permission by the Conseil of Finances to borrow money from the public in term of 
bonds, bearing interest of 3%. Initially, in fact, the Scottish banker thought to raise the amount to 
lend to the King with debt. However, he probably changed his plans and opted for equity instead, 
and obtained the right to launch the fourth issue of Company Shares. As shown in table 2, 
between September and October the Company issued 300.000 shares37 at a price of 5000 livres. 
Again, Law used the technique of monthly instalments in order to stimulate the purchase: shares 
could be subscribed for with an initial payment of 500l, from which their name of cinq cents, the 
rest being payable in other nine monthly instalments (Murphy, 1997). 
The edict of 27th August prescribed that bondholders would receive a draft from the Royal 
Treasury in the amount of their holdings, payable by the Company. These drafts would then be 
used to pay for Company’s shares and after some time they constituted the only instrument 
accepted to subscribe for the cinq cents shares. As explained before, the present perpetual 
annuities and offices contained by nature a call option: the debtor could extinguish the debt 
whenever he wanted. In this way, every bondholder would be reimbursed and could choose 
between being paid by the Company’s treasurer in specie or in banknotes or change the draft 
received for Company’s shares. Law clearly preferred this second alternative and put in place all 
his marketing ability to guide the rentier, the category that was holding the majority of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 As reported in the Mémoires de la Regence and confirmed by Forbonnais and Levasseur, the initial amount for 
which the Company obtained the right to issue obligation was 1200mL. However, the amount was readily amended 
to 1600mL to better face the total outstanding government debt. 
37 There have actually been three issues of 100.000 shares each, but they were meant for the raising of capital to loan 
to the government and the price was the same, so they can be considered as one big issue. There has been another 
issue of 24.000 shares, but this never reached the public (Fauré, 1977). 
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government debt, toward the subscription of his shares. The lending to the government and the 
overall operation of takeover therefore had de facto been a gigantic swap between government 
debt and Company’s shares (Velde, 2003).  
However, most of the rentiers did not give up their annuities since they perceived the amount 
earned from the rentes more rewarding. In fact, the holders of the greater part of the government 
debt found their investments destroyed in a period where interest rate was law and the raise in 
the value of real asset prevented them to invest in any other project but Law’s (Davis, 1886). 
Law wrote to rentier (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730) that what he did was not meant to obstruct 
them but rather for help: in fact, with the same amount they could have bought shares which 
yielded the same interest and also had a conspicuous dividend paid every six months. In order to 
further stimulate the subscription of his shares, which now had to be bought by rentier in order 
to complete the debt takeover, Law introduced the anonymity of ownership, which had been very 
much appreciated by rich people especially after the Visa of 1716. 
As always Law prepared the ground in advance (Murphy, 1997). In middle august 1719, he 
paid the pensions arrears (Histoire de Finances) in advance gaining respect and admiration from 
the population, which had never seen pensions paid in time. In order to gain the approval from 
the Council for such a big decision, he repeatedly argued that Company was already inside the 
French economy and finances (Ainsworth, 1864). Furthermore, French population was now 
ready for this kind of shares’ issue. Trust in Law and in his System was solidly built and the 
market did not scandalize when the issues were announced. This, along with the high dividend 
and the possibility of acquiring a share that was standing in the market at 5000l with an initial 
payment of 500 livres transformed Paris in a stock exchange. 
A universal infatuation for the acquisition of shares in the India Company seemed to occupy 
the whole kingdom, from the lowest of the people up to princes (Wood, 1791). This infatuation, 
of which was difficult to form any kind of conception for authors of 18th and 19th century that did 
not directly experienced the System, increased in proportion to the difficulty of obtaining 
success. In fact, on the whole 300,000 shares that were created at least 100.000 went into 
possession of the Regent, leaving no more than 200,000 in the hands of the public, a quantity 
considered inadequate to the demand (Levasseur, 1854). At the end of November, the price of 
the share rose above 10.000l, more than 50 time the original price considering the real value of 
the billet d’état. In fact, even if the number of shares almost doubled, prices of all shares kept 
growing (DuTot, 2000). 
The negotiations for Actions were at first carried on in the Rue Quinquempoix, but after some 
time it became impossible to procure the accommodation of a room for all people that went there 
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to trade; most of the stock-jobbers even started to transact their business in the open air. Had 
become necessary to shift the business to a more adequate location, therefore the stock jobbing 
was transferred to the Place Vendome and than to the newly purchased Hotel of Soisson38. This 
period is the subject of hundreds of accounts, tales, books and theatre dramas. Everything in 
Paris rotated around the trading of Company’s shares and all parties of society were involved in 
it, as well as the thousands of people who reached Paris from abroad just for purchasing some 
share.  
Share price kept raising and the volatility was tremendous. The description of the society and 
the life in Paris in this phase is not relevant to this work, and Murphy (1997) offers a thorough 
collection of anecdotes. Just to give an idea of the social turmoil of that period, an example is 
worth quoting; several sources show how a servant, sent from his master to the stock market to 
sell his shares in its stead because he was sick, having the instruction to sell the shares for 8000l, 
by the time he reached the market could sold the shares for 10.000l. Keeping the difference for 
himself, resigned in the same moment he came back to his principal. Below can be seen the 
evolution o shares’ price in Law’s System from the summer 1719 to the collapse of the System at 
the end of 1720. 
 
Graph 1: evolution of the Mississippi’s share price from august 1719 to the collapse of the System. Data are drawn 
from Murphy (1997) and combined with data in by DuTot (2000). Data until august 1719 are from Marion (1915). 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 The location of the stock market had to be removed from Place Vendome because of the continuous complaints 
made by the Chancellor, according to whom “the noise prevented him from attending to the causes in the chancery” 
(Wood, 1791). Law thereupon agreed with the Prince of Carignan to purchase his Hotel of Soissons, at the 
enormous price of 140000L where he built, in the spacious gardens, about 100 pavilions each of which was rented at 
500 livres per month. 
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The rapid transactions that took place daily in stocks and contracts for future deliveries gave 
banknotes that preference over coins that Law had predicted and aimed for (David, 1886). They 
also improved the confidence of people in the System and the social perception of the figure of 
John Law. However, this pattern was not sustainable and became even less stabile when some 
professional speculators started to trade stock just for the sake of high earnings, monetizing the 
shares into specie, which were than brought out of France, when the return was considered 
satisfactory and not worth the risk of keeping the bet of price increases (Cantillon, 1755; 
Mackay, 1846; Kindleberger, 2005).  
In October 1719 Law presented a management plan for his Company (Mémoires de la Regence, 
1730). He divided it into two major sectors, trade and tax farm, respectively divided in 7 and 13 
subsectors. One person directly managed each of the subsectors and all these managers had to 
constantly report directly to Law, which of course was taking the final decisions. Company was 
now fully working and managing France in all economic aspects. Law had finally managed to 
consolidate all French economy under his System and no one but few seemed to object to this 
friendly takeover. Through some ingenious devices, in fact, he stimulated the furor for shares 
and everybody benefit from this. However, the rise which had already taken place and the 
increasing pressure for the cinq cents shares were already showing, in last months of 1719, that a 
check was needed rather than a further spur (Hyde, 1969). 
 
2.4 The Royal Bank  	  
When Law completed the takeover of French debt in 1719 the General Bank no longer existed 
and had been substituted by the first French central Bank, the Royal Bank. 
After more than two years of functioning, the Regent had completely understood all the 
potentialities of having a public bank that ran and controlled all the economy. Even other 
important people, mainly of the nobility, at the beginning of 1718 started to look at the General 
Bank as a possible objective to take over with royal funds in order to directly benefit from all the 
profits it was starting to make.  
The nationalization of the General Bank was one of the pillars of Law’s envisioned system. As 
we have seen, the first bank he proposed to the Regent was a bank created with royal fund and 
managed by the Treasure, and all the banks he proposed across the Europe at the beginning of 
the century had a significant state’s participation. He kept showing the Regent all the benefits 
that could occur to the King’s finances and to the wealth of the nation had the General Bank 
been a royal bank since the establishment of the former. After some time, he succeeded. 
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The General Bank was converted into the Royal Bank the 4th December 1718. The original 
capital of the General bank was fully repaid in specie to original shareholders. The holdings of 
Billet d’Etat were immediately converted into shares of the Company of the West: the capital 
base of the Royal bank was therefore in part in form of equity of Law’s company. Regarding the 
issue of banknotes, they could be issued only as a decree of the King’s Council. Their quantity 
could now grow potentially with no limits (Memoires de la Regence, 1730; Histoire des 
finances). The greatest difference, however, was that the banknotes were to be payable at the 
choice of the holder either in écus of the bank or in lives tournois. The invariance in value with 
respect to the domestic exchange rate was no longer respected. 
The serious nature of these actions was even clearer couple of weeks later, when the Bank 
opened branches in several of the most important cities of France39 and the Council forbid 
transactions in argent for a value higher that 600livre, therefore incentivising the use of its paper 
currency. Only gold or banknotes could be used (Memoire de la Regence, 1730). 
As argued before, even if this friendly takeover was the result of the will of the Regent and of 
the ministry of finance to take control of such a remunerative asset as the bank was, the 
nationalization of the General Bank was again a fundamental step for the finalization of Law’s 
System. The clear proof is that he kept been at the centre of all these operations since the arrêt of 
December 1718 also declared that John Law would be the Directeur General of the Royal Bank 
(Memories de la Regence, 1730).  
In this position Law could now continuing with the measures he thought necessary to 
implement, but at this time he had the full support of the State since this measures were also 
meant to increase the power and solidity of the Bank, which now was national. However, as will 
be demonstrated later, Law probably considered only the positive part of working with an 
absolute monarchy. 
The new established Royal bank slightly departed from the principle of private and mercantile 
credit and became more concerned with the issues of public credit which in a absolute monarchy 
is no other than that of the sovereign, the solidity of which can not be depended upon (Wood, 
1791). The first thing to change was the banknotes: now they were no more payable in écus, but 
the payment to be received by the holder has denominated in livres. Therefore, the money in the 
notes could not but keep the pace with the money in the coin, being equally affected on whatever 
alteration of the domestic exchange rate. Several sources prove that Law tried to oppose this 
decision with all his strength, but the gain for the King was too high to be denied even for John 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 The Royal Bank rapidly opened five branches in “dans de villes non parlementaires”: Amiens, Orléans, Tours, la 
Rochelle, Lyon. 
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Law. The banknotes, notwithstanding the huge difference with the General Bank’s ones, kept on 
the same path as the former ones with respect to the public’s acceptance. However, this 
unnoticed change would create issues. 
From the point of view of the public, this significant change in the structure of the system did 
not induce the right reaction. In fact, the general ignorance on monetary matters let the common 
people believe that almost nothing had changed. Only the original shareholder noticed the 
switch, but the transition was not that painful. In fact, for a shareholder who was bought out in 
December 1718 by the King’s takeover, the rate of return of his investment was pretty high. 
Considering the original purchase, the dividends and the final repayment, an original shareholder 
gained an annualized 64%. 
There is not so much information regarding the functioning of the Royal Bank (Velde, 2003). 
The Royal bank probably became de facto the instrument used by Law to feed liquidity into his 
System sustaining all his policy measures, with the difference that the French treasury now 
absorbed the proceeds gained by the financial institution. This interpretation is supported by 
looking at the banknotes issues of the Bank, which dramatically increased from summer 1719 
until the collapse of the System, bringing Law to violate his original conception on money issued 
only on the sound basis of reserves. 
In June 1719, in order to facilitate the subscription of the filles the Royal Bank issued 50 
millions livres of notes, bringing the overall amount in circulation to 160mL. A month later, in 
order to further stimulate the subscription of the petit-filles needed to purchase the right for the 
Company to run the mint, the Royal Bank issued some 240mL banknotes, bringing the total to 
400mL. However, this tremendous issue can be partially explained by the withdrawal of the 
banknotes of the General Bank. In fact, its banknotes denominated in écus were no longer valid 
but had not yet retired from the circulation. Given that this seemed to be occurred during summer 
1719 (Mémories de la Regence, 1730), it can be inferred that part of the 240mL issue was just 
substitute the amount withdrew from the market. 
Notes issue kept growing in 1719 and 1720. There are no univocal information about this, since 
numbers presented by Murphy (1997) slightly differ from the one used by Velde (2003) for his 
calculation and from the ones present in contemporary writers as DuTot and Forbonnais. 
However, the magnitude of the emissions and their growth rates are in line in most of the sources 
used for this work. The emissions are summarized in Table 3. 
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  Banknote denomination Total 
 Date 
1000
0 1000 100 50 10   
30Apr1719 0 28 10 0 0 38 
31May1719 0 96 13 0 0.9 109.9 
31Jul1719 0 144 15 0 0.9 159.9 
31Aug1719 0 334.4 45 0 1.2 380.6 
30Sep1719 120 334.4 45 0 1.2 500.6 
30Nov1719 240 334.4 45 0 1.2 620.6 
31Dec1719 332.9 370 54.6 0 11.6 769 
30Jan1720 358.6 379.9 57.2 0 14.4 810.1 
29Feb1720 466.8 507.5 77.3 0 18.2 1069.7 
5Mar1720 458.6 530.9 82.2 0 18.2 1089.9 
31Mar1720 — — — — — 1261.5 
30Apr1720 — — — — — 2054 
22May1720 — — — — — 2116.5 
31May1720 804.8 1158.5 239.4 0 32.5 2235.1 
30Jun1720 — — — — — 2359 
31Jul1720 — — — — — 2081.7 
31Aug1720 538.9 1065.3 341.5 0 61.2 2006.8 
30Sep1720 529.4 1001.9 341.4 52.9 76.1 2001.7 
10Oct1720 533 1009 342.2 73.6 80.7 2038.4 
31Oct1720 524.1 987.8 342 131.6 83.6 2069 
27Nov1720 521.6 979.7 341.1 134.9 91.7 2069.1 
8Jan1721 521.6 979.7 341.1 134.9 91.7 2069.1 
Table 3: total emissions of the Royal Bank per banknote denomination. In million livres. 
 
 
Graph 2: evolution of the outstanding value of Royal Bank’s banknotes from April 
1719, when the Bank started to issue its banknotes, January 1721, right after the 
collapse of the System. In Millions livres. 
 
It can be seen from both from Table 3 and from Graph 2 that by the end of the year, the Bank 
had issued around 1billion livres in notes, with the average denomination growing significantly 
mainly because of the raising in prices. 
The other main reason why the Bank kept issuing banknotes lays in the Law’s conception of 
money. As we have seen in the first chapter, he strongly believed that specie money was inferior 
to paper money for several reasons. His position of power and his infinite influence over the 
Regent allowed him to introduce edicts and prescriptions that limited the uses of silver and gold. 
In the System he envisioned, Royal Bank had to be the only institution using specie and all silver 
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and gold present in France should have been stored in the Bank in change of circulating 
banknotes (Œuvres, I). 
With the purpose to support shares purchases and prices, the Royal Bank also started to loan to 
the public. According to DuTot, in the second part of 1719 the Bank was loaning 2500 livres at 
2% against the lodgement of one share as a collateral. This was loan was particularly profitable 
for the public, since 2500 livres allowed to purchase rights of more shares, and their raising price 
offered the simple solution to repay the loan. 
In December 1719, Bank’s notes became legal tender in France, officially decreeing the 
beginning of the first fiat money in France (Sargent and Velde, 1995). They were now the only 
payment instruments accepted to settle taxes with respect to the government; people trusted the 
notes to some extent because the State was defending them. However, as we will see in the next 
chapter, the economy was based on unsound grounds and the Royal bank, incorporated with the 
Company in February 1720, will suffer from the collapse of the System even if it was the 
soundest element of the System (Fauré, 1977). 
In conclusion, the nationalization of the Bank had two major consequences in the short term, 
necessary to give Law the instrument he needed to complete the creation of his System. First, it 
gave the King a functioning printing press for the first time in French history, an instrument that 
will be over-used in the next 2 years. Secondly, it shown the French the gains that could be made 
by properly investing at an early stage in the ventures launched by Law. The latter element has 
played a role in the higher speed that the subsequent issues of Company’s share will benefit, as 
we have seen in the previous paragraph. All these benefits, convinced to ultimate the transition 
from a private bank to a public-Royal Bank giving Law an instrument that he probably, although 
if in good faith, abused. 	  
2.5 The Mississippi System: how it worked in practice  
La Banque, en créant l'instrument d'échange, produirait le crédit; la 
compagnie le soutiendrait en utilisant l'argent de la Banque; la première 
fournirait les fonds, l'autre les emploierait; de la combinaison de toutes deux 
sortirait une prospérité à laquelle il était impossible d'assigner des limites  
(Histoire de Finances) 	  
Having presented all its components, it is now possible to give an overview of the functioning 
of the System actually realised by John Law. The Scottish economist had a precise plan in mind, 
which had envisioned step by step during several years of studies and traveling. This original 
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plan, even if not coincident with the one actually put in practice, has been the guide for Law, at 
least at the beginning. Therefore we have a System not yet completed in his components but 
based on Law’s original ideas for the first years (from 1716 to 1719), and structured System 
around 1720 that was too developed and powerful not to be influenced by King’s needs and 
therefore departing from the design Law had in mind initially. He envisaged the total dismantling 
of the financial system of the ancien regime for a more efficient and equitable one (Murphy, 
1997). 
We have demonstrated that he wanted a public bank since the beginning, in order to guarantee 
the State the complete management of monetary matters, which were crucial in order to stimulate 
the economy. Not being successful in obtaining the right to do it in 1716, he founded a private 
bank and concentrated in building the confidence. He was strongly convinced that no one that far 
had completely understood the rationales of the functioning of an economy, especially regarding 
monetary and public finance matters. However, in order to function, his System and his vision 
needed the public to use it. And before using it, people had to believe in its soundness and 
stability. The first and most important element to build was trust. Furthermore, he needed 
different types of trust: from the public to use a new instrument as paper money and from ruling 
class to allow him to put in practice his theory. He quickly understood that in an absolute 
monarchy the power of the State was immense and was firmly convinced to use it for the good of 
the population. At the beginning, he used this through his tight relation with the Regent to boost 
his ideas. At the end, he abused of it probably on the honest believe that what he was doing was 
right and in the interest of France.  
At the beginning, he used the Bank to show the public and the nobility the advantages of paper 
money. As soon as people started to trust his banknotes and they commenced to replace the 
scarce, limited specie, we can notify a great development in credit and economic activity, 
especially if compared with the level of couple of years before (Histoire de Finances). The chart 
limited the activities of the Bank (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730), but as demonstrated above it 
probably involved in credit creation anyway. After two years, most of the people that contributed 
to make the bank private wished they had made another choice. However, this was still Law’s 
plan, and he acted throughout all 1718 in order to make this happen. In the beginning of 1718, in 
fact, he managed to get rid of the Chancellor d’Aguesseau and le duc de Noailles, “qui étaient 
pour lui des obstacles” (Marion, 1915) and that were responsible of a wrong management of the 
French finances. It is not a coincidence that we find proof of augmentation in the first months of 
1718. These measures, carried out under his auspices, had three main advantages: they induced a 
bad perception of coin and specie in the public, because of the loss of purchasing power, at the 
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advantage of the numeraire, which in the framework he set coincided with his banknotes and 
shares; they created a raise in the general level of prices, which was good since it was necessary 
to re-establish prosperity across the nation and they were unwanted by the Parliament. 
Once the national Bank was established, he could finally made the link with the Company 
closer and efficient. The Company should have been the real economic driver, while the Bank 
should have just provided the necessary funds. As we have seen, Law strongly believed in the 
paramount importance of the money in advance requirement. The Bank was the part that had to 
inject the money into the economic system, the Company the part to exploit it and make it 
circulating increasing the demand and therefore avoiding inflation.  
The initial conceptualization of the Company focused it on the trade, that for Law was the 
synonymous of economic activities. After some initial investment, however, the Louisiana 
colony did not offer the expected returns. Here happens the primary shift from the initial design. 
As shown in the first chapter, Law thought that French debt was not a problem per sé, but the 
way in which it was handled was. The economic measures implemented by Desmaret and de 
Noailles were in his opinion not enough to put France into a sustainable path. The bad condition 
of the finances, furthermore, was a threat to his Company and the Bank was not enough to 
guarantee sound economic policy. According to DuTot, and other authors, he therefore decided 
that the solution was an institution that consolidated all the public revenues, increasing the 
efficiency and working closely with the Royal Bank, which had to be the source of money and 
the unique owner of specie. This is the reason why he lessened the interest in the trade part of the 
Company, which still kept functioning, and focused his next actions on the internal finances, 
substituting the returns of Louisiana with the interest on the French sovereign debt. However, we 
believe that Law had in mind since the beginning that the ultimate goal was to create one 
overreach institution that took care of all the economy. This can be deduced by the study of his 
works, especially the memoires of 1715 and 1716 (Harsin, 1934, II) and by some actions he 
undertook since the beginning orientated towards the possession of the French debt. The low 
profits from Louisiana just further motivated him that he had to focus within French boundaries. 
The source of financing, in fact, has been since the beginning the French sovereign bond. The 
billets d’Etat received with the first issue (100mL at face value, bearing 4%) were supposed to 
provide 4mL per year in cash flow. But they were used to buy the tobacco monopoly in August 
1718. The other sources of financing for the Company were the notes issued by the Bank, which 
was managed by the same people (and eventually merged into the Company in February 1720). 
In December 1718, the General Bank’s note issue had stood at 40mL; by July 1719, the Royal 
Bank’s issue stood at 400mL, and reached 1bnL in December 1720. It therefore appears that the 
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Bank simply lent notes to the Company in exchange for IOUs signed by the treasurer of the 
Company (Harsin 1928, 310). According to the Bank accounts of 1723, it can be advanced the 
hypothesis that Bank was freely lending to the Company (DuTot, 2000; Harsin, 1928). 
The conversion of government debt into liabilities is the most important passage in the creation 
of the System. We strongly believe that he had studied it a lot and in the summer of 1719 he 
finally had the occasion to put into practice. The way in which Law decided to this purchase 
shows insight on his vision and on the actual functioning of the System later on. In fact, the 
original project to collect the money to be lent to the state using debt (Company’s bond) was 
soon abandoned for the more practical solution of equity. In this regard, Murphy (1997) argues 
that there had never been two different plans, interpreting the “action rentier” quoted in the edict 
of 27th August 1719 as having the same meaning of the “actions” quoted in the edit of some days 
later. We are more in line with the interpretation provided by Velde (2003) and indirectly present 
also in Fauré (1977), that assumes the presence of two distinct plans. However, we believe that 
the initial plan of borrowing the money to lend to the King from the public through Company’s 
obligation was just an initial solution to speed up the process, while the second plan seems more 
coherent with his ideas. In fact, with the plan actually put in practice and defined by Fauré le 
plan fou, issuing shares that could be paid with government bond made the operation a gigantic 
swap of government bonds, which born 4.5% on average, for Company equity. Its profits 
consisted in the 3% paid annually by the government on the sum virtually lent and in the gains 
from commercial activity and tax farming (Velde, 2009). In fact, Law strongly believed that 
annuities were a futile investment because they just put away funds from productive investment, 
as Company’s equity was (DuTot, 1735). Furthermore, shares could be broadly considered as 
money, and the more the money in circulation, the more the benefits. 
The concession for replacing the Paris brother in the farming of French taxes and the 
repayment of government debt by the Company, both contained in the edict of 27th August 1719, 
have to be considered together. In fact, State was giving the main source of public revenue to the 
sole creditor it would have had from that moment on, Law’s Company. In this regard, it appears 
clear how Law strongly needed the rentier to convert their annuities in Mississippi shares: the 
debt takeover would transform in a swap and his company’s capitalization grew. It is with this in 
mind that we have to interpret the option to convert rentes in other annuities form his Company 
just as a way to show rentiers that they had a choice and they were not forced by the edict to do 
it. However, given the low yielding of the new annuities and the surging market for Company’s 
shares, the rational choice was to swap rentes, i.e. government debt, for Mississippi’s shares. The 
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crucial point was justifying a share price high enough to carry out the debt conversion in 
profitable manners for both parties (Rist, 1938). 
Both the Regent and Law wanted the Company as the unique creditor of the France, the proof 
being that at the beginning of September 1719, the Regent started to remove several offices that, 
as we have seen, were one of the main sources of public finances and now were no more needed. 
After the loan, the State also withdrew all the rentes outstanding so far and forced rentier to give 
up their annuities in lieu of either shares of the Company or annuity guaranteed by the former, 
with a strong preference for share as can be induced by the several measures implemented 
towards the end of 1719 to increase their desirability. 
The system reached is peak at the beginning of 1720, when the Company managed to complete 
the takeover of the French economy, where it substituted its liabilities, i.e. shares, for the 
government’s debt, and the paper issued by the Bank, which was now part of the Company and 
therefore another type of its liability, was in place of the metallic currency. In this period, the 
Company was responsible for the issuing of the currency, which was legal tender; it was 
responsible of the collection of almost all the French taxes; it ran the mint, therefore having 
control on most of the specie still in circulation; it managed and owned all the overseas colonies 
on which it had the monopoly to trade with. If we had to identify the zenith of the evolution of 
the System, this would coincides with the designation of John Law as the Controlleur General 
de Finances, on January 1720 (Memoire de la Regence, 1730). 
At this apex, leaving aside all political tensions and small monetary changes mainly 
concentrated in altering the domestic exchange rate to foster the use of banknotes, the Company 
of the Indies, who also managed to incorporate the Royal Bank in February 1720, controlled all 
French economy and was supported by a very elastic supply of money guaranteed by the Bank. 
The structure of the System made sense and brought – tough for a very short period – 
advantages for French economy (Marion, 1915). Before the System, a specific amount decided 
by the State was collected annually, inefficiently and often illegally by several tax collectors, 
who kept the difference with what the farmed as profit. The government had to pay annually the 
interests to creditor (on average 4.5% on a debt of 2bn livres). The difference between these two 
was the balance to be allocated for public expenditure. With the implementation of the System, 
the Company was the sole creditor, but the interest rate was now 3%, and the sole collector, 
increasing the efficiency in tax farming. The annual payment between government and Company 
was therefore very low, since the amount due for taxes was compensated by the amount the 
government had to pay back to the company for the loan. Furthermore, Company could benefit 
also from profits deriving from trade. If we assume that the public debt and the tax revenue for 
	  	   66	  
government stayed the same, there are significant gains for everyone: government has more to 
spend, company makes profit from taxes collection and trade and public has a lower tax burden 
because of the increase efficiency in farming. The schemes below offer a synthetic 
representation of how the System worked and what were the main differences with the situation 
before 1716: 
 
 
Figure 1: Scheme of the French public finances before the creation of the Mississippi System. 
 
 
Figure 2: Scheme of the French public finances before and after the creation of the Mississippi System 
 
However, the System worked in this sound way just for a limited period of time. In fact, this 
structure does not take into account the frenzy present in financial markets. Shares became a 
mania, their prices were roller coasting and the Bank had to inject great quantity of notes to keep 
the price of the shares high. Furthermore, the market for Mississippi’s shares was thin, since 
issue of new share had often been limited to old bondholders. This market characteristic, 
strengthened by the fact that holders were reluctant to cede their share because of the expectation 
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of a raise in the price, made it even easier to push up the price, given the less elastic supply and 
the large demand, created and fed by the issuing of notes of the Bank. As showed by Velde and 
Sargent (1995), after all government debt was reimbursed in notes of Law’s Bank by end of 
1719, inflation started to rise inducing a reduction in debt service. According to Law’s theory, 
however, inflation should not occur. 
The other constraint to the smooth functioning of the System was political. Contemporary 
writers (DuHautchamps among all) allude to the fact that there had been a conspiracy against the 
Bank which consisted in pretending the change in coins of an humongous amount of banknotes 
in order to weaken its reserves and eventually show the public that its banknotes were not 
completely redeemable. According to these authors, it is exactly for that reason that several 
decrees for the diminution of the specie had been made. In this way, holders of coins were 
obliged to change back their assets into banknotes. This interpretation is discredited by 
Forbonnais (1758), who however explains how all the diminutions occurred in this period were 
meant to be part of the System, as a measure to sustain it, rather than a solution to defeat a 
combination against it. In fact, the diminution pushed specie back to bank’s vault.  
DuTot (2000), in his apologetic account of Law’s System, explains how the notes were real 
value, that was allowing the economy to recover, shrinking interest rate, lowering the public debt 
and therefore lowering the taxes. Art, public places and other forms were flourishing. With his 
own words: 
Thus far the System had produced nothing but good, every thing was commendable, and 
worthy of admiration.  
 
Foreigner went to France to trade Company’s stock, and this even increased the amount of 
richness flowing and circulating into the country. When confronting the status of the economy 
with the one of some years before, during last years of King XIV’s reign, there is no wonder that 
people thought as Law as the Saviour of the Kingdom. Confidence and speculation were the 
explanations for the success. However Law did not consider with enough qualm the second. 
At the beginning of 1720, Law noticed that the System started to present the first, alarming 
signs of failure. The role of the Bank in providing the liquidity had been overused, especially 
after the Regent took control of it, and the notes in circulation, issued to allow the public to buy 
shares, were too many. There was too much liquidity in the System but, at the same time, the 
same System was built on the ground of high prices of shares, which were sustained by an 
accommodating money supply from the Bank. It had created a vicious circle. 	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2.6	  The	  collapse	  of	  the	  System	  
My shares which on Monday I bought  
Were worth millions on Tuesday, I thought.  
So on Wednesday I chose my abode;  
In my carriage on Thursday I rode;  
To the ball-room on Friday I went;  
To the work-house next day I was sent. 
Pasquinade, agioteurs in Rue de Quinquempoix, 1720. 
From Davis (1887).  	  
As anticipated before, the System experienced more attention in its last part, the collapse. In the 
Historie financiare de la France depuis 1715 (Marion, 1915), the System is defined as a “court 
acces de fievre”, and the uniqueness of this experience was mainly related to its liquidation 
rather than to its economic rationales. Indeed, the consequences of its failure were remarkable 
for the majority of the population and it took several years to accomplish a complete recovery 
(Velde and Sargent, 1995). However, as will be shown below, this judgement is too severe for 
two main reasons. First, the one put in place was not exactly the system Law had envisioned and 
the one envisioned was not the best policy translation of Law’s economic thoughts. Second, the 
common knowledge in term of monetary economics and policies was not enough developed to 
fully understand the revolutionary repercussions of his theoretic framework (Murphy, 1997). In 
order to describe the collapse of the System, we start from where we finished in paragraph 4. 
At the beginning of 1720, when Law was made Controlleur General des Finances, shares’ 
price was around 10.000livres. Market was still in frenzy, but some signs of sinking started to 
show up. Several speculators, satisfied with the earnings made, begun to monetize the shares 
notwithstanding the various diminutions that dropped specie’s value and the speeches delivered 
by Law where the monetization was condemned as a foolish act (Œuvres, II), because shares had 
to be interpreted as a long term investment and should have been considered money in a broader 
sense (Law, 1704; DuTot, 2000). 
In January 1720, with a share’s dividend fixed as 200 livres per share, a market price of 10.000 
livres40 and futures contract based on an expected price between 12.500 livres (Levasseur, 1854) 
and 13.000 (Murphy, 1997) after 3-4 months, the economy started to be overheated. According 
to DuTot (2000), the market value of shares was around 4.8 billion livres41 and the increase in 
market value, considering the original cost of the shares, was around 4.5 billion livres. If we 
consider also the billion livres of banknotes issued by the Royal Bank that far, the increase in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 According to duHautchamp (1739) the shares’ price reached 18.000 livres in some peak days. 
41 Paris Brother, as well as Fauré, provided with an estimate of 6.24 billion livres. This estimate is obtained from 
624.000 shares valued at 10.000 livres. However, the additional 24.000 were never issued and the price of 10.000 
was reached just in some peak days, the average in January being much lower. 
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liquidity was definitely not in line with a sustainable development path, especially considering 
the debt conversion of “just” 1.6 billion livres of six months before. This amount seems to have 
been too much even for Law who, accordingly to DuTot42 and to his later memoires justificatif 
du mai 1723 (Œuvres, III, 175), envisioned around 3 billion livres in circulation as an optimal 
situation to have a sustainable system with a low interest rate and a controlled inflation.  
 He therefore introduced a new type of share, called primes, which consisted in the right of 
purchase a share for 10.000 livres during the following 6 months after an initial down payment 
of 1.000 livres (Memoires de la Regence, 1730). In this way, Law implicitly said to the market 
that he did not want the shares price to be above 10.000 livres and also thought to have made a 
consistent move towards the elimination of future contracts. However, these new shares were 
particularly interesting for the speculators because they allowed to (acquire the right to) buy 
eleven shares by selling one at the current market value. Since the market expectations were still 
focused on an increase of the future price, several people started to sell their shares to buy 
primes, which were rapidly selling at an high premium (Ainsworth, 1864, Vol. III). As soon as 
the primes shares started to circulate, the price of the former action suddenly dropped 
(Forbonnais, 1758). In fact, since the former were needed in order to complete the transaction for 
the new shares, they were given away at a high discount with respect to the current price (but 
still at a value higher than the original and nominal price). This “strange intoxication”, as defined 
by Levasseur (1854), brought different types of shares of the very same company to be traded at 
different price points. 
After some initial frenzy, however, the expectation of future price dropped under 10.000 livres, 
making the primes suddenly worth zero. At this stage, the Company could have packed the 300m 
raised with their issue. However, Law started to understand that things were deteriorating and 
converted the primes into normal share at the rate of 1/10 (Memoires de la Regence, 1730).  
With the substantial failure of the primes and with a persisting problem of excess of liquidity, 
he introduced some compulsory measures, never proposed in his first writings, to cool down the 
System. For example, he tried to lower the price by selling some 30m livres of shares and he 
further restricted the use of specie for making payments (DuTot, 1735). It is in this period, 
according to Murphy (1997), that Law started to drastically change his policy. In fact, Law now 
needed to deal with both notes and shares in order to manage the growing money supply, with a 
decreasing support from the King and an increasing social pressure. Between late February and 
March, his policies have been marked by inconsistencies and sudden reversals (Velde, 2007). 
For example, the office created to conduct subscriptions and selling of shares at a given price 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 This estimate is confirmed in the Memoires justificatif written by Law in 1723 (Œuvres, III, 180). 
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(Fauré, 1977) allowed the Company to buy 800m livres of shares, further introducing liquidity in 
the System, as always provided by the Bank. 
On 22nd of February, the Bank was formally merged43 with the Company and Law settled a 
limit to further emissions of notes fixing the money supply at 1.2bn (Mémoires de la Regence, 
1730). The Company was additionally prohibited to lend to the King. However, this last decision 
was reached on the agreement that the Company would have bought back all King’s share at the 
fix price of 9.000 livres. Given that this price was lower than the price of 9.925 livres at which 
Company was buying back its shares (du Hautchamp, 1743) and that the major shareholder of 
the System, the King, accepted to sell all his shares for that price, the repercussions in the market 
were as devastating as immediate: in less than one week the price fell to 8.500 livres (DuTot, 
2000), starting the decreasing in price expectation that led to the collapse of some months later. 
However, Law44 quickly reversed the decreasing trend in shares’ price opening an office where 
the trading of shares were conducted at the fixed price of 9.000 livres with an edict published on 
5th of March 172145. He also closed the outstanding subscriptions ending their options and 
converting them into shares (Forbonnais, 1758). Reimbursement of the government debt 
continued to be made, but the drafts issued by the King were now exchanged for banknotes. In 
less than three months, company bought back other 1.2 billion livres of shares. This measure, 
which saved the shares’ price to the drop they would have had if left to market forces, further 
increased the outstanding banknotes in circulation witnessing the decision to control shares 
prices rather than monetary policy (Velde, 2003). The arrêt of 5th March, which contained also a 
drastic augmentation of the specie46, was meant to indicate to specie holders that further 
reduction would have come and that they should have changed their specie into banknotes at the 
current rate. The Declaration of 11th March announced the promised reductions and clearly 
showed Law’s aim to free the French economy of specie47. In fact, gold and silver were to be 
gradually reduced until April and then demonetized from May on. In this way, however, Law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 For the Histoire of Finances, when things started to deteriorate, it would have been necessary to separate the 
destiny of the Bank, the only sound part of the system in his opinion, with the one of the Company. On the contrary, 
Law decided to merge the Royal Bank this was for sure the way to destroy them both.  
44 According to Murphy (1997), the shifts in monetary policy of this period should not be completely attributed to 
Law, who could have been “victim of circumstances”. Probably, when things started to deteriorate, some powerful 
enemies of the System could have influenced some of the decisions. However, his desire to limit as much as 
possible the use of specie is present since his first writings. 
45 Arrest du Conseil d'Estat du Roy concernant les billets de banque, les actions de la Compagnie des Indes, le cours 
des especes, et le prix des matieres d'or et d'argent. 
46 The luis d’or was raised from 36 to 48 livres while the silver écu pushed up from 5 to 8 livres (Memoires de la 
Regence, 1730)	  
47 In a subsequent arrêt of 19th March, Law also banned the import of gold and silver and bullion into France. This 
was to avoid that foreigner speculators could make gains by importing specie, exchange it for banknotes 
immediately and than change it back in specie after some time, when banknotes would have been worth more in 
terms of silver and gold (Murphy, 1997). 
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could not respect anymore the limit to the money supply expansion communicated less than two 
weeks before, since shares were constantly exchanged for banknotes at 9.000 livres and Bank 
had to feed the Company with new issues. Furthermore, by reducing the value of specie it 
implicitly increased the relative value of outstanding banknotes, further mining the stability of 
the System. 
In fact, as can be seen from table 2, in May 1720 the net value of banknotes in the economy 
was around 2.2bn livres, an amount completely not in line with the amount of specie, estimated 
in 1200ml by several sources,48 and mainly owned by the Bank in its vaults. In we consider, as 
Law did, shares as money, the overall money supply was definitely out of equilibrium. Collapse 
was stanched by Law’s ability to print notes and create demand for them demonetizing silver and 
gold (Velde, 2007; Murphy, 1991). However, this was not enough to prevent inflation to corrode 
the System (Rist, 1938). 
On 21st of May 1720 was presented the arrêt that set forth the failure of the System. The 
preamble of this document, directly written by Law according to Velde (2003), indicates all the 
achievements of the System and accused some general “ill individuals” of all the attempts to 
mine it, giving some credit to Murphy’s theory of a conspiracy against Law. The core of the 
arrêt, after explaining the devaluation of the 5th March as a way to support the credit and the plan 
of 11th March as a mean to restore the proper foreign exchange rate, indicates that System 
liabilities had to be devalued. In fact, since all the measures mentioned above would have caused 
a strong deflation in price level, also System liabilities had to align to the deflationary trend. 
Shares were to decrease their value from 9000 to 5000 livres by December, and in the same time 
frame banknotes would be worth half. Public outrage constrained to retire the devaluation of 
these liabilities the week later (DuTot, 1735), but confidence in paper money never returned. In 
the next weeks Law was fired, arrested, freed and restored at his seat (Mémoires de la Regence, 
1730), giving a clear indication of the difficulties the Regent was facing. 
From June 1720, Law’s primary goal became to reduce the quantity of notes in circulation with 
the hope to save his Company from bankruptcy (Velde, 2007). The main instruments put in place 
to retire banknotes were the issue of annuities, both from the Bank and from the government. In 
July 1720, the government put on sale traditional perpetual annuities at 2.5% for a face value of 
1.000m livres (Mémoires de la Regence, 1730), de facto reversing the conversion of its debt and 
starting to renationalize it. Public confidence in notes and in the overall System was destroyed, 
and these attempts did not allow retiring many notes. For this reason, in October 1720 the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 This estimate is shared by several sources: Mémoire de la Regence (dePiossens), Forbonnais and Levasseur 
among all. Indicated also in Murphy (1997) and Velde (2003). 
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demonetization of high-denomination notes was announced (DuTot, 1735) and the freedom to 
use silver and gold to settle contracts restored. The French monetary system was going back to 
the original status quo. 
The continuous changes in monetary policy and in values of payment instruments of the second 
part of 1720, along with the drop in shares prices and the lost confidence in banknotes caused 
social unrests at the end of 1720. French population was so angry with Law that several members 
of the nobility asked the Regent to imprison him. The Regent, again against the wall, could not 
do anything but condemning Law and his “foolish plan”. The Scottish man was forced to leave 
France in hurry in December 1720, leaving behind all his fortune, since all his proceeds had been 
invested in some real estates in France. He could leave France just for the strict relation he had 
with the Regent, as later memories prove49: they were friends, and the Regent could not let him 
at the mercy of the crowd. 
The consequences of the failure of the System were devastating, especially for the poor part of 
the population who had invested the few savings into the company’s share in the hope to make 
some gains. These people, not having the clear understanding of how stock market worked, had 
not been able to anticipate the collapse selling their shares and monetizing them when still 
valuable as some more rich and educated person did (among all, Cantillon). Furthermore, as 
reported by Forbonnais (1758), the great majority of the population, of all social ranks, had 
invested in Company’s shares. In general, all debtor parties gained with respect to creditors 
because of the reduction of the debt burden (Velde, 2009). This was especially true for the State, 
the bigger debtor, who saw reducing its debt with rentiers. In the long term, however, the cost of 
the System was far more expensive because it ended the confidence of the public, the most 
important asset in fiduciary and paper money, mining the overall process of innovation that 
French finances had just tried to start. 
The table 4 below offers a synthetic representation of all steps of the evolution of the 
Mississippi System.  
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 As we have seen in the first chapter, Law and the Regent maintained an intense correspondence until 1723, when 
the Regent died (Œuvres, III). 
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Timeline Bank Company Most important facts 
May1716 Foundation of the General 
Bank 
-IPO: 6mL, 1200 shares 
-Banknotes in écus 
 Support from the Regent to build trust in 
the Bank and in its notes; Parliament does 
not support the new institution 
Oct 1716   Tax collectors can redeem banknotes in 
cash on demand 
early 
1717 
Banknotes can be used to 
pay taxes 
  
Aug. 
1717 
 Foundation of the 
Company, monopoly for 
Louisiana  
Strong opposition from the Parliament 
Sep 1717  IPO starts: 100mL, 200.000 
shares at 500l 
Billet d’état accepted as payment for the 
subscription 
Oct. 1717 Banknotes only instrument 
to pay taxes 
Develop trade with 
Louisiana 
 
Jun 1718  Revenues from Louisiana 
languish 
Down payment system to speed up 
subscriptions 
Aug 1718  Acquisition of tobacco 
monopoly for 4mL 
 
Dec 1718 General Bank converted 
into Royal Bank 
- Company IPO closes 
- Acquisition of Company 
of Senegal for 1.6mL 
- Reimbursement of original shareholders 
- Transactions larger than 600l have to be 
made in gold or banknotes 
- Banknotes cannot be refused 
May 1719  Acquisition of Company of 
Indies and of China 
 
Jun 1719 Issues 50mL of notes - Acquisition of monopoly 
to run the Mint (50mL) and 
of rights to trade with Africa 
- Issues filles 
Requirement to own older shares to buy 
new ones 
Jul 1719 Issues 160mL of notes - Acquisition of monopoly 
to collect direct taxes 
- Issues petit-filles 
- Payment in gold and silver could be 
refused 
Aug 1719 Issues of high denominated 
notes 
- Acquisition of right to run 
the General Farms 
- Loan to government of 
1600mL 
- The swap between government debt and 
company’s equity starts 
- Development of futures market 
Sep 1719 Starts loaning on margin at 
2.5% with share as collateral 
Issues of cinq cents 
 
- Cinq cent specifically issued to rentiers  
- Market goes in frenzy 
Oct 1719  Company adopts a proper 
management system 
Offices for buying and selling shares at 
given price are opened 
Dec 1719 Banknotes become legal 
tender 
Revenues from trade are 
negligible 
- Company starts dealing only in notes 
 
Jan 1720 Total banknotes issue 
reaches 1bnL 
- Issues of primes 
- Apex of the System 
- Law becomes Controlleur General de 
Finances 
- Inflation starts rising 
Feb 1720 - Company takes over the Royal Bank 
- First Company’s bonds are issued 
- New types of notes are issued 
- Limits to further banknotes issues 
Mar 1720 - Shares can be bought and sold for a fixed price of 9000l 
- Further issues of banknotes (1bnL) 
- Illegal to own more than 500l in specie 
- Devaluation of the silver coins 
- Contract cannot be denominated in gold 
May1720 - Outstanding value of notes above 2.4 bnL: high inflation 
- Announced a devaluation of both banknotes and livre 
- Devaluation of 21st may rescinded after 
public outrage 
Jun1720 Company issues further bonds and annuities and starts 
converting banknotes into shares 
- Government starts issuing annuities 
- Trust in banknotes is lost 
Oct1720 Company retires notes accepting them in payment for 
annuities 
- Demonetization of banknotes 
-Freedom of denominate contracts in gold 
Dec 1720 Social and political situation is no more sustainable: Law forced to leave France. The System ends 
Jan1721 All instruments used by the Company are submitted to liquidation, called Visa. National debt is 
recreated in the form of life annuities. Paper money gradually disappears. Indies Company survives. 
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2.6.1	  Was	  it	  a	  bubble?	  	  	  
Mississippi System is not so much known in economic literature. However, it has a fixed place 
in literature regarding financial bubbles, especially when this phenomenon is seen from an 
historical point of view. The most famous bubble is the Tulip’s Mania of 1637, closely followed 
by the South Sea Bubble of 1720. The latter, however, can be actually seen as a prolongation of 
the Mississippi’s scheme (Graber, 2000). In fact, South Sea Company developed and started 
trading on the line of what was happening in France50.  
But, first of all: what is a bubble? 
This question, and this topic in general, would deserve an ad hoc work. The purpose of this 
paragraph is just to give some quick insights on whether Law’s System can be defined a bubble 
or not and offers rooms to shed more lights on its actual functioning. This is perceived as an 
important passage since the incredible raise in Company’s prices in 1719-1720 and the 
subsequent drop have been defined as a bubble by several authors, Mackay (1864) and 
Kindleberger (2005) among all. Furthermore, as seen above, what happened in France has been 
the driver of a more famous bubble, the South Sea Bubble, which induced England to 
promulgate what has probably been the first policy act against speculation in financial markets, 
the Bubble Act, in 1720. 
Literature offers several definition of bubble, and the difficulty in finding a unique and shared 
definition shows the intricacy of this topic since the very beginning (O’Hara). Charles 
Kindleberger, in his book Manias, Crashes, and Panics (2005), proposes the following 
definition: “a bubble is an upward price movement over an extended range that then implodes”. 
Peter Garber, in his book Famous First Bubbles (2000), argues instead that a bubble is “a fuzzy 
word filled with import but lacking any solid operational definition”. He suggests that a bubble is 
best viewed as “a price movement that is inexplicable based on fundamentals”, but this can be 
either in positive or negative meaning. One of the first systematic definition ever given, 
expressed in the Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, in stating that a bubble is “any 
unsound undertaking accompanied by a high degree of speculation”, already shows the challenge 
of identifying the “bubble” before it actually burst: defining what is unsound, in fact, can mainly 
be done ex post (O’Hara). Perhaps, a less controversial approach is to adopt Brunnermeier’s 
(2007) description that “bubbles are typically associated with dramatic asset price increases, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 The two of them are however completely different for several aspect. Shares of Mississippi were part of an overall 
system with sound economic principles that failed for several reasons explained in this work. South Sea Company 
launched a similar scheme to acquire British government debt in January 1720, but the scheme was much simpler 
than Law’s (Kindleberger, 2005). A detailed explanation of the South Sea Bubble can be found in Balen (2002). 
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followed by a collapse”. The difficulty in finding a unique definition for all the problems 
explained above should induce, according to Garber, to consider the “bubble explanation” as one 
of last resort, a name we attach to a phenomenon we did not fully understand. 
All the explanation for the presence of a bubble that have been given, from the “overtrading” of 
Adam Smith (1776) to the “displacement” of Kindleberger (2005) do not offer an empirical way 
to detect a bubble nor a way to forecast it. In our case, being focused in assessing whether what 
happened can be considered a bubble or not, this concerns are less relevant. Acknowledging the 
validity of the critiques to the definition of bubbles and to the use of this concept to describe an 
economic period or situation, it is indubitable that some times asset prices do appear to be 
inexplicably high relative to theoretically underlying fundamentals. 
In the brief analysis below, we will not use the sophistication of rationality or irrationality of 
individual and more other assumptions provided by academics of this field of the economic 
literature. We simply offer a quick point of view of whether the raise in prices in France of 1719-
1720 can be justified by the fundamentals of the Company.  
The first shares of the Company could be bought for 150-160L: if the nominal value was 500l, 
in fact, the billet d’Etat that can be used to pay the ¾ of the ¼ of the nominal value to be paid at 
the moment of the subscription were at 60% discount. During the peak, in January 1720, the 
shares stood in the market at 10.000l. Is a 50fold increase completely justifiable from the 
fundamentals of the Company? In order to assess this we borrow some of the data we showed 
above and will provide some new. 
The original investor could have claimed that the venture promised great dividend even if 
knowing that this was not the case. If done on purpose, this would be a fraud. New investors 
should still base their decision on market fundamentals, but this is a situation that in game theory 
can be described by asymmetric information where one of the players has incentive to lie 
(O’Hara). How could a man of the beginning of 18th century have made a rational analysis on 
fundamental of Louisiana? The only basis they had was what common wisdom believed about 
that territories and the announced dividend per share. We strongly believe that Law did not cheat 
on purpose on the information regarding Louisiana. He surely marketed them, as he did across 
his all political life, but he perceived that those territories were worth more than what was 
thought that far and that he could have managed them in a more efficient way. As we have 
demonstrated, he was well aware of the functioning of the economy and he knew that his 
System, in order to be sustainable, needed to be based on flourishing proceeds and that 
speculation was not enough. The mistake he made was to be concerned too much with the 
sustainment of prices. 
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The point is understanding if the increase in prices of company’s shares took place in an 
environment where investors knew that there was no justification on the fundamentals but saw 
room for making gain by selling their share at an higher price before the prices actually started to 
fall. Or, in other terms, if investors participated in the gamble.  
In summer 1719 the dividend was announced to be 60 livres per share, paid in two semi-annual 
instalments, with a price around 2.000 livres and a price dividend of 33. After the issue of mere 
and filles the total number of shares was 300.000. Therefore, the Company needed revenues of 
18m livres in order to pay the promised dividend. According to Harsin (1928), the estimated 
revenues of the company were exactly around 18 million: 3 from the tobacco monopoly, 6 from 
the mint, 4 from the interest to be received by the King and 5 from the trading activities. This 
estimates provided by Harsin can be considered underrated especially regarding the revenues 
coming from trading and from tobacco monopolies. In fact, as can be seen in table 4, Law, 
DuTot and the recently revised estimates of Velde all provide higher numbers. Not being 
interested in analysing the problems in Harsin’s evaluations, we can conclude that until middle 
1719 Law’s shares were valued in a reasonable way. 
After the takeover of government debt, Law announced the increase of the dividend to 200 
livres per share. At this time, however, the number of shares issued had also risen to 600.000. In 
the memoire justificatif de may 1723 (Œuvres, III, 196) Law asserts that in order to justify that 
dividend the Company had to have annual revenues of 80 millions: 200livres for the 400.000 
shares on the market (100.000 were owned by the King and the same amount by the Bank as a 
collateral for loans offered to investors). Table 5 offer a quick overview on the estimates present 
in the literature of Mississippi Company’s annual revenues. 
Source Law (1) Law (2) DuTot Velde 
Government’s debt 48 48 48 48 
General Farms 12 10 15 10 
Recettes Generales 1 1 1.5 1 
Mint 12 10 4 0 
Trade 12 8 10 6.5 
Tobacco 6 5 2 10 
Table 5. Expected revenues of the Company of Indies (in million livres). Law’s first estimate was presented to 
shareholder in December 1719; the second is contained in his memoires of 1723 (Œuvres, III). From Velde (2003). 
 
It is interesting to note that the estimates provided by Law in 1723 in his memories are 
significantly lower of the ones presented in 1719, especially regarding trade. However, the total 
revenues are exactly the amount that justified the dividend he had fixed some years before, 
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showing the enduring conviction of the soundness of his project51. However, this figure was 
based on the flawed belief that it should not have paid the dividend on the shares owned by the 
King and on the shares owned by the Bank as collateral for the loans offered to investors. 
Considering the dividend to be paid on all the 600.000 shares, even if we consider as 
reasonable the estimated revenues provided by Law and DuTot given their similarity with the 
one recently presented by Velde (2003), the Company did not generate enough income to justify 
the paid dividend. If we use the estimates provided by Velde considering a payment on all the 
outstanding shares, the dividend should have been around 125 livres per share. Bearing in mind 
the initial potential of trade and the fact that financial markets were not developed and 
understood as they are today, we can conclude that the dividend was overvalued, but by a small 
factor.  
Can we understand in a similar way the price of the shares? In 1720, in fact, the price dividend 
was 47, a quite high ratio. However, with the understanding of financial markets we have today, 
we can not considered those prices as “market” prices, only determined by the demand and 
supply of share and on expectation of investors. Those prices had been strongly influenced by 
Law’s policy actions, especially through the liquidity injections made by the Bank further 
supported by manipulations of the domestic exchange rate. Furthermore, the high dividend was 
one of the main motives why people rushed to obtain shares in the first place and the gimmick of 
requiring the possession of previous shares in order to complete the purchase of the new one, 
tough ingenious and clever in the short term, just worsened the volatility of the price and 
contributed to the rise of the frenzy. 
Law probably miscalculated the price of shares at which his System would have been 
sustainable (Murphy, 1997), as well as the power of speculators and the unforeseeable behaviour 
of people when using money, especially if completely unused to that type of instrument. 
The main problem was that all shares moved in the same way, independently on the “cost” of 
the issue. In fact, the System developed in several stages, but Law’s desire of limiting the 
possession of new issues to his shareholder through the requirement of holding shares of 
previous issues induced the market to treat all Company’s shares in a similar way. The strict 
linkage with Bank’s notes obliged him to increase the money supply, entering in a vicious circle 
that constrained him to sustain the price of his share to the detriment of internal monetary 
balance. When the System reached its peak, the mere, created for 100mL of billet d’Etat with a 
market value of 30-40mL, were traded at prices similar to the ones used for the cinq-cent, shares 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 As we have seen in the first chapter, after leaving France he spent most of his time to write justifications to his 
actions hoping to being called back to guide France and finishing what he had started. We can’t interpret the latter 
memories as objective as the first writings. 
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issued at a price 10 times higher and meant to cover for the takeover of government debt, around 
some 1.6bn livres. 
In conclusion, the prices, therefore the overall Company, were overvalued and the System can 
be defined a “bubble” in the traditional sense of the term: prices were too high with respect to 
fundamentals, they had a vertiginous increase and rapidly dropped as soon as confidence 
disappeared. However, price overvaluation was by a factor of 3-5 times (Velde, 2003) and this 
was mainly due to the market manipulations conducted by Law and the incentives he created to 
stimulate the purchase of shares. The shares were artificially pegged and this peg price was too 
high, but it had been fixed by Law himself and not by frenzy and completely irrational market. If 
one considers these elements as part of the fundamentals (Garber, 1990), the word “bubble” may 
be perceived as too strong.  
 
2.7 The Mississippi System: how should have worked in theory  
. . . posterity will do you justice, and make a vast difference between your wretched imitators, 
and the great original they endeavoured to copy after. When some future historian, with a genius 
equal to the work he undertakes, shall in some distant age arise in France, and shall give an 
account of all the prodigies that happened in this wonderful Aera, which from henceforth will be 
the most remarkable of any in the annals of his country.  
(A Letter to Mr Law, on his Arrival in Great Britain, 1721) 	  
This paragraph pursues the ambitious aim of showing how Law had envisioned the System in 
his theoretical writings and in his imaginary and the even more ambitious objective of showing 
how the system should have functioned to properly work in a sustainable way. In fact, his ideas 
were sound and could have been translated into a sustainable system. However there are several 
discrepancies between what he had thought and theorized and what he actually put in practice. 
Some mistake are due to the political constraints the Regent had to face, other are just 
differences between what Law said in his previous writing and what he actually did on the 
ground. 
Law pushed the Mississippi system too far and too fast. He acknowledged this in the later 
memories (Œuvres, III, 197) stating that if he could have gone back in time, he would have done 
things differently:  
 
If I had the work to do over again, I would proceed more slowly but more surely, and I 
would not expose the country to the dangers which must necessarily accompany the 
sudden disturbance of generally accepted financial practice 
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Why did not he apply the free market principles repeatedly stated in Money and Trade and 
went for an intense state intervention for monetizing the shares at 9.000L in 1720? 
Retrospectively he argued that we was forced to monetize the shares and that he rather had 
wished to maintain some link with specie or at least remove the linking gradually. He stated the 
inconsistency of letting the value of shares and banknotes increasing out of line with respect to 
the value of specie.  
At the beginning of the System, he did not want to completely unlink the banknotes and paper 
money from the specie. This because he thought there was the need to back the money in 
circulation with economic activity. With the system growing and settling, he found out that the 
economy could have worked without this tight link, and therefore started to drastically reduce the 
role of the specie form the monetary and payment system. This was probably due to the political 
constraint he had to deal with and his flooding will to implement his idea and definitely solve 
France problems. The retrospection shown in later memories, where to some extent he denied 
some of his actions restating the importance of the linkage between specie and paper money, 
were probably due also to the necessity to appear a little more conservative than the person who 
every one was blaming for having brought France on the hedge of bankruptcy. His desire, as we 
have seen, was to go back in France (Murphy, 1997). 
In the first years, the System was settled on a sustainable path. The Bank was building the trust 
in paper money, which as the evolution in monetary systems of later centuries shows, is a better 
instrument to serve as money with respect to specie (The Economist, 2009). The Company was 
focusing on trade, as other major European economies were doing, further contributing to the 
revolution of the financial System. With the attempt to merge within his Company all sources of 
French revenues, he could have streamlined all those processes improving their efficiency and 
the overall proceeds. On the other end, the Bank, transformed in Royal bank, could have served 
as a modern central bank. However, the bank did not have the sufficient independence to do so. 
The passage that probably cost the System its sustainability is the acquisition of government 
debt, but not for the idea per sé, but for the subsequent policies he implemented to sustain shares 
prices (Velde, 2003). According to him, this decision has been mainly driven by political 
consideration, rather than economic theories (Œuvres, III): he would have left the Bank and the 
Company as they were in mid-1719, had it not been for the shaky state of government finances. 
But, mindful of the difficulties he had met in 1718 in being paid his interest by the King, he felt 
that government would inevitably raid his companies; lowering the interest on the debt, and 
thereby bringing the budget into balance, was a way to prevent it. His takeover of debt collection 
can also be motivated as a tactical move, intended to put out of business the class of financiers 
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who had long profited from the government’s poor handling of its finances and its inability to 
borrow from a capital market. As confirmed by his memoires: 
If the King's revenue was equal to his expenditure and the other parts of the State were in 
order, I would have been happy to have established the General Bank and the Indies 
Company and I would have been able to maintain them. But given the state of the 
Kingdom it would have been impossible to maintain them because the Minister, not 
having sufficient funds to meet even the most necessary expenses, would have caused the 
Bank to fail having used it on a number of occasions to help him. He would have done 
the same with the Indies Company . . . It was therefore necessary for me to restore order 
to the King's affairs, without which I could not have hoped to maintain the credit of the 
Bank and the Company. 
 
Another interpretation that justify the acquisition of the General Farms is the huge amount of 
bank’s notes that farmer started to hold after the decree which obliged to pay taxes with the new 
paper money. Since the banknotes were to be payable at sight, the possession of such a great 
quantity of them would have put the farmers in the position of controlling the bank (Davis, 
1886).  
Though we can understand the reasons that brought him to transform the government debt into 
Mississippi’s equities, we believe that he concentrated too many things under one institution. 
Furthermore, this institution was not enough independent and inevitably had to submit to King’s 
will when conjuncture deteriorated. 
One of the keys of the success would have been the clear separation between the Company and 
the King. Monopolies vis-à-vis a monarchy can be reasonable if done without reciprocal 
commitment (Greif, 1994). The net separation between the King and the Company, however, 
was missing since the beginning. King was the major shareholder, while Law was both CEO of 
the company and Ministry of France’s Finances (de facto before 1720, de jure after). Would have 
been possible to have a Company with such a humongous power completely independent from 
the monarchy, especially in France? Most probably, not. Here then one of the main issues of 
Law’s system, a system modern in the conceptualization but which was impossible to implement 
in the correct way given the social constraints of the time. Central Banks took over hundred 
years to gain full independency from the government. Nowadays, central bank independency is 
no more a matter of discussion between economists. 
The other big problem the System faced has been the constant focus on maintaining high prices 
of share, not considering with enough care the expansion of money supply. However, a dividend 
of 125L (based on the revenue estimate of Table 4) and an interest rate around of 3% could bring 
valuation to about 5.000 livres (Velde, 2003), the price at which Law launched his debt 
conversion in September 1719. Therefore, the System could have worked if Law did not push 
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stock market to trade his shares up to 10.000 livres. But French people were not used to those 
new instruments and therefore he had to market them in order to increase their appeal. This, 
however, turned back as an incredible boost for shares price and, giving the strict link with the 
Royal Bank, forced him to over expand the money supply. 
In conclusion, it seems that the System did not respect a simple dictum proposed by David 
Ricardo in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation: 
It is not necessary that paper should be payable in specie to secure its value, it is only 
necessary that its quantity should be regulated 
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3. Law’s role in the history of money, his (uncelebrated) 
contribution to the economic thought and…Bitcoin 	  	  	  
During his life John Law showed to the world, first in his writings and then with his policy 
reforms, several concepts and policy instruments never seen before and that today could be 
considered modern, at least in the underlying economic understanding. However, his name is 
rarely quoted into books on history of money or on monetary policy; economists who operated 
after him sporadically acknowledges his theoretic contribution and never in a proper way. 
History seems to have forgotten him and his System, mainly for two reasons. First, it does not 
deal well with failures (Murphy, 1997), and even if we showed how the System made sense and 
could have worked, it unequivocally burst and led many people in ruin. This lead several authors 
subsequent to him to avoid direct quotation of the Scottish author even if, as we will see, 
concepts presented by them were much in line with the ones already introduced with the 
Mississippi System. Second, his monetary theory was modern and his understanding of 
economic forces governing the society too advanced to be understood and supported at that time 
(Velde, 2003). 
In this chapter we aim to present John Law and his theory in the broader contest of the history 
of money and of the history of economic thought. We believe his role has been significant in 
both areas, and could have been even more, had it System not so dramatically collapsed. In order 
to do this, we initially present a quick history of money before Law started his System to 
understand how the status of arts was at the inception of his activity. Subsequently, we present 
the contribution, both positive and negative, that his theory and his policies brought upon in the 
development of money, especially fiat money, and in the history of economic thought. Finally, 
after assessing where his theories can be considered within the modern dispute between 
Keynesian and monetarist paradigms, we will show how the recent direction the world’s 
financial and monetary system has taken is very much in line with the basic understandings 
already present in Law’s theory. 
The chapter ends with the aim to create a parallel between Law and his theory with one of the 
most recent and successful attempt to change the present payment system: Bitcoin.  
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3.1 Some history of money before Law   	  
The thing that differentiates animals and man is money 
Gertrude Stein 	  
Economists have defined money in several ways in history, and this definition clearly evolved 
with the improvement of understanding of economic matters and with the development of 
society. Generally speaking, money can be defined as an identifiable object of value used to 
carry on transactions (New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics). Which object can serve best this 
purpose has been a matter of dispute since the formation of the very first societies. Aristotle, for 
example, thought that every object had two uses: the original purpose for which it was created 
and the possibility to be exchanged for something else, needed but not possessed. 
There is general agreement across literature52 over the fact that money has emerged as a more 
efficient mean to conduct transaction over barter. In rural and primitive societies, barter was the 
common tools for exchanging good. The problem of barter lied in the fact that the capacity of 
carrying a transaction was limited to the coincidence of wants (Menger, 1892). This problem was 
understood quite early, and societies started to identify different commodities to be used as 
means of exchange. Davis, in his A history of money (2002), provides several examples: grain 
and cattle were used as early as 9000BC, shells have been used by maritime communities, cocoa 
was used by Aztec before the Spanish conquest. 
The limit of the commodities rapidly emerged and metals, when available, were preferred as 
(prototype) form of money. Commodity money made markets more liquid, fastening transactions 
and reducing inefficiencies. In order to control the new instruments, societies started to produce 
small objects easier to transport and count: coins. There are several trails of “coined” coins since 
1000BC, from China to Europe (Chown, 1994). In order to solve the differences in value and 
weight of these coins, the coinage soon became standardized to facilitate counting and 
comparison (Ferguson, 2008). 
Gold and silver53 have been the most common metal used to serve as money. Their value was 
acknowledged everywhere and it was easy to melt them into objects of given shape and weight. 
The great advantage of these two metals and of the coin produced from them was that they 
intrinsically had value. The main disadvantage was that they could be manipulated, altering the 
content of metal inside a given coin. This flaw became particularly true when they moved from a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Garber (1990) proposes an alternative interpretation. According to him, money emerged first as a way to make 
credit more efficient, allowing to count and measure in a unique ways all the I.O.Us stipulated. Its function as 
medium of exchange and store of value was just a direct consequence of its use as “measure” for credit. 
53 In several European languages (Spanish, French, Italian, etc.) the actual word for “silver” still means money, 
currency. 
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unit of weight (commodity money), to unit of value (specie). In the second case, the value of the 
coin was no more directly linked with the intrinsic value of the metal contained, but was decided 
a priori, most often by the king or the sovereign (Davis, 2002). The difference between the value 
of the metal and the nominal value of the coin is the seignorage, a tax imposed on all users and a 
great source of financing for several kingdoms in various historical conjunctures. 
European had discovered first forms of paper money in the 13th century, when the Chinese 
paper money became known thanks to the accounts of travellers such as Marco Polo. However, 
they seemed not ready to implement such new form of instrument to conduct transactions. The 
first predecessor of the modern banknotes is the “bank note” – note of the bank – issued in 
medieval Italy and Flanders because of the insecurity and impracticability of transporting large 
sum of cash. These “promissory notes” were a written order to pay whoever possessed them; 
however, these receipts were not a mean of payment, they were just a tool used by merchant to 
avoid the carriage of their money and therefore the risk of loose it or get robbed. 
The shift towards the use of these “papers” as a proper instrument for making payments 
occurred in 17th century, when English goldsmiths began to give out these receipts as payable to 
the bearer instead that to the original depositor. These primordial bankers started also to issue a 
value of these notes higher than the total value of their physical reserves, on the believe that they 
would not have to redeem all their notes at the same time (Chown, 1994). This pivotal shift 
expanded the overall money supply and constitutes one of the main pillars through which credit 
is managed nowadays (Davis, 2002). With the trust in these receipts and in the solvability of 
bankers growing, people started to ask them to issue these notes in smaller amounts allowing 
carrying on also daily transactions.  
The first European institution to print and issue systematically banknotes has been the 
Stockholm Banco, the precursor of the Central Bank of Sweden, in 1661. The experiment was 
not successful since its founder, Johan Palmstruch, printed an excessive amount of notes with 
respect to the metal reserves and paper became worthless as soon as the bank started to refuse to 
redeem its banknotes. However, this episode showed the advantage of paper money to the whole 
Europe. One reason for establishing the Bank of England in 1694, in fact, was to print paper 
money, often in the form of “running cash notes”, the balance of which could be kept in an 
account. The Bank is now the longest continuous issuer of banknotes in the world (Balen, 2002). 
 
At the time when Law started writing on monetary issues, the outstanding money, mostly in 
term of specie, were not matched by a corresponding liability, as is the case in the modern 
financial systems. The shift from a specie-based outside the money system toward the modern 
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dual product inside the money system will represent a crucial passage for the correct 
establishment of the capitalism. The point is not to have an instrument that serves as money that 
has the attributes of medium of exchange and store of value, since specie already had those. The 
revolutionary change is when the money can be spent also for a decision made by a person other 
than the owner, i.e. the borrower (Rist, 1938). The bank money serves precisely this purpose: 
when the depositor lodges his money in the bank, the financial institution can lend this money 
and allow a borrower to make transaction with the very same money. Specie money, not having 
a liability behind it, can be spent only for the transaction agreed upon by the owner. The bank 
therefore allows widening the spectrum of transactions between sellers and buyers and 
expenditure deepening including a third party. 
 
3.2 Consequences of Law’s system in the development of (fiat) money  	  
“Grande et utile école en effet, mais à la condition qu'on y enseigne le 
goût, et non pas la haine, de ces nouveautés si précieuses”	  	  
Histoire de Finances. 
 
This passage from the History of Finance summarizes the main conclusion of this paragraph: 
Law introduced French people and their leading class to monetary instruments and concepts that 
will be at the core of the subsequent financial and economic development. However, the burst of 
his System can be considered the main reason why France lagged with respect to other advanced 
European countries in adopting banknotes as mean of payment in 18th century (Velde and 
Sargent, 1995). 
If we exclude all the political constraints that forced Law to take some wrong actions, as well 
as other measures derived from the flaws present in his theory, it can be argued that his System 
showed to France that paper money was helpful and could have helped to improve transactions’ 
efficiency. Furthermore, he also glimpsed that their issue does not necessarily need to be backed 
by some real commodity, if it is done on the basis of sound economic policy and centralized by 
an institution that enjoy public trust. Therefore, he did not only showed the superiority of paper 
money over specie, but he went further to show the potentiality of fiat money. The latter part was 
probably out of his scope, as his writing and his commitment to issue only on the basis of metal 
reserves indicate, but he strongly believed since the beginning the potentiality of paper money. 
Furthermore, we showed how French society was not ready to fully understand paper money; 
thinking to introduce fiat money is utopic (Mitchell, 1944). 
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His other great contribution has been the introduction to new instruments for trading in 
financial markets: options to buy reached a new sophistication, futures contract have been 
introduced for the first time, and public became aware of the potentiality of equity. 
People of his time probably did not have time to understand this revolution: too focused on 
trading and gain huge amount of money when System was raising, too mad and desperate after 
the System collapsed. People after him, instead, connoted the System and all its theories as 
wrong and devastating. France took several years to recover from Law’s failure, decades to 
rationally understand the importance of innovations he introduced. 
In fact, the immediate problem to face at the beginning of 1721 was to deal with the wreckages 
of the System: shares, bonds and banknotes. All these instruments were submitted to a 
liquidation called “Visa”, managed by the Paris brothers. The Visa recreated the national debt, 
under the form of the traditional perpetual and life annuities (Velde, 2003). Notes that had been 
submitted to Visa were converted in national debt at 25% discount and then burned. The 
remaining notes that had been formerly issued had already been converted in specie or in shares 
of the Company. The Company, separated by the Bank, was brought back to be just a trading 
company, and continued to function as such until 1769 under a strict royal control (Levasseur, 
1854). 
The measures taken right after the dismissal of Law were of course heading on the opposite 
direction to the one indicated by Law and by his policies. Several actions were taken to punish 
all net gainers of the System, with crazy taxes meant just to re-build some support from the 
public (Rist, 1938). The Regent was particularly able to impute all the blame for the System to 
Law and to stay at France’s lead (DuTot, 1735). 
However, some of the innovation the System had brought in the financial System lasted. In 
fact, by royal arrêt of September 24, 1724, the Paris Bourse was established with the intent to 
end the chaotic decentralized trading of government paper created by the liquidation of the 
System. The liquidation also brought back life annuities, the main instrument of borrowing for 
French government, which were raised in great amount to retire the masses of banknotes issued 
in 1719 and 1720. These annuities therefore became a significant component of the French debt 
from this moment on (Velde and Weir, 1992).	  
The complete loss in confidence and the related scepticism on all monetary and financial 
innovation matters relegated France back to a second order power and also contributed to 
generate an unsatisfactory environment out of which the revolution sorted out in 1789 (Marion, 
1915). It is in the revolution that we can find the first direct link with the policies and the beliefs 
shown by Law in 1720. The antagonism against the paper currency and all form of money not 
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directly linked to specie was further deepened with the failure of the assignat54, a form of paper 
money backed on ecclesiastic lands that several authors have described as an evolution of the 
first Law’s proposal on a land bank (Sargent and Velde, 1995). This bad experience with fiat 
money increased the overall mistrust in any kind of financial sophistication, leading France to 
maintain a stronger attachment to gold than most of other rich countries and even contributing to 
the delay in the establishment of a proper functioning central bank (The Economist, 2010). 	  
3.3 Law and other economists  
3.3.1 The acknowledgment of Locke’s findings 
Among the authors who wrote on economics before him – we do not feel confortable in calling 
them “economist” – John Locke has been for sure the most appreciated by Law. In the Essay 
first, but especially in Money and Trade, he acknowledged that John Locke (“Mr. Lock”) was 
the author who had understood and written better on the subject he was approaching. Locke had 
the merit to oppose the currency reform proposed by Treasury Secretary William Lowndes in 
1696 after the Nine Years War. The paradox of value Law presents in his writings is very similar 
to the one proposed by Locke; even if Murphy strongly believes that his was a great deal more 
incisive, the difference is really tiny. In fact, Locke55 was writing: 
What more useful or necessary things are there to the being or well-being of men, than air 
and water, and yet these have generally no price at all, nor yield any money: because their 
quantity is immensely greater than their vent in most places of the world. But, as soon as 
ever water (for air still offers itself everywhere, without restraint or in closure, and 
therefore is no where of any price) comes anywhere to be reduced into any proportion to 
its consumption, it begins presently to have a price, and is sometimes sold dearer than 
wine. Hence it is, that the best, and most useful things are commonly the cheapest; 
because though their consumption be great, yet the bounty of providence has made their 
production large, and suitable to it. 
 
Furthermore, since Locke is one of the few authors of which we are sure Law had read some 
works (Œuvres, III), it could be deducted that the Supply and Demand analysis, carried on in 
such a modern way by the Scottish author, was inspired by the works of the British philosopher. 
The final outcome of the two analysis is different, especially for the great disparity in the 
comprehension of the economic forces and rationales at the basis of the phenomena described, 
but the initial structure is very similar and the dynamic modelled coincides. He did not save him, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 It interesting to note that the opponent of the assignat in 1789 accused the proponents to follow Law’s theories as 
a mean to discredit them, while the advocates of this new paper instrument strongly refused any connection with the 
theories of the Scottish author (Rist, 1938), showing how the wounds the System caused 70 years before were still 
open. 
55 Quoted from Murphy (1997). 
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however, from some critiques (“I am not happy with his “lumiere”). After all, Law strongly 
argued that no one had completely understood money matters at that time. 
There are several references in Law’s writings to Locke’s thoughts and finding. The most 
relevant ones can be found in Money and Trade and are referred to Locke’s Some considerations 
of the consequences of lowering the interest rate and raising the value of money contained in a 
letter sent to a member of the Parliament in 1691. “Mr. Lock”, as Law called him in his writings, 
was correctly building a dynamic reasoning to determine the value of a good, but made the 
confusion between vent and demand. In fact, according to Locke, everything depends on the 
proportion between the quantity and the vent: 
 
The proportion in all commodities, whereof money is one, is the proportion of their 
quantity to the vent. The vent is nothing else but the passing of commodities from one 
owner to another in exchange 
 
According to Law this is wrong because the “vent cannot be greater than the quantity, but 
demand may be greater” (Œuvres, I). As pointed out by Murphy (1997), Law had understood 
that “vent” could be equal to demand just in long run equilibrium and under particular 
conditions, while in the short terms these two quantities differ because of constraints imposed on 
the supply. Among these constraints he mentioned import restrictions and exports prohibitions as 
the most frequent and relevant. 
The second main critique to Locke’s thought is related to the theory of value. His supply and 
demand analysis allowed him to conceive that some commodities could not have a proper market 
value, mainly because of an extreme excess of supply, but it did not for the “imaginary” value 
described by Locke. According to the English philosopher, in fact, silver had an imaginary value 
because of its usefulness for serving as an instrument to make payments, while the real value of 
the metal was just the “barter value”, the value at which people would have exchanged it for 
other goods. In Money and Trade Law strongly disputes this argument, explaining how silver’s 
price is determined by two different components: its barter value and the value obtained by 
transactors in using it as money instead of other less efficient means. As we have shown in the 
first chapter, in fact, the first element a good needed to possess to have a value is the “use”. In 
case of silver, it could be used for different purposes and this just increased the overall value of 
the commodity. 
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3.3.2 The contraposition with Cantillon  
Richard Cantillon is probably the first author who carried on a deep and structured critique to 
Law’s theories and policies. His Essay sur la nature du commerce en general, written in 1729, 
seems an intellectual refutation of Law’s System (Murphy, 1997). It is however interesting to 
note that some of the main finding the Irish economist offered to the history of economic 
thoughts are to some extent in line with Law’s ideas, especially regarding the circular flow of 
income. 
Cantillon has not been critical and sceptical about the System since the very beginning: before 
becoming one of the most severe intellectual opponent of the System, Cantillon was Law’s 
friend and actually participated in building part of the Mississippi scheme. In fact, in early 1719, 
he and Law had established a small company conglomerated in the bigger one to develop trade 
in Louisiana (DuTot, 1734). Cantillon strongly believed the soundness of the trading dimension 
of the Company, as the setting of a group of colonists, leaded by his brother, to develop a 
colonial trading outlet demonstrate. 
Before 1719, he strongly speculated in the System during its first years and made out of it an 
immense fortune (Murphy, 1986). With this fortune, he also lent money to other people that 
wished to speculate in the Mississippi shares. In summer 1719, however, when Law proposed the 
big shift of his Company from a simple trade company to a de facto substitute of the French 
government and central bank, Cantillon left Paris. He was in fact convinced that the substitution 
of the sovereign debt with equities of Law’s company would cause in a near future a collapse of 
the overall system. He probably miscalculated the time period in which this implosion would 
have happened and missed out the opportunity of making huge capital gains exploiting the rise in 
price from September onwards. In fact, when he left Paris in summer 1719, he strongly believed 
that the shares’ price, at that time around 3.500 livres, was not sustainable. The prediction proved 
wrong, and as we have seen shares’ price rose to 10.000 livres by the end of the year. He 
returned to Paris in spring 1720, even more convinced that the System would have soon 
collapsed and strongly believing that there were huge potential gains in betting against the 
French currency. Interestingly, he kept lending money to fanatics of Law’s System who were 
actually betting French currency would have increased its value against silver, therefore 
borrowing sterling to be exchanged immediately for French livres and that converted back once 
this revaluation on the livre would come into place (Rist, 1938). 
A part from speculative motives, which were important from him, Cantillon was strongly 
arguing against the System because he thought Law’s policies were inconsistent. In fact, the debt 
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management direction took by the Company pushed Law to pursue the policy of keeping the 
interest rate low, which as we have seen in the first chapter he thought was sound. In order to 
keep the price of his shares high, he kept feeding the economy with banknotes to create demand 
for share but also increasing the overall money supply. However, he also wanted to revalue the 
currency by changing the domestic exchange rate – the value of the livre with respect to the 
silver – therefore increasing the overall value of the money. Putting these three elements 
together, according to Cantillon, was inconsistent and would have caused the System to collapse. 
This is the economic reasoning behind his strong speculation against the System, which 
according to Murphy cost him the expulsion from France by Law’s decision. In the late summer 
of 1720, however, Law called back Cantillon asking his help to re-establish order in France’s 
finances. Cantillon declined several times, but this shows the respect and the esteem that Law 
harboured with respect to the Irish economist.  
The contraposition between Law and Cantillon took also place in the economic theory 
presented. While the latter has been considered as a proper economist, we have shown how Law 
should be considered in the same category. Murphy advances the hypothesis that the circular 
flow of income, yet in a primordial version, had been presented for the first time by the Scottish 
author. The dynamic within an economy, where money plays the role of oiling the inner 
workings, is roughly explained but clearly understood in Money and Trade. However, Cantillon 
has been the one to be credited to this discovery and Quesnay the one who presented it in a 
systematic way in the Tableau Economique. 
Where Cantillon is profoundly different from Law is in the interpretation of money and of its 
importance within an economy. In fact, money is not at the origin of wealth and richness, but 
land and work are. The assessment of Law’s System can be understood from this passage of his 
Essay: 
[si] la monnaie mise en circulation est de l’argent] fictif et imaginaire, il cause les mêmes 
désavantages qu'une augmentation d'argent réel en circulation, pour y hausser le prix de 
la terre et du travail, soit pour enrichir les ouvrages et manufactures au hasard de les 
perdre dans la suite: mais celte abondance furtive s'évanouit à la première bouffé de 
discrédit et précipite le désordre 
 
This conception brought him to envisage a different role for the bank that, according to him, 
had the primary task to make the money circulate in a smoother and faster way and not the 
one to increase its total quantity. In fact, the importance of the Bank can be inferred from this 
other passage from his Essay: 
L'établissement d'une banque générale dans un grand royaume où son utilité ne 
correspondrait jamais à la dixième partie de l'argent qui circule 
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3.3.3 Law the “visionary”: Smith and Hume   
Richard Cantillon is probably the first and the last author that played a significant role in the 
history of economic thought that fully considered Law as an economist and that directly 
addressed part of his economic writings to comment and assess the Scottish’s ideas. In the 
second part of 18th century, when the modern economic thought started to develop, John Law’s 
theory is rarely mentioned even if some “new” economic concepts are very similar to the ones at 
the basis of the Mississippi System. It is interesting to note that two of the most important 
authors of this period, David Hume and Adam Smith, barely mentioned Law and his theory and 
described him with the adjective “visionary”. 
David Hume, in his essay Of public credit, though never explicitly mentioning Law, was 
writing: 
it is not altogether improbable, that, when the nation becomes heartily sick of their debts, 
and is cruelly oppressed by them, some daring projector may arise with visionary 
schemes for their discharge. And as public credit will begin, by the that time, to be a little 
frail, the least touch will destroy it, as happened in France during the regency; and in this 
manner it will die of the doctor 
 
 Hume also addressed a critique to the System. This took the form of a strong attach on 
DuTot’s Réflexion politiques, as seen before an apologetic narrative of the System from the point 
of view of it cashier and a strong supporter of Law’s ideas since inception. In Essay of Money, 
The economist and philosopher argues that DuTot, in order to defend the action of his mentor, 
has proposed facts that did not happen from an un-authoritative point of view. 
 
Adam Smith, in his masterpiece The Wealth of Nations (1776) qualifies Law's ideas as 
presented in Money and Trade (1705) as ‘splendid but visionary’, adding that they had ‘in part, 
contributed to that excess of banking which has been complained of both in Scotland and in 
other places”. In the same paragraph56, he defined the System as one of the most extravagant 
project “both of banking and stock-jobbing that perhaps the world ever saw”. However, he does 
not analyse the System, with the justification that a complete account has already been done by 
DuTot, nor comment the theory behind it, since “the principles upon which it was founded are 
explained by Mr. Law himself” in Money and Trade. 
 According to Murphy (1997), however, he borrowed without acknowledging the distinction 
between value in use and value in exchange made by Law in his writings. This distinction was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Smith (1776), Book 2, Chapter 2. 
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fundamental for Smith to present the paradox of value. Even if we cannot be sure that Smith 
directly borrowed this distinction from Law as firmly indicated by Murphy, it is indisputable that 
the concept explained in the Wealth of Nations is very similar to the one originally presented in 
Money and Trade. In fact, in Chapter 1 of Book 1 of the Wealth of Nation, he wrote: 
The word value, it is to be observed, has two different meanings, and sometimes expresses the 
utility of some particular object, and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the 
possession of that object conveys. The one may be called ‘value in use;’ the other, ‘value in 
exchange.’ The things which have the greatest value in use have frequently little or no value in 
exchange; and, on the contrary, those which have the greatest value in exchange have frequently 
little or no value in use. Nothing is more useful than water; but it will purchase scarce any thing; 
scarce any thing can be had in exchange for it. A diamond, on the contrary, has scarce any value 
in use; but a very great quantity of other goods may frequently be had in exchange for it. 
 
The big effort made by Smith and Hume to reduce close to null the importance of the money 
within an economy is due, according to Rist (1940), to the exaltation of the role of the money 
made by Law some years before rather than the emerging mercantilist ideas on money. Law had 
strongly believed that money and its circulation were the most important drivers for expanding 
the economy. As his System, considered around 1719 the product of a genius and source of 
inspiration for the South Sea Company, failed and thousands of people were ruined, money was 
suddenly seen as a montre, something capable of having nefarious effects on the economy. Is of 
not surprise that most of the economists who wrote right after the end of the System did not put 
much emphasis on the money dimension. 
The lack of admiration and the type of assessment given by Smith, probably the most 
influential and proficient economist present after Law’s experiment, according Edwin B. Wilson 
(1948), may have played a crucial role in the dismissal of the theories and policies presented in 
this work. In fact, according to the Harvard professor:  
one may raise the question: how much of the failure in some quarters to appreciate Law as an 
economist is due to reading Adam Smith on Law, instead of reading Money and Trade itself? 
 
3.3.4 The justification from Steuart and the admiration from Schumpeter  
The first author that provide some kind of justification to Law’s action has been Sir James 
Steuart in his An enquiry into the principle of political economy of 1767. While critical of the 
excesses of the System, Steuart was probably sympathetic with the underlying mercantilist ideas 
present in the System. He probably read DuTot assessment of the System (Murphy, 1997) and 
strongly believed that Law had acted in good faith. 
 
It may seem surprising that I should take so much pains to vindicate the two principal 
conductors of that scheme. My intention is not so much to do justice to their reputation, 
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which has been grossly calumniated by many, who have written the history of those 
times, as to prove, that an ill concerted system of credit may bring ruin on a nation, 
although fraud be out of the question: and if a nation be plunged into all the calamities 
which a public bankruptcy can occasion, it is but a small consolation to be assured of the 
good intentions of those who were the cause of it. 
 
 
If Law cannot be blamed, however, the assessment of the burst of the System is particularly 
strong, and confirms the long lasting effects that its failure had in the economy for the next 
decades. Furthermore, it is interesting to note how the author clearly report the consternation 
present in France after 1720, when people found themselves poorer than before, after having 
experienced an incredible year of prosperity and luxury, without any clue on what had just 
happened: 
 
The bubble no sooner burst, then the whole nation was thrown into astonishment and 
consternation. Nobody could conceive from whence the credit had sprung; what had 
created such mountains of wealth in so short a time; and by what witchcraft and 
fascination it had been made to disappear in an instant. 
 
Amongst twentieth-century few economists who wrote on John Law, it is interesting to read the 
view of Joseph Schumpeter, author of A History of Economic Analysis, the magnum opus of 
books on the history of economic thought. Schumpeter, unlike Hume and Smith, had a 
particularly positive view on Law’s economic ideas: 
 
John Law (1671–1729) I have always felt is in a class by himself. He worked out the 
economics of his projects with a brilliance and, yes, profundity, which places him in the 
front ranks of monetary theorists of all time. 
 
This is a remarkable assessment from Schumpeter, who was not noted for admiring many of the 
pre Walrasian economists (Murphy, 1997). Unfortunately, Schumpeter died before completing 
this section of A History of Economic Analysis. He left no explanation as to why he considered 
Law in ‘the front ranks of monetary theorists of all time’. We may advance the hypothesis that 
he particularly appreciated the early discovered of the circular flow of income seen in a dynamic 
conception, where a single individual – where Schumpeter probably saw the entrepreneur – with 
his capability disturb the equilibrium and brings innovation. The other element he probably 
liked, is the great improvement Law was introducing in the credit system, that for Schumpeter 
was fundamental to realize the vision of the entrepreneur. 
 
 
	  	   94	  
It here interesting to report another contribution that relieved Law from the blame of what had 
happened. Indeed, in respect to Law and the French collapse of 1720, Knut Wicksell (Lectures 
on Political Economy, edited 1^ L. Robbins, Vol. 2, p. 78.) remarked:  
 
The chief cause of the crash was, however, as in other countries at the same time (and not 
least in Sweden), the immoderate appetite of Governments for money and the contempt 
with which they placed themselves above ordinary business morals. 
 
 
3.3.5 The indifference of Keynes   
“The important thing for Government is not to do things which individuals 
are doing already, and to do them a little better or a little worse; but to do 
those things which at present are not done at all”.  
The end of laissez-faire,  
J.M. Keynes, 1926 	  
The similarities between John Law and John Maynard Keynes are several and can be found in 
different aspects, from the personal life57 to the economic theory. Furthermore, most of the 
literature58 that assessed Law’s economic theory interpreted it as mainly Keynesian given the 
importance of money in the real economy and the involvement of government. However Keynes, 
the economist that revolutionized the economic thought in 20th century, does not give much 
credit to the work of Law as economic theorist. He briefly refers to him and to the System in his 
A treatise on Money of 1931. 
As mentioned above, the common aspects between the two economists are several. Wilson 
(1948) consider them both economist, “of the most brilliant” of their times and “well ahead” 
with respect to their contemporaries. Murphy (1991, 1997) notes that the relationship 
between Essay on a Land Bank and Money and Trade, is in many ways similar to the 
relationship between two of Keynes's great works, A Treatise on Money and The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest and Money. The later works were considered to be both broader in 
subject and more revolutionary. Furthermore, several of the ideas present in Law’s writings can 
found an evolution in Keynes’ works. However, “whether or not Law deserves to be regarded in 
the same vein as the great Lord Keynes remains to be seen”. 
According to Wilson (1948), both Keynes and Law felt certain that the greatest good for the 
greatest number of people could not be reached without some active intervention of government 
in the economy and they both wanted this intervention to be as little an infringement on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  57	  Regarding personal life, it is interesting to note how Keynes shared two main passions with Law: speculation in 
financial markets and collection of fine art (Jenkins, 2011). 
58 Murphy (1991, 1997), Velde (2007), Rist (1940) among all. 
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individual liberty and enterprise as possible. While the first part is indisputably true (Murphy, 
1991; Velde, 2003), we believe that the magnitude of the state intervention envisioned by Law 
was much more intense than the one wished by Keynes.  
Like Keynes, Law thought that the economy could be stimulated and that growth rates could be 
permanently elevated through active monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies (Hanke, 2009). 
Especially monetary policy, through the correct management of money, would have influenced 
trade and economic activity in general. The basic explanation given to the problem of 
unemployment, although provided in different way from the technical point of view, shows some 
similarities in the transmission mechanisms within an economy. For Keynes, is the inadequate 
aggregate demand that leads to periods of deep unemployment. A stimulus on the demand can 
help to moderate boom and bust cycle of economic activity. For Law, the unemployment is 
firstly solved increasing the overall money supply that allows starting using resources 
unproductive so far. This would in turn increase the aggregate demand, fundamental for keeping 
in balance the economy. 
Although Law’s economic understanding is weaker than the one provided by Keynes and his 
theory can considered flawed in some aspect from a Keynesian perspective, some common ideas 
are undisputable. However, John Maynard Keynes does not mention Law and his theory when 
describing the antecedents to his theory (Hanke, 2009; Murphy, 1991). It is reasonable to think 
that Keynes did not quote nor give credit to Law for some ideas at the basis of the General 
Theory and already present in the Scottish writing because of the failure of the System and the 
bad reputation this had induced on its proposer. Keynes did not want ideas similar to the ones he 
was proposing to the economic community to be associated with a person responsible of one of 
the greatest financial bubbles ever experienced by an European country59. 
 As we will see in the next paragraph, another reason of this “forgetfulness” could be related to 
the fact that Keynes, which definitely read Law (Murphy, 1997), recognized some discrepancies 
between his theory and the one presented in the Essay and in Money and Trade. If the policies 
implemented in the System and the way the economic policy was conducted can be generally 
defined as Keynesian (Velde, 2007), the economic theory behind them should not. However, the 
fact that Keynes not only did not give credit to Law’s ideas, but also decided not to talk at all 
about them implicitly assuming the low relevance of Law in the history of economic thought that 
far, gives more support to the first interpretation. 	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 This was what common wisdom thought at that time, mainly because of the work of Mackay (1864) 
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3.4 Keynesian or monetarist? Law’s 300th (true) anniversary 
Since one of the goal of this work is to assess whether John Law could be considered an 
anachronistic economist, and given that the theories and policies presented in previous chapters 
have several features that can be considered modern, it is interesting to see where they can be 
better fitted within the on-going debate between Keynesian and monetarist paradigms and finally 
state what are the most modern concepts proposed by Law three century ago. After the above 
paragraph, it seems quite obvious to consider Law a Keynesian in swaddling clothes. However, 
this is not as straightforward as it seems. 
The first aspect of his theory to be modern is the account and the definition of the functions of 
money. Though he lacked a complete understanding of the store of value function and 
considered shares as a money within the broader definition, several authors have defined his 
interpretation of the importance of money in stimulating the economic activity as Keynesian. 
Like Keynes, in fact, Law thought the economy could be stimulated and that growth rates could 
be permanently elevated through active monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies. In short, 
both economists supported the idea of an active, interventionist government (Hanke, 2009). 
However, the deep analysis of his writings of the first chapter shows some theoretical findings 
that are more in line with monetarism. Law in fact had a profound comprehension of the quantity 
theory of money (Murphy, 1991). As we have seen, in the Essay he stated that if the quantity of 
the money were greater than the demand of it, money would be less valuable. The complete 
understanding of this concept is proved by the example used to demonstrate this argument: the 
inflation of the previous two hundreds years. According to him, in fact, the inflation of that 
period and in general the continuous change in the value of money instrument was due mainly to 
Spanish, who had to be blamed because they had brought “a great quantities [of gold] into 
Europe as they can get wrought out of the mines”.  
The continuous emphasis on the need for monetary stability within an economy echoes the 
concept brought upon to the economic literature by another gigantic economist of 20th century, 
Milton Friedman. In fact, the economist of the University of Chicago reiterated that the two most 
important things that monetary policy could do is prevent money itself to be a major source of 
economic disturbance and to provide a stable background for the overall economy (Friedman, 
1956; 1968). 
Another element of Law's theory that accords with monetarism is his recognition of the 
international dimension when it comes to price determination, or what is now known as the law 
of one price. As we have seen in the first chapter, this concept is explained in Money and Trade 
with surprising lucidity: 
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goods differ little in price, from what they were when money was in greater quantity 
because the value of goods or money differs as the quantity of them or demand for them 
changes in Europe; not as they change in any particular country 
 
Law solved the problem of inflation with the strong – and disputable – assumption of high 
elasticity of supply of commodities. In fact, for him, the level of price would not have increased 
as a result of a monetary expansion because the quantity of goods would adjust to the demand: 
 
Perishable goods as corns, etc. encrease or decrease in quantity as the demand for them 
encreases or decreases; so their value continues equal or near the same. 
 
This assumption leaves his theory of monetary expansion consistent with the quantitative 
theory of money. This is coherent with what Milton Friedman was arguing in his The quantity 
theory of money: a restatement of 1956: 
changes in money income mirror changes in the nominal quantity of money. But it tells 
nothing about how much of any change in Y is reflected in real output and how much in 
prices. To infer this requires bringing in outside information, as, for example, that real 
output is at its feasible maximum, in which case any increase in money would produce 
the same or a larger percentage increase in prices; and so on. 
 
Therefore if the real output is at full employment, an increased quantity of money will 
immediately translate into an increase of prices, i.e. inflation. But if the economic activity is 
languishing and a lot of people are unemployed, the same increase will have some effect on real 
output and will not entirely translate in inflation. Law, assuming that supply was elastic to 
changes in demand, thought that an increase in the quantity of money in the economy would 
increase output leaving prices constant, because the former would also bring an increase in the 
demand of money that will match with the increase supply. This assumption, which is 
undoubtedly wrong in Law’s strong version, it is however reasonable given the precarious 
economic condition of both France (dePiossens, 1730) and Scotland (Murphy, 1991). 
The control over the money supply in order to affect the real economy it is theoretically in line 
with modern monetarism, which recognises that monetary policy could be used to offset 
economic disturbances. The difference is that monetarism believes that such measures are likely 
to aggravate the situation due to lack of knowledge about the economy, and so advocates the 
monetary growth rule (Friedman, 1968). 
As previously shown, the System put in place differed from the original theory. However, the 
bigger flaw in the management of the system, the excess of issue of money, is in line with the 
main flaw of the theory. Law had continuously multiplied the monetary wealth of many people 
in a short period of time without much consideration for the real economy. When he recognised 
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this and tried to remedy the situation, it was too late. This whole experiment seems to show that 
Law believed too much in the capabilities of money and assumed away the role of the demand 
and of the real economy. Law must have believed that his elasticity of supply assumption would 
hold.  
If some elements of the theory can be considered pseudo-monetarist, the economic policies 
advocated in his writings and later partially implemented in the System seem to be more 
Keynesian. In fact, money had real effect of the economic activity and a greater quantity would 
have allowed turning the unrealized demand into effective demands. As stated in Money and 
Trade, money serves to pay salaries and to buy goods, and the increase in the money supply 
would allow entrepreneurs to hire more people and push out the production frontier. This would 
create an increase in the employment rate of a country, which would have stimulated 
consumption. The increase in consumption would have further stimulated the economy, 
increasing the demand and the production and therefore employment, in what can be interpreted 
as an anticipation of the Keynesian multiplier. 
Therefore we can conclude that although starting from some basic features of monetarism, Law 
evolved toward a Keynesian management of the economy, where the government played a 
crucial role in stimulating the economy. When Law finally got a chance to implement his ideas, 
in fact, it exposed an overemphasis on the real effects of money and a neglect of the real 
economy (Hutchinson, 1988). This is what has ultimately led to his popular, and perhaps 
misguided, classification as a Keynesian. 
An aspect of Law’s modernity can be found in some measures he implemented when his 
System was collapsing in 1720. When the scheme faltered Law resorted to a number of rescue 
packages, many of which have their echoes 300 years later (Murphy, 1991). The main one, and 
the one that made the System last more, was for the bank to guarantee to buy shares in the 
Mississippi company at a set price of 9.000 livres. This measure shares the same rationale of the 
various government asset-purchase schemes today (Velde, 2003). Another measure, which can 
be thought as similar to the recent events the 2008 financial crisis brought, is the takeover 
through which the company rescued the bank, a rescue along the lines of Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac (The Economist, 2010).  
The main revolutionary innovation that Law introduced with his System is the paper money, 
which ultimately can be interpreted as one of the first experiment of fiat money ever seen in a 
developed country (Murphy, 1997; Garber, 2000; Velde, 2003; The Economist, 2009), and the 
respective financial system envisioned. The switch to paper took decades, but it was 
unstoppable. In the late 19th century, economists were still arguing about the merits of 
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bimetallism, a monetary system in which paper notes were backed by both gold and silver, rather 
than gold alone. During the 20th century that debate became academic, when paper money was 
finally separated from any metallic equivalent. 
When Law introduced paper money, in 1716, other countries had done it already, Sweden 
among all. What is innovative in Law is the belief, reached after some years of functioning of his 
System, that paper money did not have to be completely backed by a real commodity as gold and 
silver, or by the economic activity of a company. Initially he strongly believed that paper money 
had to be backed by some real asset, which was the land in the Essay. As soon as he went into 
politics, he probably understood that land was not stable in value as well and landlords were 
more a source of problems rather than a solution. He therefore turned to the real activity of his 
company as benchmark for the growing money supply, gradually reducing the link with gold and 
silver and finally breaking it when the money issued was too much and he could no longer 
guarantee the banknotes to be redeemed in specie. Instead of counterbalancing banks’ liabilities 
(paper money and deposits) with gold or silver assets, the liabilities in his credit-based system 
would be counterbalanced with government bonds, i.e. loans (Hanke, 2009). 
The reason that brought him to break the link with the gold are very similar to the reason that 
induced president Nixon to stop the convertibility of the dollar in gold in 1971, ending the 
Bretton Wood system. Since that year, when United States refused to guarantee any longer the 
fixed price of $35 for an ounce of gold, the international financial system has been unshackled 
from specie. Banking system did not need anymore to be anchored to gold or silver, financial 
system started to be based on paper/credit and currencies to floating in foreign exchange market. 
The complexity of the markets of 20th century and the sophistication reached in the economic 
theory cannot be compared with the period in which Law created his System. However, his 
principle of a paper money unlinked by specie that allow to better conduct monetary policy and a 
financial system based on credit are today orthodox concepts and definitely justify the positive 
answer to the question of this work: John Law has been an anachronistic economist. 
The last element of Law’s flair for innovation, the debt management, where he implemented a 
debt-for-equity swap, has not been repeated yet in modern economies. Will we consider John 
Law even more anachronistic, in some years? 
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3.5 John Law and Bitcoin 
John Law strongly believed that the instruments used as money during his epoch were not good 
to serve properly as the functions he envisioned for money. As we have seen, one of the main 
revolutions he introduced was the use of paper money, which eventually became fiat money in 
the second part of the System. The idea of a fiat currency will revive 300 years later and 
nowadays paper money without any intrinsic value and not redeemable for a specific, valuable 
commodity is the pivotal concept of the current international financial system. The dramatic 
change brought by the transition from gold standard to fiat money, however, does not rely on the 
instrument per sé. Banknotes were used even before 1971. What is different is that the money in 
circulation, i.e. banknotes and coin, in a regime of fiat money do not need to be backed by gold 
reserves because guaranteed by the State as legal tenders and this allow governments to 
potentially create all the money they want. This possibility, if overexploited, might reveal very 
dangerous, as Law’s System has shown. In this work, however, we are not interested in assessing 
the merits and the potential dangers coming from the current monetary and financial system. 
In this later part we focus on the instrument used as money. Today, most of the people probably 
do not even think that the banknote they are holding is intrinsically worthless because they are 
certain that it will be accepted all over the nation  - the continent, if we think to euro - to buy 
goods and services. Fiat money is the status quo. However, every epoch has innovative ideas and 
new theories, and money instruments are not exempt to this process. In recent years, in fact, with 
the dramatic development of technology and with the internet taking roots in people daily lives, a 
new type of money has developed: electronic money. E-money, here meant according to the 
definition provided by the European Commission60 “a digital equivalent of cash, stored on an 
electronic device or remotely at a server”, is not in contraposition with the fiat money from the 
point of view of the monetary and financial system required to support it. It is just another, more 
technologically advanced way to express it and make it circulate faster. However, over the last 
20 years there have been some attempts to create some new forms of e-money based on different 
principles, with the final goal of reshaping and revolutionizing the current payment and 
monetary systems. None of them seem to have taken roots but on one: Bitcoin. 
After having studied Law’s theories and policies and having stated his anachronism as 
economist, it is interesting to compare his experiment of reshaping the monetary system of his 
time with the most modern and successful attempt to accomplish a similar task. These two 
experiments, in fact, aim to revolutionize the respective systems of payment; they shares several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The definition, as long as a complete explanation of the new instrument, can be found on the specific webpage of 
the European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/emoney/index_en.htm. 
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features and have some peculiar differences on the underlying economic and monetary 
principles.  
 
3.5.1	  Bitcoin:	  an	  overview	  	  
 Bitcoin is a digital currency first appeared in 2009, created by a computer programmer that 
used the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto. It is an open source (the controlling computer code is 
open to public view), peer-to-peer (transactions do not require a third party intermediary) digital 
currency, which means that is completely electronic without any physical manifestation (Elwell 
et all, 2013). The Bitcoin system is private but does not involve any traditional institutions for 
completing transactions. It does not have any relations or duties with respect to any government, 
believing that the instrument used as a mean of exchange should not be linked or controlled by 
any central authority (Nakamoto, 2009). However, in the original paper is not expressed a 
particular concern or aversion to the State; the objective of the new digital currency is to avoid 
the inefficiencies still present in online transactions and mainly due of the necessity of a third 
part.  
Since 2012 Bitcoin use has increased substantially, gaining the attention of the press and of the 
US Congress. In fact, the system does not only introduce a new money instrument but envisions 
a complete reshaping of the current payment and monetary systems and offers a new opportunity 
for money laundering activities (Grinberg, 2001).  
Like the euro and the dollar, the Bitcoin is a fiat currency in the sense that is not redeemable for 
any commodity; however, is not legal tender nor is backed by any legal entity. Furthermore, its 
supply is not determined by a central institution as the BCE or the FED. The bigger difference 
with the other digital currencies the world has experienced so far, and probably the aspect that 
contributed the most to its success (Barber et al, 2011), is that Bitcoin network is completely 
decentralized, where all parts of the transactions are executed by the system’s users. 
Bitcoin relies on cryptography to validate transactions and to administrate the production of the 
currency itself. The coin is substantially a string of zeros and ones (Nakamoto, 2009). Each user 
has an encrypted and exclusive identity, which is visible to all the computers in the network 
every time he participates in a transaction, since all transactions are recorded on a decentralized 
public ledger. This public ledger is a unique attribute of the Bitcoin since it allows solving the 
double spending problem, i.e. to verify that the buyer has the amount of Bitcoin spent and he did 
not use the same coin for different purchases (Nakamoto, 2009). 
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The first step in order to use the network is downloading the free and open-source software. 
The user can obtain the currency in three ways. The first, and most of the time the one used by 
new users, is to exchange traditional currencies such as dollar and euro for Bitcoin on an online 
exchange for a small fee that decreases with the increase of the transaction amount. The price of 
the digital currency with respect to other traditional currencies is simply determined by the 
interaction between demand and supply (Velde, 2013). The second way is receiving Bitcoin as 
payment for the sale of goods and/or services: instead of receiving the amount in cash or with a 
credit card transfer, the user is willing to accept a payment from the buyer in terms of Bitcoins. 
The third way consists in the actual generation of new Bitcoins, through a process called mining. 
The user can apply his computer’s processing power in order to solve complex math problem to 
discover new Bitcoins. However, the probability of discovering a new Bitcoins is proportional to 
the processing power used, which means a very low value for a single machine.  
The mining aspect of Bitcoin system deserves some more attention. As we have seen above, 
transactions are not controlled by a third party or by a central authority. In fact, they are 
validated by the users of the network: every time a transaction occurs, in order to be completed it 
has to be validated by other nodes of the network. Since validation is as difficult as crucial, those 
who do it are rewarded by being allowed to create new Bitcoin in a controlled way. Every ten 
minutes, the nodes who want to participate to this process, called miners, gather up the proposed 
transactions that were recently broadcasted and attempt to add them to the block chain, or the 
universal ledger of Bitcoin transactions. The cryptography problem is difficult to solve, but the 
solution is easy to verify, as it is difficult to factorize a large number but it is easy to verify that 
the factorization is correct. When the solution is found, it is broadcasted to the whole network 
and as soon as it is validated, i.e. accepted by the majority of the computational power of the 
whole network, the miner who found it receives the reward initially encapsulated in the 
transaction (Babaiof et al., 2011). The Bitcoin protocol regulates the degree of difficulty of the 
problems as well as the entity of the reward, which is halved every four years (i.e. every 210.000 
blocks), implying that the number of total Bitcoin will approach 21 millions. 
The latter characteristic shows how the supply of Bitcoin behaves. In fact, the total quantity of 
coins in circulation does not depend on a central bank’s monetary policy, as is the case in most 
of the developed countries. From a theoretical point of view, the growth of Bitcoin is similar to 
the growth of money under a gold standard system, even if empirically the amount of gold mined 
has been more erratic than the growth of the Bitcoin’s supply is supposed to be (Elwell et all, 
2013). In fact, the protocol is settled to increase smoothly the overall supply and to cap it at 21 
millions coins in 2140.  
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One of the system’s peculiarities that attract many people is the anonymity of the transaction. 
As stated by Elwell et all. (2013), however, the transactions within the network are 
pseudonymous rather than anonymous. This because every time a transaction occurs, it is 
registered in the public lodger with the encrypted identities of the buyer and of the seller and 
with sophisticated computer analysis is possible to track the transaction. If this process were 
paired with some law enforcement tools, would be even possible to gain information on the 
person that is moving Bitcoin (Babaioff, 2011). Furthermore, if Bitcoin exchanges, where the 
large transactions are most likely to occur, want to be fully compliant with the bank regulations, 
they will have to start to collect personal data on their customers. Bitcoin is therefore facing a 
trade-off between the privacy and secrecy offered to its users and the compliance with banking 
rules and regulations. In fact, it appears clear how the Bitcoin system is particularly tempting for 
all those people and activities involved in money laundering operations. If tracking is 
theoretically possible, has not been done regularly over the last years since it requires time and 
processing power. This flaw has been the main reason of the attention of the governments and 
agencies for the banking regulation, especially in US and, recently, in China (Reid, 2013). 
Bitcoins can officially be exchanged since 2009, but is just in last year that they gained some 
popularity in the financial markets, as can be seen in the bottom part of graph 3. Despite this 
significant growth since the inception, their scale is still small (Velde, 2013). The number of 
Bitcoins in circulation has reached 12 million in 2014, about 2 million coins more than last 
year61. Every coin can be divisible to eight decimal places and each of them can be spent, 
totalling more than 2 quadrillion spendable units. With the current market price of around 420 
USD (300 euro) per Bitcoin, the overall market capitalization is around $6 billions. However, as 
can be seen from graph 3 below, the price has been particularly volatile in the last six months. In 
November, for example, the price was around $1.000 for a market capitalization of 13$ billions. 
Less than one month later, it reached almost $20billion with a price of over $1300 per coin. 
Regarding the diffusion of the instrument as a payment method, according to Bitcoin Charts, in 
2013 the daily transactions in Bitcoin had been on average 40.000, for an average value of 16 
coins (4.800 euro at the actual exchange rate). The size of its market is still low, if compared 
with the amount of other fiat currencies present in the market or with other online payment 
mechanisms. For example, the US money supply (M2) in March 2014 was $11.2 trillion dollars62 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 All data relative to Bitcoin are taken from Bitcoin Charts, available at http://bitcoincharts.com 62	  The updated table for the US money supply (M1 and M2) can be found on the FED website in the Board of 
Governor section, http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/h6/current/default.htm 
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while Visa reports that for the year ending in June 2013 the total volume of transactions was $6.9 
trillion, with an average of 24 millions of daily transaction (Elwell et al., 2011).63 
The graph also shows the different quotation of the Bitcoin depending on the exchange where 
they are traded. As can be seen, the different exchanges present a similar volatility and common 
trend. However, as the orange line in Graph 3 clearly indicates, this does not guarantee an overall 
stability, since the single exchange can experience shocks and seeing its value drop. This is what 
recently happened to Mr.Gox, who filed for bankruptcy in March 2014 and formally declared 
that some 800.000 Bitcoin had been stolen by its online wallets.  
 
 
Graph 3: price of Bitcoin in the main five exchanges (Coin stamp, Bitstamp, Bitfines, BTC-e and Mr.Gox). The 
orange line is Mr.Gox exchange, which recently stopped exchanging Bitcoins. Data are taken from Bitcoin charter 
and are updated at 13th of April 2014. 
 
What recently happened to Mr.Gox exchange, though not yet clear and still under study from 
worldwide financial analysts, shows one of the vulnerabilities of Bitcoin. Whether the coins had 
been actually stolen or the owner of the exchange platform committed fraud, several people lost 
huge amount of money within some days. The system is open source and this allowed competent 
users over past years to freely fix bugs and issues related to the protocol. However, the openness 
of the code allows also hijacking (Grinberg, 2011). 
Bitcoins yet offer several advantages. According to Velde (2013), Bitcoin protocol offers an 
elegant solution to the problem of creating digital currency without relying on a single authority. 
In fact, it solves simultaneously the regulation of the issue, it defeats counterfeiting and double 
spending and ensure that it can be conveyed safely. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 It has to be noted that the amount does not refer only to the online transaction, the one for which Bitcoin is a direct 
substitute.	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One other practical appeal is the ease with which coins can be both divided and recombined to 
create any denomination desired. This was the main weakness of the earlier e-cash system that 
had to use standardized amount in order to be un-linkable with the identity of the payer  (Barber 
et al., 2011).  
The category that could appreciate the most Bitcoin is that of merchants, for two reasons. First, 
the transaction fees are lower than the ones charged on them from credit card provider (Visa, 
MasterCard, PayPal) since there is no third party to be remunerated for the control. Second, since 
the transaction is non-reversible, the possibility for consumer of misusing charge-backs – costly 
for merchants – is removed. These two advantages could be partially transferred on to the 
customers (Reid, 2013). 
The relatively inelastic supply could theoretically offer a hedge against the loss in purchasing 
power by inflation, provided that the demand of Bitcoin does not decrease relative to the fixed 
supply. But this scenario presumes that people start using Bitcoin as the principal currency. Even 
if seems that Bitcoin picked up in last months, the patter it had during last year is due to 
speculation rather than to a swift in the preferred payment instrument, as shown by the incredible 
volatility (Velde, 2013).  
The capping of the supply in the long run, however, will induce in the system a deflationary 
bias. As the demand will eventually outstrip the supply, the price of Bitcoin will raise, inducing a 
decrease in the price of goods and therefore leading to deflation. This long-term pattern creates 
an incentive to hoard coins rather than spend them, since their value will ultimately increase 
(Grinberg, 2011).  
Recently, the major central banks of the developed world have expressed some concerns 
regarding this new digital currency. The principal one is related to the possibility offered to the 
black economy to recycle money without being caught. The other concern that central banks 
could have is related to the influence that Bitcoin might have in their conduct of the respective 
monetary policies. Notwithstanding the substantial increase in the price in last six months, it can 
be argued that Bitcoin will not affect the overall money supply (Velde, 2013). What Bitcoin can 
potentially influence is the velocity of circulation of money, even if the effect will probably be 
not strong enough to influence the demand by banks for liquid dollar-denominated reserves, 
which ultimately allow the FED to conduct monetary policy and decide interest rates. In 
conclusion, it seems difficult that Bitcoin will be able to undermine the network externalities of 
the dollar or of other major fiat currencies (Elwell et al., 2013).  
Although some of the enthusiasm for Bitcoin is driven by a distrust of state-issued currency, it 
is hard to imagine a world where the main currency is based on an extremely complex code 
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understood by only a few and controlled by even fewer, without any kind of accountability. A 
fiduciary currency like Bitcoin is useful only insofar as others accept it broadly. As a matter of 
theory, this broad acceptance need not rely on the state. However, it does not seem probable to 
see a development of Bitcoin without a deep State involvement. And since no government so far 
has expressed appreciation for the digital currency, Bitcoin will not replace the current 
currencies for a while. Should Bitcoin become widely accepted, it is unlikely that it will remain 
free of government intervention, if only because the governance of the Bitcoin code and network 
is opaque and vulnerable. Bitcoin is free from state power, but is also outside its protection.  
 
3.5.2	  Would	  Law	  have	  approved	  Bitcoin?	  	  
 This is a strange question. However, given Law’s anachronism in the conception of the forms 
that the instruments used as money should have, we decided to conduct the exercise of assessing 
Bitcoin from the point of view of the Scottish author. At least for once, his theoretical 
contribution can be appraised and used to understand an economic situation, in our case the 
validity of the attempt to provide the current payment system with an innovative instrument to 
conduct transactions. 
The Bitcoin experiment presents some common elements with Law’s creation of paper 
currency of three centuries ago. First of all, it represents an attempt to reshape and revolutionize 
the status quo. As paper money unlinked to any valuable commodity was a drastic change in the 
monetary system of the beginning of 18th century, a synthetic currency virtually coined that 
exploit cryptography and the computational power of thousands of computers is not a trivial 
concept today. This characteristic of being out of the ordinary required both instruments to gain 
the trust of the public before serving properly as money. However, in both situation there have 
been some individuals not interested in the intrinsic qualities as money and therefore in the 
success of the system, but only in speculation motives. This induced the market to use the 
instruments not for the purpose they were created but just to exploit market fluctuations, leading 
to what can be defined in both cases as a bubble. 
Before presenting an assessment of Bitcoin from the point of view of Law’s theory, it is 
necessary to point out the differences in the economic situation between the two historical 
periods. Of course, the degree of complexity and sophistication in monetary instruments and the 
level of economic understanding are completely different now with respect to Law’s time. 
Trying to put this aside, what matters the most here is the difference in the money supply. If in 
France of beginning 18th century quantity of money was low and inelastic because of the scarcity 
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of specie, nowadays the monetary policy of the central bank guarantees a certain growth of 
money such that inflation is low and controlled. Bitcoin is more directed to solving the issues in 
the process of payment rather that in reshaping the monetary policy. However, the way in which 
it is envisioned would have effects even on the monetary policy if it became the main currency 
within the economy, so we need to consider both aspects. 
In order to assess Bitcoin from Law’s point of view, we need to analyses the qualities of money 
he described in the Essay, restated during his political life. Bitcoin possesses the qualities of 
homogeneity and divisibility: as we have shown in the above paragraph, the single Bitcoin can 
be divided until the eight decimal place and all portions of coin would have the same value. This 
is a positive aspect that allows conducting every type of transaction. The transferability is 
probably the most significant quality of the digital currency: transactions can be carried on fast 
and in a rather secure way, without any cost for the involvement of a third party. Bitcoin also 
possesses, theoretically, the durability quality: being a string of zeros and ones, every Bitcoin is 
associated to a specific owner - or wallet - and it does not loose value because of an 
impoverishment in the object, as could have happened to gold and silver coins. However, Bitcoin 
so far seems potentially non-durable from a security point of view: as the recent happenings with 
Mr. Gox show, the digital currency is still not immune to these cybernetic attacks. If is true that 
this should not happen according to the original conceptualization of the instrument, Bitcoin 
bases its main strengths on the power of cryptography and on the gains in efficiency possible to 
the absence of a central authority and the facts that telematics thefts are sill possible mines the 
validity of the instrument. 
The final quality that money should possess is the stability of value. Here arises the main 
critique that Law would have posed to Bitcoin. In fact, as can be seen from the graph 3 above, 
the value of Bitcoin has been extremely volatile since its inception and this characteristic does 
not allow the instrument to properly fulfil the unit of account function. As Law would have 
explained, the continuous variations between demand and supply cause the instability of value, 
exactly as was the case for silver and gold. Even if we assume that Bitcoin could become the 
main instrument to serve as money and we exclude all the speculation motives behind the 
fluctuations of its price, the stability of value would not be respected. In fact, given the capped 
supply there will be the tendency of a rise in value of the single Bitcoin - what a contemporary 
economist would call deflationary bias. 
As explained above, if it is true that Bitcoin has been proposed to offer a new and more 
efficient instrument to conduct transaction, the way this virtual money is generated has 
repercussion also on the overall monetary system. In this regard, Law would not agree with the 
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attempt to unlink monetary matters from a central authority. For the Scottish author, and 
probably even for the present common wisdom, monetary policy is a crucial aspect to the healthy 
functioning of the economic system and had to be controlled by a central, public authority. 
Finally, from a general point of view the Scottish author would have welcomed two features 
that Bitcoin induce in the payment system: liquidity and anonymity. However, these two aspects 
would not have been sufficient to approve Bitcoin as a proper instrument to serve as money. 
In conclusion, Law would have included Bitcoin in his broader definition of money, within the 
second category, acknowledging its advantages in carrying on transactions, but would have 
consider it a inferior type of money, given its similarities with the flaws possessed by specie.   
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Conclusion 	  
John Law de Lauriston has been a quite singular character. He managed to recover from 
bankruptcy in the early stage of his life, to be one of the richer man in Europe thanks to his 
gambling and financial abilities; he went from the sentence to death, to be the first ministry of 
France; from been considered a saviour by French people, to be the most hated and threatened 
person in the continent. Murderer and gambler are rare traits for an economist. 
However, despite the undeserved exclusion from the list of theorists that made a serious 
contribution to the development of economic theory by the literature, John Law has been without 
any doubts an economist. It is true that not so many economists have had, over the course of 
history, the chance to put in practice their ideas with the same power and freedom of action that 
connoted Law’s experiment. An economic theory never had such good way to be tested in a real 
economy. As many economists would say, and have actually said, notwithstanding this 
incredible opportunity, the system failed: probably, the economic theories at the bottom of the 
System were not sound and the economic policies sprang from them were dangerous and flawed. 
Would a contemporary have been able to predict the vitality and the prosperity France showed 
under Law’s management between 1716 and 1720? In less than four years the Scottish 
economist and policymaker created a System found on modern economic principles, based on 
paper money, credit and a central bank. In his System, paper notes would be initially supported 
by the bank's assets of gold and silver and would circulate as a medium of exchange. In the 
second part of the System, banknotes were just supported by the French economic activity in a 
regime of fiat money. The latter was completely under the control of the Company of the Indies, 
which controlled the tobacco monopoly, the overseas trade, the farming of all types of taxes and 
owned all the government debt. Law paid for these activities and privileges by issuing additional 
shares in the company. Shares were also issued to complete the biggest takeover a European 
economy ever experienced, where Law’s company made a gigantic swap between government 
debt and its own equity. These shares could be paid for with banknotes issued by his own bank 
or with government debt, and several, innovative devices were introduced to increase shares’ 
attractiveness. Law believed that paper notes would increase the money in circulation, which, in 
turn, would increase commerce. These conditions would help revitalize and rehabilitate the 
finances of the French government. Law’s policy to support shares’ price, along with the 
speculation that developed at Paris, inflate the value of the company creating what most of the 
commentators have defined a bubble. As soon as people started to monetize the share and the 
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biggest shareholder, the King, sold all his shares at a fixed value, the market price dropped, 
confidence in paper disappeared and the Mississippi System collapsed. 
We have demonstrated how Law as a theorist was definitely more advanced and sophisticated 
than as a policy maker. Today, with some more economic understanding than 3 hundreds years 
ago, and with the benefit of the doubt, it can be argued that the System could have worked had it 
been put in place as originally envisioned, provided the avoidance of some major flaws.  
Law, in fact, made four big mistakes. The first was to overestimate the Mississippi territories’ 
resources and the capacity of this colony to guarantee a sustained flow of revenues, the main 
fundamental of the Company’s shares. In fact, most of the people that went in Louisiana died, 
the mines of gold and precious metals were never found and the integration with local 
communities was never completely achieved; the expected returns from the colony, which were 
of course necessary for the sustainability of the System, failed to come and constrained him to 
look at other sources of revenue to support the banknotes. The second mistake, the bigger one 
from an economic point of view, is the miscalculation of the price at which shares would have 
been sustainable along with the will to sustain this price with direct injections of liquidity from 
the central bank. This, combined with his theory of money and the assumption of a rather elastic 
supply, led him to inundate the economy of paper over-monetizing the French financial system, 
on the strong belief that the economic expansion would have avoided inflation. The third mistake 
is related to the underestimation of the power of government under an absolute monarchy. If the 
same power had been of great help in the building of the System, it revealed insuperable as soon 
as some difficulties started emerging, obliging him to take actions he did not want to take. The 
last mistake he did was to misinterpret the actual obedience of French people in using banknotes 
as the main instrument of payment as confidence. 
If we examine carefully these mistakes, only the second denotes a flaw in his theory. The first 
is a miscalculation done in good faith, which is further aggravated by his will to take control of 
the overall French revenues, partly neglecting the trading dimension. The third and the fourth, 
instead, just confirm that the ideas proposed by the Scottish author, no matter how correct and 
modern, were too anachronistic for the time and were doomed to fail. We demonstrated how the 
System could have worked, but the assumptions we made do not seem realistic if contextualized 
in the France of 18th century. 
Despite several contemporary authors’ consideration of the System being all hot air that sooner 
or later would have blasted, Law showed that the economy could function without specie money, 
something never even thought before him. The paradox being that after showing how a paper 
based economy could work even in practice, the failure of his System further distanced the 
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grasping and the adoption of this crucial concept leading France to delay in the use of fiat 
currency with respect to other European countries. The collapse of the System, in fact, left a 
legacy of animosity towards financial innovations, which restored and reinforced the rule of the 
financier class and straitjacketed the French economy under its control until the Revolution. 
Law’s conceptualization of an economy without metal would revive three centuries later, when 
president Nixon in 1971 removed the final link with gold starting the regime of fiat money, 
which is the pillar of the present international monetary system. The principal lessons learnt form 
the analysis of Law’s theory and his System, namely that paper money necessitates a deep-rooted 
trust to work, that artificial price support lead to degenerations in the market, that speculation can 
cause damages far greater than the short term benefits and that in a regime of fiat currency the 
possibility to print money should not be overexploited, are impressively modern matters. 
Furthermore, his experiment to renew the instruments used as money can be used as a guideline 
to assess similar, much more recent, attempts. Law would in fact have relegated Bitcoin within 
his second category, appreciating some features of the new digital currency but supporting it 
only as mean to make payments, not as proper money.  
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